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ABSTRACT  
   
A growing body of literature has sought to explain the nature and effects of 
conflict-related sexualized violence. However, a critical problem that persists concerns 
why wartime rape varies both within and across conflicts. Political science literature 
mainly addresses these questions of variation in sexualized violence through group-level 
or structural explanations. Yet, clear patterns of combatant non-participation in conflict-
related sexualized violence is apparent, even in cases where sexual violence is severe and 
pervasive. What allows one combatant to refrain, while another combatant, even within 
the same combat unit, perpetrates sexualized violence? In this dissertation, I argue that 
critical differences concerning attitudes, beliefs, and motivations exist between individual 
combatants. In light of these differences, I reintroduce the individual combatant onto the 
theoretical map as a critical unit of analysis and I explore the implications of gender 
inequality as an important and relevant factor related to sexualized violence in political 
conflict. Drawing on findings from social psychology, political psychology, sociology, 
and political science, the theory developed argues that combatants differentially 
internalize important norms related to gender that become particularly activated based on 
primarily externalized contextual influences. To test the theory, I conduct a mixed-
method, sub-national comparative analysis of combatants and attitudes and beliefs 
associated with gender inequality during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). I rely on 
qualitative data generated from semi-structured, comprehensive interviews with 
psychologists, victim’s advocates, and legal experts managing sexual violence war crimes 
cases, and combat veterans directly associated with the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) to 
assess differences at the individual-level of analysis. To additionally determine the 
  ii 
broader effects of gender inequality, I employ an ordered probit regression analysis to 
ascertain the relationship between gender inequality related to institutional health and 
education factors and the severity of wartime rape. The combined results of these 
analyses demonstrate that individual differences between combatants better predicts the 
likelihood of a combatant to commit sexualized violence compared to structural or 
institutional accounts alone.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
“In the social jungle of human existence, there is no feeling of being alive without 
a sense of identity.” – Erik Erikson 
 
On an unusually sunny mid-June day in 2014, I occupy a table at an outdoor café 
facing Katedrala Srca Isusova, the Sacred Heart Cathedral, located just a short distance 
from the Eternal Flame memorial honoring the loss of life of both military personnel and 
civilians in the region of Bosnia Herzegovina1 during World War II. A short walk from 
the Eternal Flame on the highly trafficked Ferhadija pedestrian road brought me to this 
seat in the center of Sarajevo. Here, I transcribe notes and impressions from the latest 
interview I conducted with a civilian and medical professional. As I write about her 
recollections of the fall of Jajce2 to the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) in 1992, and 
her efforts to save lives in a makeshift hospital she labored in for 18 hours a day, along 
with her memories of her family’s harrowing journey to escape as war descended, the 
bright day darkens as the clouds roll in. And, in typical Sarajevan fashion, the weather 
radically shifts, and rain begins to lightly fall and shortly thereafter pours out in earnest.  
Passersbys raise their umbrellas and I crowd under an awning to wait out this 
latest round of afternoon storms. As I stand there, with the cathedral and the entrance to 
Galerija 11/07/953 within my sight, I notice the bullet holes on the outside of cathedral 
and pause. Like many conflict scholars, I am curious about the processes and motivations 
that can alter a seemingly peaceably coexisting multi-ethnic and religious society, like the 
                                                 
1 Heretofore Bosnia  
2 A city located in central Bosnia.  
3 Galerija 11/07/95 is a memorial gallery with a permanent exhibition of the events in Srebrenica, which 
were a motivating factor facilitating more substantive international intervention ultimately leading to 
conflict termination and the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA).  
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one in Bosnia, into a warzone where neighbors and friends transform into mortal 
enemies. Where bullet holes remain embedded in sacred religious sites even two decades 
later. Even more so, I am interested in better understanding what motivates, constrains, 
and manages individuals when political violence erupts.  
Just around the corner sits Markale open-air market, a site where two bombings 
directly targeting civilians occurred during the course of the Siege of Sarajevo. During 
the first Markale massacre, 66 civilians died in February of 1994 and an additional 43 
perished in a second attack in August of 1995, along with hundreds of injured (ICTY 
2014; Kifner 1994). Indeed, in this spot, and hundreds of others across the city, a 
‘Sarajevo Rose’ demarcates a moment of atrocity where mortar fell and civilians died. 
The scarred concrete, filled in with red resin, serves as a reminder to all who pass of a 
moment in time where civilians lost their lives during warfare (Korchnak 2014). .  
Undeniably, one of the more concerning consequences of modern warfare is that 
most casualties are civilians – primarily women and children – and in some cases are 
targeted for sexual violence by combatants. The sheer numbers of those affected is 
staggering. Importantly, the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), the central case examined in 
this dissertation, is a conflict in which the severity of sexualized was considerably severe. 
In the UN’s estimates of high severity cases of sexualized violence, the former 
Yugoslavia is recognized as such in the following:  
“In Rwanda, between 100,000 and 250,000 women were raped during the three 
months of genocide in 1994. UN agencies estimate that more than 60,000 women were 
raped during the civil war in Sierra Leone (1991-2002), more than 40,000 in Liberia 
(1989-2003), up to 60,000 in the former Yugoslavia (1992-1995), and at least 200,000 in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1998 (2014)4.” 
                                                 
4 The estimates for the DRC may be slightly different for two main reasons – 1) time since this report and 
2) incentive structures in the DRC for reporting sexualized violence (Crawford, Hoover Green, and 
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In many ways, modern warfare situates women as the leading victims of sexual 
violence in war5. Women disproportionately carry the costs of political conflict in ways 
that are frequently unobservable. Without a doubt, the price of wartime rape is high and 
the harm is not limited to the individual. It tears at the social fabric of communities, 
traumatizes the victim, breaks up families, and leads to significant health related issues 
(i.e. HIV, unwanted pregnancy, and STI’s) (United Nations 2013). Furthermore, the 
legacy of psychological effects and potential legal costs if redress is sought, lead to heavy 
burdens in post-conflict environments that these communities can little afford to manage 
in the fragile aftermath of war (United Nations 2013).  
The scale of those affected and the weight of the costs of conflict-related sexual 
violence has led to a body of literature devoted to increasing our understanding of this 
type of political violence. However, the presence of sexualized violence in warfare is by 
no means a new phenomenon. What has shifted is the burgeoning interest in these 
occurrences over the past few decades, which has not only transformed the ways in which 
we view political violence and conflict processes, but also the methods we engage to 
study these processes and their effects. This dissertation represents an effort to examine 
important patterns in sexualized violence in conflict from a distinct and relatively 
underexplored perspective – individual combatants’ motivations.  
While conducting field research during the summer of 2018 in Bosnia, I made a 
similar inquiry of each person I interviewed regarding acts of sexualized violence during 
                                                                                                                                                 
Parkinson 2014). Regardless, the scale of this type of violence in these cases and amongst several others 
remains significant.  
5 Men are also frequently victims of sexual violence in warfare. However, in spite of the likelihood of a 
greater degree of underreporting by men vis a vis women victims, women are still excessively affected in 
this way in comparison to their male counterparts.  
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the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). I was intrigued by the questions related to variation in 
sexualized violence raised in the political violence literature, which was the primary 
impetus behind my inquiry. The question I raised challenges readers (and this researcher) 
to shift perspective regarding acts of sexualized violence in conflict settings.  
Importantly, all respondents unequivocally and unreservedly responded, “yes” to 
my question. My query may surprise readers given the affirmative responses participants 
provided and the ways in which we currently frame questions related to sexualized 
violence in the academic literature. I asked, “Were you aware of combatants who did not 
commit sexualized violence during the conflict?” Not only did participants readily 
confirm that they were aware of such individuals, they were also able to quickly provide 
anecdotes of enemy combatants sometimes intervening on behalf of civilians and 
potential victims, along with accounts of non-interventionists who made efforts to avoid 
committing acts of violence. Some participants further offered observations about the 
passive, non-interventionist who did not commit violence, but who also did nothing to 
intervene. The stories were many.  
    However, if one were to rely on media and academic accounts about sexualized 
violence alone, the non-offending combatant is mostly absent from this narrative. In 
conflicts that have been characterized by a high degree of sexual violence – the former 
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) - to name a few, it is rare, if 
at all, to hear stories of the combatant who refrained. Yet, the combatant who resists 
committing sexualized violence exists and, I contend, likely has important insights to 
offer about what allows them to withstand committing violence in spite of the 
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opportunity structure to do so. Indeed, the difference that exists between the passive 
resistor and the perpetrator is a theme that underpins this research.  
Yet, while it was a desired aim at the outset of this research to empirically 
evaluate the resistor and other categories of combatants who did not commit sexualized 
violence in conflict, that endeavor turned out to be much more challenging than it 
initially seemed. Undoubtedly, the fact that the passive resistor exists and represents a 
significantly large cohort (as will be demonstrated further along in this dissertation) is an 
important descriptive observation in and of itself, especially since this category of actor is 
mostly absent from the current literature. More importantly still, in spite of significant 
efforts on my part to gather interview data from respondents on the non-perpetrator, in 
this case my efforts were in vain. This seems interesting and important to consider.  
There are a host of likely suspects for this outcome, which I enumerate here as a 
means of anchoring and guiding the reader for the analysis in the pages ahead. First, as 
has been argued by scholars of sexual violence, the portrayal of wartime sexual violence 
often focuses on the most sensational narratives in a well-meaning effort to mobilize 
support that often leads to a host of unintended and detrimental consequences (Crawford, 
Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). This focus on the sensational not only leads to 
unhelpful outcomes for victims, but it also generates inaccurate representations of sexual 
violence data and patterns, which informs policy and research agendas (Crawford, 
Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). In the case of this dissertation, I argue that one of 
the negative externalities of the selective focus on the perpetration of sexualized violence 
is the challenge this presents in illuminating the categorical other who does not commit 
sexualized violence.  
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 By way of example, while respondents I interviewed were able to reflexively and 
openly identify single shot stories of restraint, when I probed further about the potential 
motivating factors for this restraint, they remained relatively silent. This may be a 
reflection of the expertise the respondents I interviewed have in terms of their knowledge 
related to the perpetration of sexual violence in conflict. They are well acquainted with 
perpetrators because their roles require laser-focus on the perpetrator. And yet, as a result, 
the unobserved but substantive category of non-perpetrator remains inscrutable and little 
understood. While this dissertation does not engage this unobserved category causally or 
empirically, I invite the reader to keep the potential motivations of the non-perpetrator in 
mind as a subtext of this analysis juxtaposed against the individual motivations of the 
perpetrator that are empirically explored in this dissertation.   
 Critically, this dissertation engages in two orders of analysis and inquiry. First and 
implicitly, I consider the origin and emergence of gender-biased attitudes and beliefs and 
how they pertain to conflict-related sexual violence. Secondly and directly, I explore 
individual differences between combatants broadly as a factor motivating sexual violence 
in conflict. It is the synthesis of these two processes by which a theoretical account of 
gender-bias is both developed and tested in this dissertation. While I empirically focus on 
the individual differences associated with the perpetration of sexualized violence in 
conflict, the individual difference theoretical framework I develop may have applicability 
to other individual drives and motivations associated with restraint for future research. 
However, in the case of this research, I focus on a singular application of the theoretical 
framework.  
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In this way, this project explores the politics and psychology of identity as part of 
the answer to the two orders of questions raised above. By drawing on several literatures 
– social psychology, developmental psychology, sociology, and political science – I 
examine the notion of identity in relationship with contextual influences. I consider how 
combatants’ self-construal operates within the broader context of political conflict. I 
further assess whether and in what ways certain social identities manifest into the 
formation of distinctive attitudes, beliefs, and preferences amongst combatants, which are 
then observable in behavioral outcomes within the politically conflicted context.  
Critically, this dissertation argues that aggregate explanations of violence leaves 
out important individual distinctions occurring both within and across conflicts. 
Structural and even institutional explanations cannot, in isolation, effectively account for 
the large number of combatants who refrain from violence even in cases experiencing 
highly severe rates of sexualized violence.   
Thus, I outline a theoretical explanation addressing the process by which 
individual differences make sexualized violence more likely to occur. In this theory - 
which I have labeled the individual difference theory of gender bias – I suggest that 
certain social identity labels that are more deeply embedded for the individual combatant 
results in the formation of biased attitudes, beliefs and preferences. These biased attitudes 
and beliefs then translate into different behavioral outcomes than what may be typically 
observed during peacetime due to the unique constraints placed on an individual’s 
judgments and motivations within the context of political conflict. 
Moreover, this interactive process between social identity, attitudes and beliefs, 
and judgment and motivations operates within a milieu of exogenous contextual factors 
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related to warfare that the individual combatant navigates. These extrinsic factors – 
military organizational factors, group cohesiveness factors, and  various types/qualities of 
violence6 - all shape the ecology of the environment in which the individual soldier 
operates. These conditions can either serve to amplify or diminish the likelihood for 
soldiers’ biased beliefs to be enacted.  
As an initial effort in evaluating a potential array of individual differences 
between combatants that make sexual violence more likely, I hone in on a limited set of 
social identity labels and ensuing attitudes and beliefs that are theoretically more salient 
to enacting sexual violence in conflict. Respectively, I argue that certain social identity 
labels over others act as orienting principles in navigating the social world - in this case – 
political conflict. Further, the resulting biased attitudes and beliefs linked to a sense of 
self-construal generated from these more fixed labels are also more entrenched and thus 
more readily utilized as reference points for decision-making under conditions of 
uncertainty.  
Given this, a central precept of this dissertation is that gender analysis is critical – 
and a source of differentiation in combatants’ attitudes and beliefs. Undoubtedly, a 
primary and deeply embedded social identity category is gender. Notions of gender – and 
masculinity and femininity – are essential reference points that individuals rely on in 
daily living in order to make sense of the social world.  To leave gender out of the 
equation of conflict-related sexual violence analyses is to perhaps miss a vital component 
that potentially shapes combatant behavior in conjunction with other important contextual 
influences. However, the ways in which we conceptualize and include gender into our 
                                                 
6 Not an exhaustive list.  
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examinations has critical implications for the research we engage and the outcomes we 
observe. This dissertation thusly is cognizant of how, when, and it ways the notion of 
gender is considered.  
In what follows, I conduct a case study of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) as a 
means of empirically testing the individual difference theory of gender bias. I select a 
sub-national case study as the primary method of analysis in order to capture and closely 
evaluate within conflict differences that are central to the two orders of inquiry raised in 
this dissertation. However, in keeping with a dual theme in terms of questions explored, I 
also employ two distinct methods of analysis by evaluating the sources of differences 
through a cross-conflict, ordered probit regression analysis. In such a way, a multi-
method approach allows for a comprehensive investigation of the two orders of questions 
raised  - a) the sources of individual differences and b) the effects these individual 
differences have in motivating sexualized violence within conflict.    
As I apply two different analytical approaches, I similarly assume two different 
tones throughout this dissertation. Initially, I take up a more traditionally positivist tone 
reflective of the theory development and broader cross-conflict analysis explored in these 
sections. As I engage in the qualitatively driven analysis, I invoke a more ethnographic 
voice, similar to the tenor that began this chapter. I do so with purpose to signal the 
distinctions in these approaches. And, much like the method of this chapter, I strive to 
find a synthesis and balance between the two.   
Accordingly, in Chapter 2 I outline the main research question driving this 
project, namely why some combatants commit sexualized violence in conflict when 
others clearly refrain. By way of response, I outline the main tenets and component parts 
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of the individual difference theory of gender bias, which suggests that combatants 
differentially internalize a set of attitudes, beliefs and preferences – particularly as it 
pertains to gender. Essentially, I argue that combatants who have certain gender biased 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences are more likely to engage in sexualized violence in 
combat. I additionally explore contextual influences that interact with the aforementioned 
individual factors including conditions of uncertainty and social norm constructions that 
surround the individual. From there, I generate deductively developed hypotheses 
outlining the ways that individual differences predict the likelihood that a combatant will 
commit sexualized violence.  
In order to effectively evaluate the individual difference theory of gender bias 
regarding combatant behavior in conflict, in Chapter 3, I provide an overview of 
Bosnian history with attention given to the development of the multi-ethnic society 
leading up to the conflict (1992 – 1995). In this historical overview, I describe several of 
the contextual influences outlined in the theory chapter that helps to shape identity 
formation and future combatants’ beliefs and attitudes in the buildup to Bosnian War 
(1992 – 1995). In this way, Chapter 3, in part, addresses the first order of questions 
regarding institutional and societal sources of identity formation in the former 
Yugoslavia. The shaping of ethnic, religious, and gender identity is traced in this chapter 
as a means of portraying the environmental factors under which combatants’ form 
identities.  
Following this, I provide an analysis of the nature of the sexualized violence 
committed during the course of the conflict in Bosnia (1992 – 1995). In Chapter 4, I pay 
close attention to the form, purpose, timing, and targeting elements of the sexual violence 
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engaged in the Bosnian case. In a similar vein as Chapter 3, I focus on important 
contextual influences – including the type of sexualized violence – targeted and 
opportunistic, amongst several other patterns illuminated in this analysis. Additionally in 
this chapter, I evaluate human rights reports and the Annex IX Rape and Sexual Assault 
Report commissioned by the UN Security Council through Resolution 780 (1992) to 
begin to demonstrate a pattern of individual differences within a conflict characterized by 
highly severe sexual violence. In this way, Chapter 4 begins to descriptively illuminate a 
pattern associated with the second order of analysis in this dissertation – that individual 
differences do motivate sexual violence in conflict.  
Returning to the first order of inquiry in this dissertation, in Chapter 5, I directly 
consider sources of individual differences and evaluate the effects of societal level gender 
inequalities and their relationship with the severity of wartime rape. A key element in the 
individual difference theory of gender bias is that combatants vary in terms of their 
beliefs and attitudes about gender. In this chapter, I explore whether or not the effects of 
gender inequality are observable in the aggregate or if the individuating process of 
combatant internalization is where the effects might be more readily observed. To 
analyze this, I provide a sub-theoretical account – the gender role socialization theory – 
describing a societal level source of gender bias in combatants. In this chapter, I evaluate 
whether or not societal gender inequalities are an observable source for the differences in 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences about gender formed by combatants during childhood. 
In order to empirically evaluate this proposition and the sources of individual differences, 
in this chapter, I conduct a cross-conflict, ordered probit regression analysis testing the 
relationship between gender inequalities in the aggregate and severity of conflict-level 
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wartime rape. The result leads back to the individual as the integral unit of analysis. 
While the sources of gender inequality are many, what remains pivotal and relevant is the 
ways in which the individual combatant internalizes, interprets, and then enacts them.  
Finally, in Chapter 6 I directly evaluate the individual difference theory of 
gender bias through qualitative discourse/content analysis of semi-structured interviews 
conducted over the course of two field research trips to Bosnia in 2014 and 2018 
respectively. In this analysis, I explore both orders of questions driving this dissertation 
and I evaluate the individuating processes outlined in the individual difference theory of 
gender bias. In this investigation, I find evidence supporting the relationship between 
combatants’ attitudes and beliefs associated with gender inequality and the likelihood to 
commit sexualized violence in the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995). In addition, I also find 
that two important judgment constraining and motivating factors were also present as 
posited by the individual difference theory of gender bias – conditions of uncertainty and 
alcohol use. Moreover, as is often the case with inductively driven research, important 
variables were revealed that offer critical insight for future research regarding the 
principal individual differences between combatants, which I also reveal as part of the 
interview content analysis conducted in this chapter.  
In Chapter 7, I offer a summary of the results of this research and make 
suggestions for an ongoing research agenda. I highlight the importance of continuing to 
explore ways to evaluate and better understand the non-perpetrator and suggest ways to 
move this complex research agenda forward to help prevent and mediate the detrimental 
effects of conflict-related sexualized violence in the future. Notably, because this is a 
relatively novel question and approach to studying sexualized violence in conflict, there 
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are several limitations associated with this research, which I describe in the concluding 
chapter and also highlight here. First because this is a case study of the Bosnian War 
(1992 – 1995), which occurred over twenty years ago, there are constraints associated 
with the time that has elapsed since the war, which undoubtedly has an effect in terms of 
respondent recollection and perception. However, the Bosnian case is unique in that it is 
well documented, so I triangulate evidence with reports made at the time or close to the 
conflict to try to manage this limitation to some degree. In addition, evaluating an 
individual-level process associated with political conflict is a complex and ambitious 
endeavor. Methodologically, the most ideal approach is to collect data that directly 
captures individual distinctions. While more direct methods would have been preferred, 
constraints in terms of capacity and ethics prevented these methodological approaches. 
As such, field research and interviews extrapolating the impressions of experts and those 
with direct experience with perpetrators who committed conflict-related sexual violence 
was the approach deployed. This provided significant within case data, but it is limited to 
the Bosnian case only.  
Accordingly, while the findings of this research are limited, it does show promise 
as a burgeoning research agenda. Consequently, this dissertation generates prevalent 
questions to consider as part of ongoing research and supplies answers for only one 
dimension of the puzzle due to the complexity of this phenomenon. By discovering more 
about the potential causes associated with individual combatant differences in behavior, 
and most importantly, more about the non-perpetrator, we can undoubtedly better enrich 
existing and future research agendas and ultimately better inform future policy 
prescriptions that research generates.  
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CHAPTER 2 
UNDERSTANDING AGENCY: THEORIZING INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 
 
Introduction  
 
Questions persist concerning why civilians are seemingly targeted in some conflicts 
and yet enjoy relative immunity from violence in others. Given the puzzling variations 
observed in these patterns of violence, attempts have been made in order to better 
understand the mechanisms that lead to or constrain political violence in conflict settings 
by academics and policy practitioners alike.  Adding to this, in conflicts where civilians 
are targeted, additional questions surface related to the types and variation of the violence 
engaged over the course of conflicts both on and off the formal battlefield. One notable 
form of political violence that is characterized by these noticeable variations is conflict-
related sexual violence.  
A burgeoning body of literature specifically addresses some of the more puzzling 
variations observed in sexualized violence both within and across conflicts. These 
valuable contributions offer excellent analyses that outline distinct causal mechanisms 
presumably at work within conflict settings. However, in most cases, these explanations 
have examined the phenomena mainly from meso and macro level perches with a 
noticeable dearth in the examination of the micro-level processes that undoubtedly 
impacts how, why, and when combatants engage in sexualized violence. For example, 
recent scholarship has identified clear cross-conflict variation in the perpetration of 
conflict-related sexual violence. These broad, macro-level studies have successfully 
identified a general pattern of variation that undoubtedly calls for deeper examination.  
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Yet, when we sharpen the conceptual lens, we know that within these broader 
contexts, soldiers commit different forms of sexualized violence. For example, some 
conflicts are characterized by more frequent gang rapes and others appear to engage more 
opportunistic forms of sexualized violence that do not involve the performative elements 
of gang / group violence (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Indeed, there are even greater 
variations in these patterns when factors such as timing and location are considered 
(Cohen and Nordås 2014).  
To date, scholars have looked to structural accounts, like systemic gender inequality 
(Enloe 2004), and organizational and group socialization reasoning for explanatory 
power (D. K. Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; E. J. Wood 2009b). These 
arguments provide important insight about the broader context in which combatants are 
situated, but they tell us little about the ways in which combatants internalize the 
structural and group influences that surround them. In short, these studies attribute 
differences in combatants’ behavior mainly to organizational and/or structural factors 
leaving the individual attributes of these combatants underexplored.  
I contend that while group cohesion and organizational variables matter as it 
pertains to the context in which combatants engage in conflict, there remains an element 
missing from our current conceptual map. Micro-level factors, such as combatant 
personal characteristics and beliefs, map onto these broader processes and indelibly 
shapes the resulting patterns of conflict-based sexual violence. Accordingly, the analysis 
of variation at the individual combatant level allows for a more nuanced exploration of 
the linkages between 1) identity, 2) motivations, and 3) actions (Kalyvas 2003). 
Arguably, the individual combatant remains an important unit of analysis since political 
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violence is an interactive and process-oriented phenomenon that spans different levels of 
analysis (Tarrow 2007). As such, this research maintains that understanding micro-level 
processes serves to add to the explanatory power of existing structural and organizational 
accounts.  
Investigating Variation in Conflict-Related Sexual Violence 
Presently, several leading explanations for variations in conflict-related sexual 
violence are explored in the existing literature. In terms of mapping the phenomenon, 
scholars effectively demonstrate that sexual violence is more prevalent in some conflicts 
and less so in others (Cohen 2013; Wood 2009b). In conflicts where evidence of sexual 
violence is apparent, there is also additional variance in terms of the timing, location, and 
quality of the sexualized violence deployed (Cohen and Nordås 2014). Additionally, 
conflicting accounts argue whether or not extreme war rape and/or rape as a weapon of 
war is ubiquitous or rare (Meger 2016, Crawford 2013; Farr 2009; Leiby 2009). These 
studies examine the prevalence and severity of particular forms of sexualized violence 
and debate what qualifies as sexualized violence in conflict. Additionally, agreement 
about the conceptualization and operationalization of this form of political violence 
continues to receive attention. In spite of ongoing debates concerning the degree and 
quality of variation in sexualized violence in conflict, scholars agree that variation does 
indeed exist, and they also agree that these patterns merit deeper exploration.       
Existing analyses of the observed variations have led to important arguments that 
explain some of the aforementioned patterns. A significant contribution argues that, 
"armed group leadership, the norms of combatants, dynamics within small units, and the 
effectiveness of military discipline (Wood 2006 p. 308),” all contribute to the differing 
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levels of sexualized violence in a given conflict context. This line of reasoning maintains 
that fluctuations in wartime rape also depend on critical organizational factors (Wood 
2009). Primarily the argument explores in what ways military group leadership and 
hierarchies have established norms concerning sexualized violence and can effectively 
enforce these norms through information flows and chains of command7.  
 Building on the organizational effectiveness explanation, Hoover Green (2011, 
2018) notes that the quality of the institutions and ideologies of armed groups are directly 
related to the capacity of the militarized organizations to establish and maintain control 
over violence. Hoover Green (2011, 2018) explains that commanders face a dilemma - 
they must simultaneously valorize violence to encourage combatants to utilize it when 
required and limit it when not needed. In order to control violence, militarized bodies 
must - 1) demonstrate military organizational effectiveness in terms of discipline and 
sanction power, and 2) develop effective institutions to control combatant preferences for 
violence. In order for commanders to effectively control combatant preferences, 
combatants are socialized into the military culture through institutional arrangements that 
seek to alter combatant preferences for violence.  
Notably, Hoover Green (2011) defines combatants’ preferences and 
predispositions as “beliefs, instincts, and attitudes regarding violence (p.22)," that are 
                                                 
7 Wood (2009a) advances a two-pronged explanation for the absence of conflict-related sexual violence 
across conflicts. There are several mechanisms described under these two overarching factors, which are 
the basis upon which much of the literature on variation in this area has been built. The first point suggests 
that military leaders may decide sexual violence is counterproductive or normatively abhorrent and are 
charged with the task of enforcing this position.  The second logic argues that observed patterns of violence 
may diverge from the command structure norms because of the norms held by combatants concerning 
violence against civilians. For more on the additional mechanisms under these categories, see (Hoover 
Green 2012).    
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observable in different “layers.”8 The ‘layer’ Hoover Green (2011) primarily focuses on 
pertains to the pro-violence preference changes combatants experience under the 
influence of the military socialization processes of indoctrination and discipline (p. 22). 
Markedly, both Wood (2006; 2009a) and Hoover Green (2012, 2018) concede that 
combatants undoubtedly enter the militarized environment with heterogeneous 
norms concerning violence9. Although Wood (2009a) indicates that it is possible that the 
recruitment strategy of armed groups may lead to combatants joining armed groups with 
homogenized norms concerning violence, this notion of entering with a uniform set of 
norms is only believed to be operative in a minority of cases10. Regardless of this starting 
point, Wood (2009a) is consistent with Hoover Green (2011, 2018) when she states that 
combatants, “norms and beliefs may be profoundly altered as recruits are inducted into 
the group through formal and informal practices...(p. 138, emphasis mine)11."  
Similar to the position of Wood (2006, 2009a) and Hoover Green (2011), Cohen 
                                                 
8 In my review of this literature, only Wood (2006; 2009) and Hoover Green (2012) (political science), and 
Henry, et al (2004) (criminology) address heterogeneous preferences of individual combatants in this 
context. Additionally, it should be noted that these scholars utilize a variety of terms for combatants’ 
beliefs, attitudes, preferences, and motivations. Wood (2006; 2009) uses combatant norms and internalized 
norms interchangeably. Henry, et al (2004) use terms such as distal, individual traits, and personality 
dispositions.  
9 Wood (2006, 2009a) and Hoover Green’s (2012) concession concerning the heterogeneous norms of 
combatants is limited to violence in particular. The individual difference theory advanced in this research 
suggests that the consideration of combatant preferences ought not be limited to violence alone as 
alternative preferences beyond norms concerning violence serves to shape the propensity for violent 
behavior in conflict. This research posits that attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of combatants associated 
with notions of masculinity and femininity are key in this analysis.  
10 For example, a fighting group that has the resource capacity for remuneration may lead to the 
recruitment of criminals or mercenaries who share a similar perspective about the use of violence. 
Conversely, a fighting group that lacks material resources must recruit based on ideological imperatives, 
which could result in a strongly shared vision concerning violence by recruits and combatants alike. For 
more on the resource hypothesis, see Weinstein (2007) and Wood (2009a). Also, Hoover Green (2012) 
engages this hypothesis in her research. Ultimately, while cases where shared beliefs may exist, it is more 
likely that individuals differ in beliefs and preferences.  
11 I place emphasis on the language of ‘profoundly altered’ as this research explores this particular 
theoretical assumption in Wood (2009a) and Hoover Green’s (2012, 2018) arguments. Which norms, 
beliefs, and attitudes held by combatants and have salience in conflict-settings and whether or not they can 
be ‘profoundly altered’ are central concerns addressed in this research.  
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(2013) explains variation in wartime rape as a function of forced recruitment and unit 
cohesion. Cohen's (2013) theory argues that forced recruitment leads to battle units with 
low group solidarity and social cohesion. Drawing on Humphreys and Weinstein (2006), 
Cohen (2013) makes the case that these low solidarity groups commit gang rapes as a 
form of "performative violence," in order to build group solidarity. In this way, Cohen 
(2013) addresses and adds to both prongs of Wood's (2009a) two-part theory, which 
pertains to combatant norms on violence and the efforts at small-group organizational 
cohesion. For Cohen (2013), group socialization processes associated with forced 
recruitment and the building of group solidarity can help explain cross-conflict variation 
in wartime rape. Yet, this account does not fully capture significant within conflict 
variations in wartime rape, nor does it readily apply to the broader category of sexualized 
violence12. 
As such, even within units exhibiting the characteristics existing analyses have 
identified, considerable variation in the perpetration of sexual violence persists and 
remains unaccounted for within the parameters of these existing explanations. It is not the 
case that every soldier in every unit with weak command and/or organizational control 
and low group solidarity engages in sexual assault. Indeed, many refrain from enacting 
this form of political violence. Indeed, these conditions create a permissive environment 
that makes sexual vioelnce likely, but this does not explain individual differences in 
behavior when exposed to similar conditions. These individual differences is at the heart 
of the puzzle this dissertation engages.   
                                                 
12 The phenomenon of conflict-related sexual violence is more extensive than the specific category of 
wartime rape. The performative nature of this violence as a group solidarity function does not readily fit 
with opportunistic patterns of sexualized violence that appear to be the more common form of sexual 
violence in conflict settings (Cohen and Nordås 2014; Crawford, Green, and Parkinson 2014).  
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Moreover, these divergences do not necessarily arise from lack of opportunity to 
commit violence and cannot be explained away as simply being in the right place at the 
right time. By way of example, the UNJHRO (2013) reported extensive human rights 
violations committed by the Congolese armed group, the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) 
and the Congolese national army (the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du 
Congo (FARDC), between November 15 and December 2, 2012, when soldiers from the 
FARDC were forced to retreat from their front line positions in the city of Goma to the 
towns of Sake and Minova. During this time, roughly 2,000 FARDC soldiers from 
various regiments were present in Minova13. UNJHRO reported 135 incidents of 
sexualized violence committed by FARDC forces during the course of the fighting. 
While the number is grave indeed, it is evident that many of the soldiers refrained from 
committing sexualized violence in spite of belonging to the same fighting units with 
exposure to the same organizational and socialization factors thought to explain variation 
in conflict-related sexual violence14. Thus, even when accounting for the organizational 
and structural factors utilized to explain variation, it is clear that there are some soldiers 
who do engage in sexual violence and some who refrain.  
                                                 
13 This number is an estimate from documentary sources. Accurate counts of soldiers in the Congolese 
national army are not presently available, especially given the regular fluctuation in the military census. 
This fluctuation is in part due to the integration of groups in and out of the national army at various stages 
during the conflict. Human Rights Watch (2015) reported that, “(d)ifferent army battalions and thousands 
of soldiers were in Minova at the time of the crimes, making it difficult to identify individual perpetrators 
(p. 3).” This highlights the challenges associated with accessing accurate census data on the fighting forces 
in the Congolese conflict.  It should also be noted that 2,000 soldiers is a conservative estimate. UNJHRO 
(2013) reports that following the fall of Sake to M23 on November 22, 2012, that somewhere between 
6,000 and 8,000 FARDC soldiers, along with their dependents, retreated towards Minova and the 
surrounding areas. While not all of the retreating soldiers installed in Minova, there were a number of 
FARDC soldiers in and around Minova, quite possibly more than the conservative estimate outlined in this 
example.  
14 Underreporting related to sexualized violence and wartime rape is common. While it may be argued that 
not all cases of rape during the episodes of violence in Minova were reported, even allowing for inflation, 
there is clear anecdotal evidence that many soldiers refrained from committing acts of sexualized violence.  
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The Value of Micro-Level Analysis  
Viewing these differences in combatant behavior from a micro-level perch opens 
inquiries as to what incentivizes a combatant to engage in sexualized violence and 
conversely what allows them to refrain.  From this analytical position, we observe clear 
distinctions in individual combatant experiences that remain hidden under the purview of 
alternative theoretical accounts for variation. Thus, it is necessary to explore these 
emergent questions concerning variation at the level of analysis that allows these 
questions to be detectable. Consequently, it is a valuable endeavor to understand the 
micro-level mechanisms and factors that shape these differences.  
A particularly critical question that is generated from this viewpoint evaluates 
which belief systems and/or attitudinal positions are activated and relevant for 
perpetrators in enacting this type of violence?  Arguably, an assumption that underpins 
many of the existing explanations for variation in sexualized violence in conflict is that 
each belief, instinct, and attitude combatants hold about violence are equal in salience 
and thus will be uniformly susceptible to pro-violence military training and socialization 
strategies. 
For example, while Hoover Green (2011, 2018) acknowledges that combatants enter 
the conflict environment with pre-military beliefs, instincts, and attitudes about violence, 
she explicitly states that her argument assumes that these prior preferences matter little 
under the powerful constraint of organizational control and military socialization 
processes. In addition, for Wood (2006; 2009a), Hoover Green (2011, 2018), and Cohen 
(2013), individual agency in conflict settings appears to be mostly overridden by 
prevailing group and institutional processes. Yet, given that there is evidence that many 
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combatants refrain from violence, the notion that individual agency is mostly constrained 
by factors exogeneous to the individual is not always the case. 
Importantly, in the context of civil war, research suggests that it is vital to explore the 
interaction between the broader political motivations associated with a fighting group’s 
master cleavage and the private motivations of the individual in the conflict 
setting (Kalyvas 2003). In order to effectively examine the transactional relationship 
between the wider political climate and the private drives of the combatant, a deeper 
investigation of individual attributes and motivations is imperative and presently lacking 
in the literature. Attention to individual preferences and motivations has largely been 
limited or assumed irrelevant in the face of the presumably more powerful influence of 
structural, organizational, and small-group factors.  
Given the evidence that these explanations cannot fully explain within combat unit 
variation in conflict-related sexual violence, it is necessary to probe further. I argue that 
certain, although not all, pre-military beliefs, instincts, and attitudes held by combatants 
matter more than previous accounts suggest. Building on existing theories, this research 
explores the underdeveloped treatment of individual combatant attitudes, beliefs, and 
preferences in order to add to our current understanding of the patterns of sexualized 
violence in conflict.  
While these pre-existing beliefs are potentially moderated by the degree of 
organizational control leveraged by military units and command structures, an empirical 
question persists as to the extent these organizational factors suppress and/or facilitate the 
individual beliefs and attitudes of combatants. Because individual beliefs and attitudes 
remain mostly under analyzed empirically, this research adds to existing knowledge by 
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re-engaging the individual in group-level models, so we can better understand within 
group variation as it pertains to incidents of sexualized violence under the context of 
differential organizational control factors.  
A micro-foundational understanding of individual differences enhances the 
conceptual landscape by identifying combatants who commit sexualized violence and 
observing those who resist the influence of organizational and structural factors intended 
to shape combatant preferences regarding the use of violence (Hoover Green 2011, 
2018). Similarly, this perch calls for a deeper understanding of those combatants who 
refrain from committing sexualized violence. Current meso and macro level conceptual 
analyses overlook non-perpetrators and their critical presence as conflict actors. While 
this dissertation provides a thoeretical account for those who do commit sexualized 
violence, the presence of the non-perpetrator is considered in the subtext of this research.  
A final added value is the potential to expand upon our comprehension regarding the 
interaction between individual attitudes and beliefs and organizational and institutional-
level influences. The interactional processes between these distinct factors shapes 
combatant behavior within the context of political conflict. Thus, as the examples in this 
section illustrate, meso and macro-level factors remain unable to fully account for 
observed within unit variations in acts of sexualized violence, which suggests that there 
are additional factors to explore in order to better understand this complex phenomenon.  
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Individual Differences as a Theoretical Framework in Conflict-Related Sexual 
Violence 
 
A) The question of unit of analysis – why the individual and gendered attitudes and 
beliefs matters.  
 
“The locus of agency is as likely to be at the bottom as at the top, so civilians 
cannot be treated as passive, manipulated, or invisible actors…”  - Stathis 
Kalyvas (2003, 481)15 
 
 When developing a theory related to the individual differences between 
combatants and their propensity to commit sexualized violence within conflict, it is 
essential to consider what relevant factors are associated with variation between them. 
Within the context of this research, I consider social identity factors16, along with 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, to be foundational elements within the framework of 
the individual difference theory of gender bias I introduce in this dissertation. These, 
along with other features expanded on in the following section, provides a conceptual 
map for understanding the logic of combatant behavior as it pertains to acts of sexualized 
violence in conflict settings.  
I begin by evaluating why social identities matter when considering questions 
related to individual combatant differences. It is fitting to consider what ends social 
                                                 
15 While this quote refers to civilians, I employ a similar logic to soldiers. Soldiers, who may be more 
directly considered political actors vis a vis civilians as it pertains to political conflict, are also agents. 
Indeed, soldiers, especially in the case of intrastate conflict, are often civilians first and foremost. This 
means that they do not receive the same training, socialization, or even pay that professional soldiers 
receive. Thus, these ‘soliders’ are often civilians occupying a position of power. Because this dissertation 
considers the social context as a mediating factor shaping beliefs into behavior, these distinctions between 
‘soldiers’ may result in different violent behaviors. This has implications for behavioral outcomes in 
conflict.  
16 Social identity labels are discussed at length in the sections ahead. In brief, identity can be thought of as 
a sense of self-construal within the larger social world an indiviudal interacts with. Building from the 
singular notion of identity, social identity labels then are considered categorical groupings an indivudal and 
others perceive an individual belonging to including gender, ethnicity, relgious labels amongst a host of 
others. Social identity is an inherently social psychological concept in that it is both socially constructed 
and indivudally perceived. Thus, it is a highly interactive and recreated concept.  
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identities serve to the individual who occupies them. Hale (2004) provides the following 
response for consideration:  
“(T)he notion of identity (is) the set of points of personal reference on which 
people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad 
constellations of social relationships they encounter, to discern their place in these 
constellations, and to understand the opportunities for action in this context (p. 463).”  
 
 This definition suggests that social identities are critical orienting principles upon 
which, in this case, combatants rely on to effectively navigate the environment that 
surrounds them. In a sense, it is the primer from which attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately 
motivations for actions are built. While combatants hold more than one social identity, 
some are more salient within the context of political conflict than others.  
The theory advanced here directly challenges the notion that combatants are lone 
actors with no variability in terms of motivation and identity within the civil war context.  
I posit that combatants are not passive actors that simply comply with the directives of 
the master cleavage of their fighting group or even their commander. While these factors 
contextually influence combatants, they remain agents with their own set of attitudes, 
preferences, beliefs that translate into an interpretation of contextual influences that 
informs their behavior during warfare. In this way, the individual difference theory of 
gender bias departs from other contributions by accounting for these distinctions between 
combatants, which are observable in the differential behaviors of these actors.  
Kalyvas (2003) argues that patterns of violence that emerge during conflict are 
simultaneously ambiguous and complex, much like the social identity labels that are 
relevant for combatants in the case of political conflict. Kalyvas (2003) cautions scholars 
to be wary of considering only a singular social identity label for actors in civil war as 
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this can lead to underrepresentation of the variability in interests, beliefs, and motivations 
at work for individuals within the civil war context. Indeed, this is particularly true when 
a singular identity label is appropriated and conceptualized from the top down to the local 
level. Kalyvas (2003) contends that this is an overly homogenizing conceptual approach 
that misses significant variability given that individuals occupy multiple social identity 
categorizations. It is not the case that a combatant identifies exclusively and only as a 
soldier and it remains critical to consider the complexities of self-construal within the 
framework of political conflict.  
For example, Kalyvas (2003) describes conceptual issues that arise when viewing 
civil war dynamics (and political violence in particular) from a singularly top-down 
perspective. According to Kalyvas (2003), identity, motivations, and actions in the 
context of civil war are as diverse as the array of actors that are relevant within this 
context (civilians, armies, combatants, local, and government actors to name a few). 
Kalyvas (2003) further suggests that generalizing a unitary, master cleavage from the 
center leads to imperfect theories of causation.  
Case in point, these sorts of generalizations lead to the assumption that (all) Serbs 
(as distinct actors) are then driven by a lone motivation (ethnic domination), which then 
results in the same actions and behavior for all (p. 481). And yet, this is not empirically 
borne out. Not all Serbs sought ethnic domination and indeed, the Serb identity is further 
reducible to even more nuanced categories – Serbian and Bosnian Serb – for which 
motivations during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) were quite distinct. This example 
highlights the importance of considering how interests and motivations are built from 
various social identities, which is shaped by contextual factors associated with the social 
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context of warfare. Indeed, these conditions interact to shape combatants’ violent 
behavior.  
For instance, while individuals evaluated in this research occupy the social 
identity category of combatant, solider, rebel and the like, these are not the only identity 
categories that are relevant to their behavior in conflict. While the combatant category is 
certainly highly salient, it is this identity label coupled with other relevant social identity 
labels and additional factors that can assist in predicting who will and will not commit 
conflict-related sexual violence.  
Arguably, social identities are constructs and debate persists concerning the 
malleability or fixedness of them. In political science, sociology, and comparative 
politics, much of our discourse surrounding social identities pertains to the relationship 
individuals have with different social groups and how these attachments are mobilized by 
political elites, institutional influences, and by processes inherent to social groups (i.e. in 
group/out group processes). In the case of conflict studies, and civil war in particular, 
scholars mainly explore social identities as it pertains to notions of ethnicity.  
In this body of work, analysis of social identities is primarily differentiated based 
on two distinct positions - primordial explanations (Bayar 2009; Geertz 1963; Shils 1957; 
Van Evera 2001) and constructivist accounts (Brubaker 2002; Chandra 2012; Nagel 
1994; Okamura 1981). These points are further differentiated by questions about the 
durability and flexibility of these identities. Instrumentalists claim that these identities are 
easily altered whereas “perdurabilists,” as coined by (Hale 2004), argue that once formed 
and embedded, these identities remain highly durable17.  
                                                 
17 See Hale (2004) for a robust discussion regarding the politics of social identity construction.  
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In the case of the individual difference theory of gender bias outlined in this 
chapter, I follow a middle path position that suggests that identities are indeed social 
constructs and thus are alterable. However, I qualify this by suggesting that certain 
identities, by the nature of their very construction and embeddedness, are much “stickier” 
than others. In this way, I posit that not all social identity categories and social group 
membership are readily comparable, which suggests that more enduring social identity 
categories are internalized differently, will be mobilized differently, and will ultimately 
lead to different behaviors.  
Consider the identity of a soldier, for an example. ‘Solider’ is a social identity 
label our exemplary individual currently carries. In addition, our soldier’s gender, ethnic, 
and religious identity all may be relevant to this soldier’s self-construal and is 
simultaneously pertinent to those who interact with them. The list of identities this soldier 
carries may be extensive and may include political affiliations, relationships, and 
avocations, amongst others.  
These identifiers provide the world surrounding this soldier with information 
about them, while also providing the soldier with a ‘social compass’ to effectively 
navigate the world that surrounds them. In this way, the internal drives of the soldier and 
the shaping influence of the social world are connected. Indeed, this notion of identities 
being dependent on the social world – that the psychological and social are indelibly 
linked (Erikson 1968) – is central to the individual difference argument advanced in this 
dissertation.  
Our soldier’s connection with varied identities is intriguing. Perhaps our soldier 
identifies as an artist, as well as an athlete, and also as a parent. Does this mean that the 
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parent and athlete identity are equivalent? Does the soldier equally value association with 
these groups? Is one more valuable to the solider, thus making it more fixed as an 
identifier? Furthermore, does the context surrounding the social identity matter? When 
our soldier is competing athletically, and their child is at school, does the athlete identity 
perhaps take primacy in that moment, even though the soldier does not stop identifying as 
a parent?  
The example here is, of course, a simplification of complex issues around social 
identity. Certainly, some social identity categories are more readily shed throughout a 
lifetime. A soldier retires, interests change, and children grow. Yet, some identities 
appear to be more crystallized compared to others. Perhaps this is because of the 
persistent relevance such an identity has in the daily rituals of social life. If a particular 
identity is ever present and carries with it deep social meaning, it is likely such an 
identity will be even more entrenched as a point of self-construal.  
In the case of this research, gender is just such an identity that carries with it 
important social meaning and rituals, while also being highly relevant to sexually violent 
behavior in conflict. Before turning to a discussion regarding the individualization of 
gender, I first describe the ways in which gender and political conflict are linked. 
Comprehending this context provides clarity regarding why biased attitudes and beliefs 
combatants hold about gender are more readily activated in this space.  
Given that conflict-related sexual violence is a gendered form of violence, 
consideration of gender as a salient social identity factor cannot be overstated. There are 
several reasons why gender remains a critical analytical concept to include in this 
analysis. First, political conflict is a highly gendered space. By way of example, 
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Goldstein (2001) importantly highlights that in nearly all of the national armies across the 
world’s nation-states, women soldiers, and particularly women combat soldiers, comprise 
an incredibly small portion of these fighting forces18. This means that women and their 
lived experiences within political conflict are often underrepresented or imperceptible. 
Analysis thusly tends towards a partial account of their experiences and perceptions of 
conflict. The imbalance and dearth of women’s representation in these spaces provides 
compelling anecdotal evidence that gendered factors and processes innately shapes 
political conflict.  
The case may be made that women do in fact participate equally in conflict, but 
their participation is unobservable due to the types of questions explored in conflict 
scholarship and the manner in which they are evaluated. However, even Tickner (2001) 
notes that while the role of women in war has been rendered relatively invisible, in part 
due to epistemological challenges in the study of international relations and political 
conflict, she agrees that a gendering of war persists19. She outlines clear linkages between 
masculinity and war. Notably, she argues that misogynistic training is employed in states’ 
militaries to teach soldiers how to fight. For Tickner (2001), “military masculinity” 
requires the disparagement of the feminine within this space. Further reinforcing typified 
norms associated with masculinity and femininity, the militarized environment valorizes 
                                                 
18 Arguably, these data are dated from 2001 and Goldstein (2001) is speaking only of national forces, not 
rebel groups and irregular actors who often recruit or count more women fighters in their ranks vis a vis 
national forces. Yet, these descriptive statistics provides convincing evidence that the warring context is a 
highly gendered space, even giving room for large error margins in the data (Goldstein 2011, 10 -11).  
19 Tickner (2001) suggests that women have been a part of armies over the course history in support roles. 
Indeed, she notes that women have worked on the front lines in military nursing roles, but these stories are 
rarely told, likely due to not fitting into the dominant cultural narratives that are inclined to make links 
between masculinity and warfare. 
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the “just” and “hero” soldier for protecting vulnerable people who cannot protect 
themselves – namely women and children.  
The gendering of political conflict is discernable in multiple sites. In addition to 
the observable gendering in the militarized environment, Caprioli (2005) uncovered a 
correlation between gender inequality and the onset of political conflict. According to 
Caprioli (2005), states that are characterized by high degrees of gender discrimination are 
more primed for internal conflict because the context is ripe with violence supporting 
norms.  
In addition, the gendering of war is particularly salient as it pertains to sexualized 
violence within the conflict context itself. Skjelsbæk (2001) claims that the victim of 
sexual violence in the war zone is victimized through the feminization of both their sex, 
ethnic, political, and/or religious identity. Conversely, the perpetrator's sex, ethnic, 
political, and/or religious identity are empowered by becoming masculinized. 
Consequently, in times of conflict, the association with gender and patriarchy more 
frequently and substantively maps onto other social identity categories – ethnic, political, 
and religious20.  
This suggests that the concept of gender is relevant to explore not only within the 
broader conflict context, but most especially as it pertains to conflict related sexual 
violence. However, the concept of gender is complex. Gender is not a simple discrete 
variable that can readily be plugged in as an input with a correlating output. Indeed, some 
scholars claim that gender is not a variable at all, but rather it is an accomplishment of 
sorts (Deutsch 2007; West and Zimmeman 1987). From this constructivist perspective, 
                                                 
20 I argue that the uncertainty of the conflict setting more frequently facilitates ascribing significance to 
these categories than in peacetime. This process is described in greater detail in the next section.  
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gender is dynamically produced through interaction and thus readily changeable, which 
in some ways counters leading sociological and psychological arguments concerning the 
ways in which gender difference occurs.  
Like some “perdurabilist” accounts, many psychological and sociological 
arguments suggest that individuals understand gender through an internalized set of 
norms that embed during key developmental periods (Bussey and Bandura 1999; 
Ridgeway and Correll 2004). Much like the scholarship on ethnicity - psychological, 
sociological, and biological theories debate the degrees of flexibility surrounding notions 
of gender and differentially explore what facilitates variation in our understanding of this 
important concept. However, nearly all of these theoretical approaches agree that critical 
processes occur during developmental life phases. In keeping with this agreement across 
theories, the individual difference theory of gender bias advanced in this research 
assumes that soldiers’ development during formative years has important implications for 
how these soldiers view the world beyond these developmental phases21.  
The theory advanced here takes manifest accounts of gender and gender 
difference under consideration. While it is clear that gender is a construction and as a 
construction its conceptualization can transform, it is equally clear that gender is an 
organizing principle that provides a primer from which social relations are built (Bussey 
                                                 
21 Henry, et al. (2004) also consider development in their complex model of wartime rape. The individual 
difference theory of gender bias I outline differs from this account in several ways. In their model, Henry, 
et al. (2004) focus on links between sex and aggression during adolescent and pubescent developmental 
periods explicitly. While this is interesting, the theory I outline posits that aggression and sex linked by an 
individual in peacetime may not be primary in predicting the likelihood of a combatant to commit 
sexualized violence. Rather, beliefs and attitudes surrounding notions of masculinity and femininity, which 
are built upon key social identity categories (gender), have significant influence on combatant decision-
making upon entering the context of civil war. These attitudes and beliefs may not be what is typically 
associated with and conceptualized as “aggressive,” which is why victims are often surprised when 
perpetrators known to them enact sexualized violence upon them.   
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and Bandura 1999; Deutsch 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmeman 
1987). While the cultural meanings associated with gender may shift over time, the 
embeddedness of internalized gender norms during childhood cannot be overlooked22.  
Thus, both the intrapersonal conceptualization of gender norms and the 
interpersonal construction of gender in social interaction are relevant to the violent 
behavior of combatants. These are each sources of gender bias. For example, individuals 
learn early in life the difference between masculine and feminine. They further develop 
associations with the attributes that comprise these categories during early childhood 
development and receive regular and persistent societal reinforcement related to these 
categories (Bussey and Bandura 1999). Undoubtedly, these associations are learned 
constructions, but they are learned and constructed during key biological and 
psychological developmental periods, which leads to the entrenchment of these 
associations. Further, these embedded associations are then performatively reinforced as 
individuals move into adulthood through “doing gender” in social interaction and 
relations (Deutsch 2007; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; West and Zimmerman 1987).  
And, the “doing of gender” is a daily ritual. Bussey and Bandura (1999) 
importantly state that, “Human differentiation on the basis of gender is a fundamental 
phenomenon that affects virtually every aspect of people’s daily lives (p. 676).” This 
contention suggests that both the conscious and nonconscious performance of gender 
deeply reinforces and informs upon a person’s self-construal. This critical factor 
associated with a sense of self is then carried into various contextual interactions and sites 
                                                 
22 See the cross-conflict analysis in Chapter 5 for more developed discussion on gender role socialization 
processes.  
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throughout a life span.  And, the different sociological sites of these interactions and 
differential exposure for individuals lead to the development of varying degrees of bias.  
One such distinctive site, political conflict, provides a unique context where 
combatants’ self-construal interacts with a traditionally masculinized environment. 
Scholars advancing socialization and organizational arguments agree that the concept of 
"military masculinity" is heightened during times of conflict (Cohen 2013; Enloe 1983; 
Goldstein 2003; Wood 2006). Notably, power is intimately associated with the military 
masculinity norm. Consequently, when “doing gender” combines with other significant 
social identity categories in the wartime milieu, certain behavioral outcomes become 
more likely as a result of the interaction between identity categories, beliefs and attitudes 
developed from these identity categories, and continued interaction with the social 
context. As such, understanding whether and in what ways biased attitudes about gender, 
gender-power relations, and masculinity impacts combatants’ actions matters.  
While it is important to analyze particular social identity categories, it is also 
critical to be clear about which attitudes are relevant to explore. Indeed, individuals hold 
thousands of attitudes and beliefs, yet which of these attitudes and beliefs are salient to 
this context matters. Given that conflict-related sexual violence is an act of gendered 
violence, the individual difference theory of gender bias considers the broader 
relationship between developed gender-biased attitudes and acts of sexual violence. 
Importantly, previous literature in social psychology has extensively explored the links 
between individual trait differences and attitudes towards rape and sexual violence.  
In a meta-analysis of 72 studies exploring the relationship between individual 
traits and rape attitudes, Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) found that, “traditional 
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gender role beliefs, adversarial sexual beliefs, needs for power and dominance, 
aggressiveness and anger, and conservative political beliefs predicted rape acceptance (p. 
295).” Because the individual difference theory of gender bias is interested in the 
conditions under which biased attitudes translate into behavior, I focus primarily on 
overarching attitudes and personality inclinations that appear to link to a more accepting 
attitude towards rape and sexualized violence.  
Notably, Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) found that individuals who 
believe in the continuation of more traditional gender roles were associated with higher 
attitudes of rape acceptance. Additionally, individuals who measured higher in anger and 
expressed a high need for power and dominance were also linked with a higher incidence 
of rape acceptance. Further, individuals who hold a negative view of sex-relations and 
have a higher hostility position towards the opposite sex were also more associated with 
higher rates of rape acceptance (Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura 1997). While the 
studies analyzed by Anderson, Cooper, and Okamura (1997) were conducted in the 
context of the United States outside of conflict-zones, the attitude proclivities uncovered 
provide important insight into which overarching attitude clusters link to rape acceptance, 
which may ultimately translate into sexualized violence in conflict. These attitudinal 
positions also mirror the attitudes and beliefs associated with the military masculinity 
norm explored in the political science literature.  
Thus, this research seeks not only to explore the relevant social identity categories 
of interest, but it also analyzes particular attitudinal states that are more likely to result in 
conflict-related sexual violence. In this way, it is critical to evaluate the connections 
between combatants’ identity and their role as soldiers, their biased attitudes associated 
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with femininity and masculinity23, and the resultant patterns of conflict-related sexual 
violence.  
B) The conflict context and attitudes, beliefs, and behavior – how does it all connect?   
 
“The human mind must think with the aid of categories… Once formed, categories are 
the bases of normal prejudgment. We cannot possibly avoid this process. Orderly living 
depends upon it (Allport 1954).” 
 
As a result of the conflict context increasing levels of insecurity, polarization 
occurs frequently such that individuals are inclined to rely on heuristic strategies in 
decision-making and problem-solving about the environment within which they are 
operating (Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Common 
heuristical strategies employed by individuals include stereotyping and/or profiling 
(Shapiro and Neuberg 2007). Individuals rely on heuristics when the cognitive resources 
needed to deduce an optimal outcome is unavailable. Often, decision-making is 
cognitively costly, which makes heuristic strategies practical and attractive. Undoubtedly, 
such cognitive strategies are regularly deployed in the conflict setting since civil war 
threatens an individual’s physical integrity and life chances in significant ways, thusly 
requiring rapid impression formation and decision-making. This means that individuals 
rely on deeply embedded beliefs and attitudes to form impressions and ultimately make 
decisions. Given that gender is an organizing principle in human life, combatants, like 
anyone, hold deeply embedded attitudes and beliefs about gender and gender relations 
                                                 
23 I add a note here on bias. Because humans are not machines, I assume that all individuals hold some 
degree of bias. Further, I do not assume a value related to bias (i.e. good/bad), but rather I hold a normative 
free position in that I assume that a basic part of being human is to have biased atttiudes and beliefs based 
on the varied influences involved in attitude and belief formation. Essentially, humans are constrained, 
which leads to bias. The extent of that bias is variable. Interestingly, indivudals are able to recognize bias in 
others, but are notoriously ill-equipped to recognize their own biases (Propin 2007). Individuals are 
convinced that their own perspective reflects reality, in spite of the fact that cognitive, perceptual, and 
motivational biases are innaetly part of the human condition (Pronin 2007). In the next section, I discuss 
conditions that moderate or facilitate bias in greater detail.  
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and it is these deeply rooted beliefs that informs their decision-making process regarding 
violence in the conflict setting. 
The condition of uncertainty and its relationship to combatants’ self-construal 
cannot be understated. Social psychologists have long understood that uncertainty 
reduction is an essential human motivation (Brown and Pehrson 2019; Gaertner et al. 
2002; Hogg and Mullin 1999). Active political conflict, with its persistent and immediate 
existential threat, remains a critical filter through which individual combatant beliefs and 
attitudes translate into actions. Summarizing Hogg and Mullin (1999, pgs. 253 - 255), 
Hale (2004) puts it best:  
“People have a fundamental need to feel certain about their world and their place 
within it – subjective certainty renders existence meaningful and thus gives one 
confidence about how to behave, and what to expect from the physical and social 
environment within which one finds oneself (p. 464).”  
 
This desire for certainty and a need for categorization helps explain how social 
identity groupings serve as reference points when navigating the social sphere. These 
identity categories are associated with a set of attitudes, beliefs, and preferences that 
eases the complexity associated with navigating the social world that surrounds the self. 
As such, combatants draw on these developed and biased attitudes and beliefs, which in 
turn serves as a reference point for establishing their preferences regarding violence24.  
  The individual difference theory of gender bias centrally engages the concept of 
gender and gender bias. As outlined in the previous section, differences between gender 
categories are one of the first distinctions humans are socialized to identify and it is from 
                                                 
24 While I do not address this directly in this research, it is important to note that many of the attitudes and 
beliefs that influence combatant preferences for violence occur nonconsciously. Implicit bias is an 
important concept to consider for future research related to attitudes and beliefs that may be connected to 
pro-violence behaviors. See Brown and Pehrson (2019) and Greenwald and Banaji (1995) for more on 
nonconscious bias and implicit social cognition processes.  
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this category that individuals begin to know themselves and others (Bussey and Bandura 
1999; Henry, Ward, and Hirshberg 2004). This is important because in an effort to cope 
with the vast amounts of incoming data individuals are confronted with in their 
environment, they are forced to make simplifying judgments to manage. Gender 
differentiation and the sense of one’s own gender identity position within the social world 
is one of the earliest simplifying distinctions individuals are primed to access (Bussey 
and Bandura 1999; Henry, Ward, and Hirshberg 2004).  Indeed, early in life individuals 
are able to identify their own gender and that of others and further feel some pressure to 
follow the expected behavior ascribed to the gender category the individual has been 
assigned to (Blakemore, Berenbaum, and Liben 2008; Bussey and Bandura 1999). In 
many ways, the capacity to categorize in this important way reduces feelings of 
uncertainty experienced by the individual.  
Thus, a central theoretical assumption in this argument is that gender is an important 
organizing principle, which means that biased attitudes and beliefs associated with gender 
are generally more deeply embedded than other attitudes in certain contexts. While it is 
also true that gender is also produced through the performance of social interaction (West 
and Zimmerman 1987), these interactions rely on prior scripts about gender in order to 
perform them at all. Above all, what is imperative is not only that combatants see a 
difference between gender categories, but also the value that combatants ascribe to these 
categories. This is the breeding ground for gender bias and it is in assessing this 
difference between combatants that is at the heart of this theoretical account25.  
                                                 
25 Sources of gender socialization and gender bias are many and mostly outside of the scope of this research 
design. Arguably, there are a host of institutional, political, societal, and cultural processes that shape and 
inform the development of this bias. These potential sources of gender bias could undoubtedly be a separate 
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Additional contextual factors also matter. Violence does not occur in a 
deterministic manner. Rather, there are several different ways in which political actors 
deploy violence – targeted, indiscriminate, and opportunistic to name a few. Thus, the 
ways in which gender bias sways combatants’ actions depends on the contextual 
influence exerted by the quality of violence deployed.  In consideration of the manner of 
violence employed, I also suspect that other high valence social identity categorizations 
interact with gendered attitudes and beliefs to result in distinctive patterns of violence26.  
Another critical contextual factor that has received attention in the literature is the 
effects of military norms on violence, strong/weak enforcement mechanisms of these 
norms, and effective command responsibility and control (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 
2011, 2018; Wood 2006). These factors undoubtedly shape combatants’ behaviors as it 
pertains to sexualized violence in conflict. Much like the moderating effects of effective, 
stable peacetime institutions, strong military enforcement mechanisms can curb pro-
violence preferences to some degree whereas weak enforcement provides a more 
permissive environment (Hoover Green 2011, 2018). 
Keeping these contextual factors in mind, I situate the aforementioned social 
psychological arguments about gender explicitly within the current literature on conflict-
related sexual violence.  In this way, I contend that those combatants that have attitudes 
that hold more bias about gender generally, gender roles specifically, and adversarial 
                                                                                                                                                 
dissertation project. Suffice it to say, the individual difference theory assumes that combatants have been 
exposed to a host of forces that have shaped this process. However, while the concept of gender 
socialization is invariant in the sense that all people have experienced socialization, the internalization of 
norms concerning this social identity category and the degree of bias an individual develops is variable. 
26 Since the conflicted space constrains more developed decision-making strategies, it holds that beliefs and 
attitudes about other social identity categories will also be relevant. However, it should be noted that while 
religion and ethnicity are also high valence social identity categories, socialization into gender occurs 
before these other categories and is recognized early in life by most individuals. Thus, this dissertation 
primarily focuses on the gender distinction in the empirical analysis that follows.  
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beliefs about the opposite sex prior to military socialization are more likely to engage in 
sexual gender-based violence in conflict. Indeed, this is likely, especially if the military 
socialization procedure simply reinforces the attitude already held. On the other hand, 
those combatants who hold less bias are more able to resist the effects of militarized 
valorization of violence and as such, are less likely to commit sexual gender-based 
violence. Further, those same combatants who more deeply hold gender biased attitudes 
and beliefs will be less likely to commit sexualized violence in cases where strong 
enforcement mechanisms are in place. However, when they step away from these more 
direct enforcement mechanisms (i.e. off the formal battlefield), they remain vulnerable to 
committing sexualized violence within the uncertainty of political conflict.  
Thus, I contend that the explanatory effects of the socialization, organizational, 
and indoctrination procedures outlined by Cohen (2013a;), Hoover Green (2011, 2018), 
and Wood (2009b) are critical and relevant. The individual difference theory of gender 
bias advanced here simply adds to the literature by contending that accounting for 
differences in individual attitudes and beliefs that have developed and embedded not only 
over time, but also during key developmental periods in an individual's life (Henry, et al 
2004; Bussey and Bandura 1999), contextualizes the effects of socialization and 
organizational arguments (Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; Wood 2006, 2009a).  
In this way, I explore the biased beliefs and attitudes of the individual that are 
more or less susceptible to these military socialization and organizational factors, namely 
attitudes associated with gender bias.  Kimmel (2000) notes that gendered biases develop 
and become relatively fixed early in life. These biases represent implicit attitudinal states 
that are then adjusted or moderated explicitly through information processing. However, 
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the capacity – the luxury – of reflection and processing is either constrained or facilitated 
by the environment that allows the information processing to occur. The conflict context 
seriously constrains this capacity.  
Thus, the individual difference theory of gender bias argues that certain beliefs 
and attitudes of the individual are more or less susceptible to military socialization and 
organizational factors. This means that certain beliefs and attitudes might be more readily 
supplanted with the military socialization position on violence, but those beliefs and 
attitudes that are more deeply embedded are less flexible to this military indoctrination 
and education. Further, given that there is some anecdotal evidence of a difference in 
behavior between combatants exposed to the same organizational and socialization 
factors, this difference merits further investigation.  
Conceptualization and Operationalization 
Thus, the individual difference theory of gender bias addresses the conditions 
under which combatants’ gender-biased beliefs and attitudes impacts patterns of political 
violence in conflict. The sources of biased beliefs and attitudes are many. As discussed in 
the previous sections, the sources include socialization during combatants’ formative 
years, interaction with gender inequaliaties built into societal institutions, and a host of 
individual level interactions recreating gendered social identities. In addition, the 
conditions that allow these biased attitudes and beliefs to be enacted include constraints 
on judgments and motivations unique to the context of political conflict. These 
constraints are realized either externally through strong/weak military norm enforcement 
mechanisms, or internally through influences on combatant cognitive functioning such as 
threat perception or feelings of uncertainty.  
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Accordingly, my main argument expands on existing scholarship on conflict-
based sexual violence by exploring the individual level factors that shapes this form of 
violence in conflict settings. I argue that while group cohesion and organizational 
variables matter, individuating factors concerning combatants’ gendered attitudes maps 
onto these broader processes and shapes the resulting patterns of conflict-based sexual 
violence. The formula below in Figure 1 describes the theoretical interactions between 
individual attributes, contextual influences, and the resulting behavioral outcomes.  
Figure 1: Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias Theoretical Formula  
 
Individual: (social identity categories + attitudes + beliefs) (judgment + motivation) + 
Context: (conflict type, quality of violence [opportunistic or strategic], 
military/organizational structures, societal norms/institutions) =  
Behavioral Outcome (sexualized violence in conflict) 
 
 Table 1 outlines the basic composition of the variables of interest in this 
theoretical model. The table is parsed into two broad categorizations – individual 
processes and contextual influences. The previous section has described the importance 
of each within the theoretical framework and how each of these factors link back to the 
likelihood combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict.  
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Table 1: Table of Theoretical Factors  
Individual  Context 
Social Identity Factors 
(gender + ethnic identity + religious 
identity) 
Violence Type  
(targeted, indiscriminate, opportunistic) 
Attitudes and Beliefs  
(gendered beliefs, attitudes, preferences)  
Military Organization/ Group 
Cohesion   
(Strong command structure/ 
enforcement    mechanisms, weak 
command structure/ enforcement 
mechanisms, group 
cohesion/solidarity) 
 
Judgments and Motivations  
(impaired, implicit, conscious)  
Societal norms / institutions  
(structural inequalities in military 
codes of conduct norms; 
religious/political/state institutions; 
norms regarding gender)  
 
Conceptually speaking, a variety of terms describe forms of gendered violence in 
conflict in the literature and by media. It is critical to identify what is meant by conflict-
based sexual violence. It is also essential to define the contextual qualities this form of 
violence takes on in order to test these relationships.  An important contribution argues 
against singular attention on “rape as a weapon” and suggests that this conceals other 
forms of sexualized violence that occurs both during and outside of active conflict 
(Crawford 2013). Thus, expanding the conceptual definition of sexualized violence 
beyond rape as a strategic weapon of war is imperative27. 
                                                 
27 The Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is the case study explored in this research. This well-known case is 
often characterized by wartime rape as a strategic weapon war. While the International Criminal Tribunal 
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Consequently, for the dependent variable, I employ the definition of sexual 
violence as conceptualized by Cohen and Nordås (2014) in the Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict (SVAC) dataset. Drawing on the definition from the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and from Wood (2009), Cohen and Nordås (2014) include seven acts in their 
classification of sexual violence. This includes “(1) rape, (2) sexual slavery, (3) forced 
prostitution, (4) forced pregnancy, (5) forced sterilization/abortion…(6) sexual 
mutilation, and (7) sexual torture (p. 419).” The import of this conceptualization is that it 
moves beyond the singular framing of wartime rape and accounts for other forms of 
sexualized violence that are critical to include in analyses. A further appeal is that it is 
gender neutral, allowing for the analysis of female perpetrators and male victims (Cohen 
and Nordås 2014)28. 
My primary independent variable(s) are the gender biased attitudes, beliefs and 
preferences held by combatants. Thus, I conceptualize gender biased attributes typically 
associated with cultural notions of masculinity.  For example, combatant attitudes about 
power and strength, both of which are desirable attributes in combat, are considered to 
comprise a gender-biased viewpoint. Further, attitudes that are supportive of traditional 
gender roles are also considered under my conceptualization of gender bias. Finally, 
negative viewpoints about sex-relations are also considered to be gender-biased attitudes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) has found evidence that there was a clear strategic objective involving 
the use of sexualized violence in this case, interviews and research conducted in 2018 revealed a continuum 
of sexually violent behavior both during and outside of active combat within the case. Thus, even in cases 
associated with wartime rape as a military strategy, opportunistic violence and distinct patterns of sexual 
violence persists in these cases.  
28 While the preponderance of references of sexual violence examined in this research involved male 
perpetrators and female victims, it is critical to note that male victims and female perpetrators were also 
referenced in this research. Importantly, gender bias is held by all to some degree, regardless of the gender 
identity category a person occupies. What is critical here is the value combatants ascribe to masculinity and 
femininity. Do they value qualities typified with masculinity over qualities associated with femininity, 
particularly within the context of political conflict?  
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Additionally, contextual patterns surrounding broad categorizations of conflict-related 
sexual violence also has implications for the effects gender bias has on combatant actions 
in conflict settings. It is critical to note that the combatant clings to a hyper-masculinized 
identity in the conflicted environment, much more so than during peacetime. In this way, 
gender biases held by combatants become more likely to be enacted in this space.  
Drawing deductively from these concepts, I hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, 
combatants who hold higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit acts of 
conflict- related sexual violence compared to combatants who hold lower levels of gender 
bias (H1). While (H1) captures the basic expected relationship between gender bias and 
the likelihood that a combatant will commit conflict-related sexual violence, accounting 
for what is exactly meant by gender bias remains critical. In this research, I conceive of 
gender bias as beliefs associated with masculinity and femininity that are ordered in a 
hierarchical or unequal manner. The operational composition of inequality in these 
attitudes and beliefs is outlined in what follows.  
In the case of this research, attitudes associated with a high need for power and 
domination, attitudes supportive of traditional gender roles, and a negative viewpoint 
about sex-relations are all proxy indicators for gender-biased beliefs (Anderson, Cooper, 
and Okamura 1997). As such, I further offer several sub-categorical hypotheses that 
comprise a way to effectively test for (H1). In this way, I assert that combatants who have 
a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related 
sexual violence (Sub-H1.a). Further, combatants who have a higher need to adhere to 
traditional sex relations are more likely to commit acts of conflict-related 
sexualized violence (Sub-H1.b) Finally, combatants who hold more negative views of 
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the opposite sex are more likely to commit conflict-related sexualized violence (Sub-
H1.c).   
This research additionally explores the interactive relationship between 
combatants’ gender biases with other situational factors specific to conflict. Some 
situational factors that mediate the relationship between gender bias and behavior include 
the difference between active armed combat and the overarching conflict space generally, 
organizational control, master cleavage of the conflict, and military socialization factors. 
These previously established factors interact with the differential gender-biased beliefs 
and attitudes of combatants’, which in turn drives inclinations towards political violence. 
As such, considering these different contextual factors is essential. I argue that the ways 
in which gender bias impacts combatants’ actions depends on the contextual influence 
exerted by the organizational and military socialization environment in which the 
combatant operates.    
Consequently, I posit that when sexualized violence is opportunistic, combatants 
with higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit conflict-related sexual 
violence. While previous scholarship has engaged the question of strategic wartime rape 
and/or gang rape in conflict (Cohen 2013; Farr 2009), scholars have come to agree that 
much of the sexualized violence observed across internal conflicts is often opportunistic 
in nature (Cohen and Nordås 2014; Crawford, Green, and Parkinson 2014; Meger 2016). 
When violence is opportunistic, it is likely that organizational and group socialization 
factors will have a lesser effect than when sexualized violence is strategically ordered. 
When violence is opportunistic, the individual differences between combatants in gender 
bias will be more pronounced and observable. Conversely, I argue that when command 
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control is weak, combatants with higher levels of gender bias will be more likely to 
engage in conflict-related sexual violence than their counterparts with lower levels of 
bias29.  
As argued, contextual factors that occur in conflict matters, so these relationships 
are either facilitated or constrained by the influence of these important situational factors. 
The key is that the difference in the gender-biased beliefs between individual combatants 
interacts with these different contextual factors, which either increases or decreases the 
likelihood of the individual combatant to commit sexualized violence. 
Figure 2: Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias Visualization30  
                                                               
Conclusion  
It is evident that to better understand the complex landscape of conflict-related sexual 
violence, deeper analysis is needed into individual-level characteristics and decision-
making processes that predicts who will and will not engage in conflict-related sexual 
violence. Given the vast amount of resources and attention that is devoted to overcoming 
sexual violence in conflict, and into demobilizing, disarming and reintegrating former 
                                                 
29  Arguably, under the theoretical framework advanced in this dissertation, when sexual violence is part of 
the military strategy for warring groups, it is likely that those combatants with lower levels of gender bias 
will be more likely to resist or avoid committing acts of sexualized violence. Nonetheless, I do not 
empirically evaluate the non-perpetrator in this project. However, these categorizations appear to be 
potentially important for future research and are natural extensions of the discussion here.  
30 For ease, I refer to the Individual Difference Theory of Gender Bias as the Individual Difference Theory 
moving forward in the manuscript.  
  48 
combatants back into society, understanding the complex motivations that induce the 
propensity to commit violence in conflict and elsewhere is crucial for advancing our 
knowledge of how to overcome it and better understand where, when, and why it is likely 
to occur.  
In order to empirically evaluate this theory, I now turn to the case of the Bosnian War 
(1992 - 1995). The Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is an ideal case for evaluation given the 
well-documented, high-levels of sexualized violence associated with the conflict. 
Additionally, variations in several of the key factors outlined in Table 1 are identifiable in 
this case. In the chapter that follows, I provide a history of Bosnia with attention to the 
identity construction of some of the key social identities of interest in this research. In 
this way, I explore a source of biased beliefs – the historical and hierarchical construction 
of societal gender norms that is recreated over time and space into the present day.  
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CHAPTER 3 
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA: A HISTORY OF WARFARE AND GENDER NORM 
FORMATION 
 “On that day we’ll say to Hell: ‘Have you had enough?’ 
And Hell will answer: ‘Is there more?” 
Toga dana mi ćemo reći paklu: 'Jesi li se napunio?' 
A pakao će odgovoriti: 'Ima li još?' 
  Meša Selimović, Derviš iSmrt31 
 
Introduction 
 
The history of mass violence in the Balkans is long and storied. While this 
dissertation deals specifically with the parameters of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), it is 
useful to understand the historical processes that inform patterns of violence in the former 
Yugoslavia (FYR). Close examination of the background that led to the outbreak of 
violence in the early 1990’s, and Bosnia’s central role in this violence, provides a 
foundation for process-tracing this particular case. This allows for increased 
understanding of the potential mechanisms at work that can also be generalizable to cases 
similar to this single case study (Beach 2017).  
In addition, because this dissertation is focused on the social construction of 
identity, it is critical to analyze the historical framework by which we arrive to modern-
day Bosnia. As I identified in the previous chapter, entrenched inequalities built into 
social institutions is one source for the internalization of gender-biased beliefs and 
attitudes. Indeed, this is the milieu where other more immediate or close social 
interactions occur. Understanding the processes that shape various Bosnian identities and 
                                                 
31 Quote from Little and Silber (1997), Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. See this title for more detail on the 
events leading up to and during the war period explored in this dissertation.  
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culturally grounded notions about what it means to be a man and a woman within this 
context is vital.  
The Balkans, comprised of various states occupying the southeastern area of 
Europe, is a geopolitically and culturally diverse region of the world. Drawing its name 
from the Balkan Mountain Range that stretches from the Serbian-Bulgarian border, which 
then rises and reaches east to the Black Sea, it is a place with a rich and abundant natural 
environment. This highly mountainous region has seen its environs utilized in completely 
contradictory ways. This setting has served as the stage for the politically unifying 1984 
Olympic Games and has also been the platform for destructive and catastrophic mass 
political violence during more than one historical epoch.  
Inside this region resides Bosnia, a unique nation-state with a complex and 
diverse history and geography. The landscape is as varied as the people who call Bosnia 
home. It boasts dense mountain ranges characteristic of the region, along with a host of 
rivers that crosscut the landscape. Conversely, the Herzegovina canton located southwest 
of Sarajevo is arid and dry. The countryside shifts from the lush greenery of the 
mountains to the brown and taupe-tones characteristic of the desert. The seat of this land 
is styled with a culture of east meets west due, in large part, to a host of great powers 
converging on this pocket of the world during various historical eras. The Roman, 
Ottoman, and Austro-Hungarian Empires have all influenced and shaped both this region 
and the political and religious structures that have emerged as a result of their presence. It 
is a place where a rich tapestry of religious practices including Eastern Orthodox, Roman 
Catholicism, Islam, and Judaism have combined and overlapped resulting in a distinctive 
and singular society (Malcolm 2002).  
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Historians have grappled with documenting Bosnia’s complicated history in order 
to better understand the ultimate dissolution of the Yugoslav project in the early 1990’s. 
Explanations for the causes of the disintegration often depend on which perch the 
dissolution account is explored from. As such, it is critical to look back at some of the 
processes and events, as perceived from different contexts, that led to the making and 
ultimate unmaking of modern-day Yugoslavia.   
Lampe (2000) notes that there is undoubtedly a ‘point of view’ effect in his 
introduction to understanding modern-day Yugoslav history. He suggests that through 
cunning media manipulation in the 1980’s, along with the strategic machinations of 
nationalist party leaders, both Croats and Serbs32 were led to believe that other ethnic 
groups presented an existential threat to their own survival that thusly resulted in the 
revival of “imagined adversaries (xvii).” This ultimately provided the fuel for adherence 
to and support for ethno-nationalist ideologies that suddenly came into the political 
consciousness in full force in the 1980’s. 
 Maksić (2017) agrees with Lampe when he argues that individuals defaulted to 
support nationalist parties like the Srpska Demokratska Stranka (SDS), Hrvatska 
Demokratska Zajednica (HDZ), and the Stranka Demokratske Akcije (SDA)33 through 
affective mobilization. These parties effectively argued that the only way to defeat the 
                                                 
32 The two largest ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia at the time of the war period (1992 – 1995) 
explored in this dissertation.  
33 These political parties (and others) will be discussed intermittently throughout this dissertation. Several 
nationalist parties arose just before and as Yugoslavia began to fracture. Each of the parties mentioned here 
were officially founded in 1990 as nationalist parties aligning with the different ethnic groups in Bosnia. 
The SDS, Serbian Democratic Party, was first founded in Knin, Croatia where there was a majority Serb 
population, and then also formed in Bosnia. The official leader of the party was the psychiatrist Radovan 
Karadžić who was under the direction of Slobodan Milošević. The HDZ, the Croatian Democratic Union, 
led by Franjo Tuđman in Croatia, also had an ofshoot in Bosnia that was managed by several different 
leaders. Lastly, the SDA, Party of Democratic Action was led by Alija Izetbegović, was the Bosnian 
nationalist response as Yugoslavia disintegrated from the previous 45-years of one-party rule.  
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nationalist party of the opposition was to fight fire with fire. Thus, reluctant support was 
offered out of fear that was facilitated through the rhetoric espoused by many party 
leaders that opposition parties posed an existential threat to Yugoslavia broadly and 
individuals specifically. It is here where the memory of ‘otherness’ that was presumably 
long forgotten came to the fore once again and became the justification for massive 
bloodletting and violence.  
Given the importance of understanding the conditions leading up to the Bosnian 
War (1992 – 1995) and the importance of identity, beliefs, and motivations in this 
dissertation, I cover a condensed history of Bosnia and the surrounding region. This is 
explored to demonstrate the process by which ethno-nationalist identities were formed 
and how they informed the political conflict examined in this dissertation. In conjunction 
with this process tracing, I also review gender dynamics in the South Slav region mainly 
over the course of the twentieth century as gender, gender-roles, and gender-relations are 
relevant to several hypotheses advanced and examined in this thesis.  
Where Did the ‘Otherness’ Begin? A Brief Bosnian History 
In June of 1989, Slobodan Milošević, with his characteristic charisma, spoke to a 
crowd of several hundred Serbs on a battlefield in Priština, the capital of Kosovo to 
commemorate a battle from 600-years before. Milošević addressed the crowd with these 
words, “After six centuries, we are again engaged in battles and quarrels. They are not 
armed battles, but this cannot be excluded yet34.”  
The revival of seemingly long abandoned ethnic hatreds was suddenly finding 
mobilization in the nationalist rhetoric of the various leaders of the newly forming 
                                                 
34 Malcolm (2002, p. 213) cites this quote as harbinger of the death of Yugoslavia.  
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nationalist parties. But, from where did these source and why would a reference to a 600-
year-old battle receive uproarious applause from the several hundred attendees listening 
to Milošević espouse this rhetoric?  A glance backwards at the historic processes that led 
to modern-day Bosnia is required in order to better understand the complex political and 
economic relations that immediately preceded the war period (1992 – 1995) examined in 
this dissertation. This look back will also help explain how long-ago battles became 
salient political fodder once again and how once dormant identities became high valence 
political issues as Yugoslavia inevitably fragmented.  
Ancient Bosnian History 
The Slavs arrived in the Balkans, and Bosnia, over a thousand years ago and 
encountered the Illyrians. These ancient peoples were organized into various tribes that 
inhabited most of the Balkans region. Their ancient language closely matches modern-
day Albanian and their ancient practices have been culturally recognized and expressed in 
song and poetry to this day (Malcolm 2002). While several of these tribes attempted to 
rebel against the invading Romans, by 9AD Roman rule reigned supreme in the region. 
Roman road building and infrastructure had an early effect on the racial and religious 
diversification of Bosnia. Christianity came quickly to the region as evidenced by the 
excavated Roman basilicas peppered throughout the territory.  
Following this era, several invasions were attempted by various actors between 
the third and sixth centuries but left relatively little imprint on the region. It is possible 
that these visiting groups were more interested in raiding rather than settling, but what 
remains clear is that in the 6th century a large migration of Slav settlers came onto the 
peninsula bringing with them two distinctive Slavic tribes – Croats and Serbs (Malcolm 
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2002). Historically, these two tribes shared a close connection and it is believed that they 
may have descended from the Iranian caste and/or tribe system. The two groups settled 
into different areas of the Balkan territory with Croats organizing in what is roughly 
modern-day Croatia and Serbs settling into what is a portion of modern-day Serbia and 
Montenegro and a small part of Herzegovina (Malcolm 2002).While these groups were 
distinct and separate, it is evident that they were closely related.  
As the 10th and 11th centuries approached, it was clear that Bosnia was 
recognized as a separate autonomous territory. However, as is the case with this historical 
era in other regions, a host of skirmishes and efforts at power grabs meant that the area 
was alternately controlled by the various ruling groups of the moment, but seemingly 
none of these groups had lasting impact on the social, political, and cultural structures 
(Malcolm 2002). By the close of the 11th century, Serbs establish a territory in the 
eastern Balkans and the Croatians were ruled by Hungarian royalty, which established a 
long-standing relationship between the Croats and Hungary that continued until the end 
of World War I (WWI) (Malcolm 2002).  
Malcolm (2002) notes that both Slavic Croat and Serb tribes influenced and 
settled in certain areas in Bosnia throughout the course of this early history. He 
demonstrates that Serb tribes clearly settled in parts of what is today Herzegovina and 
that Serbs ruled Bosnia for short periods – notably at times in the 10th and 11th centuries. 
And yet, culturally speaking, Bosnia's religious and political structures appear more 
influenced by Croat-Hungarian design. However, in either case, Malcolm (2002) argues 
that it is a mistake to apply the tribal labels and settling patterns of the past to modern-
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day structures. He states, “All that one can sensibly say about the ethnic identity of the 
Bosnians is this: they were Slavs who lived in Bosnia (p. 12).” 
As history moved forward, Bosnia made territorial gains in Herzegovina and a 
part of the Dalmatian coast during the medieval era. This area was certainly coveted by 
neighboring Serbian Kings and by Hungary, but Bosnia was a difficult conquest. The 
terrain made it challenging to enter the territory and the semi-feudal political structure 
resulted in an empowered land-owning class that was troublesome to manage (Malcolm 
2002). These and other factors served to protect Bosnia from any real aggression during 
the medieval period. This status altered quickly in the mid-1400's when Bosnia was 
invaded by the Ottomans, which had a lasting impact on Bosnia's social, cultural, and 
political structure (Malcolm 2002).  
Ottoman Rule and Influence   
In 1463, the Turkish military machine of the Ottoman Empire conquered Bosnia 
with relative ease. Over the next century and a half there were some efforts to hold off the 
Turks, mainly by the Habsburgs, but they were mostly in vain. Ultimately, the Ottomans 
consolidated power in the region and the vestiges of its influential reign remain evident to 
this day (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
The Ottomans were known for their military prowess and effectiveness. Their 
political and administrative systems were designed exclusively to support the military 
structure and the conquest interests of the empire. In this way, under the administration of 
the Ottomans, Bosnia was organized as a military-feudal state in order to fuel soldiers 
and materials to wage war and expand the territorial interests of the empire (Lampe 2000; 
Malcolm 2002).  
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While identifying as a Muslim certainly had its advantages under the Ottomans, 
military matters superseded religious concerns. Malcolm (2002) illustrates these 
preferences: “It was not state policy to convert people to Islam or make them behave like 
Muslims; the only state policy was to keep the country under control and extract from it 
money, men and feudal incomes to supply the needs of the Empire further afield (p. 49).” 
This meant that there was a degree of religious freedom for non-Muslims, albeit with 
some restrictions, due to a sort of pseudo-secularization approach by the Ottomans.  
Yet, in spite of this, Islamization clearly spread throughout Bosnia as the Ottoman 
Empire consolidated in the region. Evidence from the Ottoman tax registers demonstrate 
the pace and rhythm of the transformation (Malcolm 2002). In the early years post the 
1463 conquest, the migration of the non-Islamicized out of the region is apparent. About 
a century later, an increasing number of individuals identifying as Muslim seems to have 
been the result of converting Christian and Catholic individuals to Islam (Malcolm 2002). 
In roughly 150 years, Muslims became the religious majority35. Notably, the large towns 
that developed during the Ottoman era were Muslim and were defined by Muslim 
institutions and buildings. The influence of this process is undeniably present in the 
composition and demographics of modern-day Bosnian cities and towns (Lampe 2000; 
Malcolm 2002).  
 
 
                                                 
35 There are a host of theories about the Islamization of Bosnia that are relevant to the historical land claims 
leveraged by differing ethnic groups in the region. The claim for certain territorial rights has been identified 
as a potential cause of the war. Most of these theories are outside of the scope of this dissertation. For more 
on these theories and whether or not the Islamization in the region was forcibly imposed or imported, 
please see Malcolm (2002) Chapter 5.  
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The Orthodox 
Interestingly, Serbian Orthodox presence in Bosnia was timed symmetrically with 
the arrival of the Turks. While there are few mentions of this demographic prior to the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, they quickly become a marked presence in the region 
with several notable monasteries being built during the sixteenth century (Malcolm 
2002). The apparent speed of this shift is attributable to the Ottomans supporting 
migration from Orthodox regions to areas that experienced extreme depopulation from 
plague and war (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
Vlachs, a large demographic that migrated to fill the depopulation gap, were 
ideally aligned with the Ottoman military agenda. They were known for their military 
aptitude and were given special permission to carry arms legally and were allowed to 
keep any spoils from their military expeditions36. While the Ottomans did not formally 
pay them, they were expected to fulfill a military role in exchange for the aforementioned 
special permissions. When they initially arrived in the Bosnian territory they were more 
nomadic in nature, but over time and under Ottoman rule, this distinctive group 
ultimately settled in various parts of the region and carry down demographically to this 
day (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
Ottoman Decline, Serbian Autonomy, and Austro-Hungarian Rule  
As is the case with many empires, the Ottoman’s slow decline in Bosnia can be 
attributed to many costly and lengthy wars that had significant and catastrophic economic 
impacts. Another shaping effect of the wars between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires 
was the refugee effect. As the Austrian armies marched toward and into Balkan territory, 
                                                 
36 These individuals were known as janissaries.  
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Muslims residing in the contested territorial areas affected during these sieges were 
driven into Bosnia for refuge (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
As a highly militarized empire, the Ottomans warred with several different actors 
at the same time. A few key conflicts had significant determining effects on the territorial 
and demographic identity of Bosnia. These included a series revolts mobilized from the 
east in modern-day Serbia in the early 1800's (Malcolm 2002). By 1815, the militarily 
efficient janissaries and other anti-Ottoman factions, managed to create enough battle 
fatigue to force the Ottomans into negotiation for a relatively autonomous region as a 
precursor to Serbian independence (Malcolm 2002).  
Simultaneous to Ottoman military decline, the military-feudal structure of old 
transitioned into an administrative system of landowning aristocracy that created taxable 
revenues for the governing Ottomans (Malcolm 2002). Under this evolving system, the 
majority of the major landowners were Muslim and the peasant class was primarily 
Christian. This system led to early social polarization based on religious and social 
dimensions (Malcolm 2002). This tension between peasants and landowners persisted to 
the end of Ottoman rule.  
Bosnia experienced heavy economic hits during this decline and the economic 
uncertainty resulted in massive reform efforts. Some of these efforts included equitable 
representation of the various ethno-religious groups participating in judiciary and other 
administrative functions (Malcolm 2002). Additionally, there was a significant increase 
in places of worship for the Orthodox and Catholic communities. However, these reform 
efforts could not hedge the economic instability, the weight of which was primarily borne 
on the back of the peasant class (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). These factors and others 
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led to the ultimate decline of the Ottoman Empire and ushered in Austro-Hungarian rule 
and influence.  
The dual monarchies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were actually reluctant to 
pursue Bosnia as a territory. The manifest benefits of the rich, largely untapped, natural 
resources were not alluring enough to balance the political complications such a move 
would engender (Malcolm 2002). Policymakers worried that taking on Bosnia would 
result in a strong South Slav alliance between Bosnia and Croatia that would result in a 
host of political concessions the Empire was loathe to provide (Malcolm 2002). Yet, the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire most feared a greater Serbia absorbing Bosnia, which would 
ultimately generate influence in Croatia as a South Slav alliance. Thus, the decision to 
pursue Bosnia was made as a defensive measure when Serbia pursued war against the 
Ottomans in 1876 (Lampe 2000; Malcom 2002).  
The Austro-Hungarians took over the administration of Bosnia, but mainly kept 
the functional operation of the Ottoman institutions in place (Malcolm 2002). The change 
in administrative processes was generally gradual with little substantive change. One 
change that would largely impact the demographics and migration patterns in the region 
was the Austro-Hungarian conscription policy. Conscription, along with emigration, by 
those avoiding reprisal and/or avoiding being ruled by a Christian monarch, led to large 
swaths of individuals migrating mainly to Turkey (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2000).  
While the Austrians remained relatively neutral on social reforms, their rule was 
characterized by robust economic and infrastructural development (Malcolm 2002). 
Roads that were previously considered practicably impassable were improved and 
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railways were built to crosscut the region. The agriculture and industrial sectors also saw 
much improvement under these reformation efforts (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
However, it is during the Austro-Hungarian era that nationhood and religion 
became entangled resulting in the salience of religious identities for the Orthodox Serbs 
and the Catholic Croats (Malcolm 2002). As South Slav identity began to be parsed into 
more refined categories on the basis of shared histories, language, and religion - Croatia 
and Serbia also began to be more territorially defined along these same dimensions 
(Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
In Bosnia, however, identification for Serbs and Croats were different since ethnic 
and religious labels could not functionally align with territorial boundaries. As such, the 
Serb and Croat national identities lined up exclusively with their correlating religious 
qualifiers. Both within and outside of Bosnia, nationalism amongst these groups rose 
during this period and was effectively facilitated through the social networks of educators 
and priests committed to these groups (Malcolm 2002). Additionally, these identities 
became more entrenched as a result of some heedless Austro-Hungarian policies – most 
notable of which was the full annexation of Bosnia (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). 
Ultimately, the annexation of Bosnia led to strong anti-Austrian sentiment across 
the South Slav region. While anti-Austrian Serbs and Croats initially mobilized 
separately, inter-ethnic and inter-religious organizations emerged desiring social 
revolution and liberation (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). The agenda for a unified South 
Slav state independent of Austria became the order of the day. And, on the infamous June 
28th day of 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Serb nationalist famously assassinated the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the Duchess of Hohenberg through a series of gunshots 
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on the streets of Sarajevo next to the Latin Bridge. During his trial, Princip stated, “I am a 
Yugoslav nationalist, aiming for the unification of all Yugoslav, and I do not care what 
form of state, but it must be free from Austria. (Jelavich 1983, p. 235; Malcolm 2002, p. 
153).” 
World Wars, The First Yugoslavia, and the Interwar Years  
The assassination of the Archduke is known as the precipitating event that set the 
Great Powers in warring motion in what is known today as WWI. The fact that Princip 
was considered a Serb nationalist led to a backlash against the Serb community in 
Bosnia. At the outset, there was massive resettlement - Serbs were pushed outside 
Bosnia’s eastern border towards Montenegro and Serbian and Bosnian Serb nationalists 
were held in internment camps (Malcolm 2002; Lampe 2000). In spite of this backlash, 
the community of South Slavs ultimately pursued and won a negotiation with Austria to 
become a defined and autonomous sovereign state. The first Kingdom of Yugoslavia was 
understood to be the unification of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs. As is often the case with 
power transitions - skirmishes, looting, and attacks against the landowning class, who 
were mostly Muslim - characterized the early period of the first Yugoslavia (Malcolm 
2002).  
As the region settled into a new political order, various ethnic and religious 
groups maneuvered and organized in order to maximize their power (Malcolm 2002). 
Bosnian policymakers were pushing to be a separate territory within the newly forming 
Yugoslav state. However, several Serb parties and activists supported either an entirely 
centralized Yugoslav state or the addition of Bosnia to Serb territory in order to expand 
Serbian boundaries (Malcolm 2002). Conversely, Croatia supported a confederate system 
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and wished to avoid a highly centralized approach. The tensions concerning regionalism 
vis a vis centralization between Croatia and Serbia persisted through the interwar period 
(Malcolm 2002).  
In the late 1920’s, Serbia’s centralization dream was realized, although not in the 
way or to the degree it was wished for or intended. Constant and escalating debate and 
violence amongst representatives in the parliament provided the impetus for King 
Alexander37 to arrange for royal rule with the suspension of the burgeoning constitution 
of the First Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). A royal system was not the type of centralized 
government Serbia was aiming for and resentment festered against the Crown for most of 
the interested parties. Ultimately, the Crown made moves to deepen centralization in 
most government institutions, and soon after King Alexander was assassinated and the 
pendulum swung back to form a more constitutionalized government (Lampe 2000; 
Malcolm 2002).  
As World War II (WWII) was fast approaching, the inevitable breakup of the First 
Yugoslavia began in earnest. There was to be no federal arrangement at that time that 
would be satisfactory for Croatia. Through a series of tense negotiations, parts of Bosnia 
were assigned to Croatian territory (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). In spite of the best 
efforts of Bosnian statesman who still pursued the possibility of an autonomous Bosnia, 
this suggestion was deemed untenable due to the high concentration of Serbs that 
remained in existing Croatian territory (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). And yet, the 
                                                 
37 First King of Yugoslavia. He was initially the Crown Prince of Serbia. He led forces during the First and 
Second Balkans Wars.  At the end of WWI, as part of the reorganization of the territorial map, he accepted 
the role as Prince Regent of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. See Lampe (2000) and Malcolm 
(2002) for more.  
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ongoing debate and efforts to negotiate a solution were ultimately for naught as WWII 
reached over and breached the borders of the First Yugoslavia.  
Yugoslavia experienced WWII as a series of international and internal conflicts. 
First, there was the invasion by Germany and Italy into Slovene territory. Yugoslavia was 
of strategic interest because it provided raw materials and human capital for the Axis 
powers to wage war against the Allies. While the international conflict was incredibly 
damaging to the region; importantly, there were two civil wars that largely accounted for 
the estimated one million people who died in Yugoslavia during those four years of war 
(Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
After making military gains in the region, the Germans and Italians established an 
independent Croatian state, known as NDH, which included the whole territory of Bosnia 
and Croatia (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). This territory was then divided into German 
and Italian militarized zones and a Croatian leader was established – Ante Pavelić, who 
was the leader of the Ustaše movement (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). Shortly following 
the creation of the NDH, anti-Jewish laws and policies were issued and executed 
(Malcolm 2002). However, another ethnic group was the target of the extreme Ustaše 
ideologues – the sizable Serb minority within the newly established borders of the NDH. 
Between June and July of 1941, widespread acts of violence were committed against the 
Serb population. These acts included mass arrests, indiscriminate killing, and destruction 
of entire villages (Jancar-Webster 1990; Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002).  
These atrocities mobilized the Serb population into defensive action and 
individuals began to align with the two primary resistance movements operating within 
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the NDH. The two resistance movements were the Ćetniks38 and the Communist 
Partisans (Malcolm 2002). Serbs filled the ranks of both movements but the ideologies of 
the two groups were distinct, leading to a secondary internal conflict premised on the 
competition between the two (Malcolm 2002).  
The vision and agenda of the two movements were quite distinct. The Ćetniks' 
post-war vision for the territory was for a greater and homogenized Serbia (Lampe 2000; 
Malcolm 2002). Ćetniks wanted to absorb Bosnia and other parts of the territory, but they 
also wanted Croats to go to Croatia and Muslims to go to either Turkey or Albania 
(Jancar-Webster 1990; Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002). This meant that they saw a future 
where ethnicity and nationality were exclusively defined and aligned within territorial 
boundaries.   
On the other hand, under the direction of Josep Broz Tito, a Stalin loyalist with a 
Communist vision for the future Yugoslavia, the Partisans sought to drive the Germans 
out and facilitate social revolution (Malcolm 2002). The communist ideology driving the 
Partisans was based on the position that organizing on the basis of ethno-religious 
identity was bourgeois and untenable, which was entirely counter to the position of the 
Ćetniks. The Partisans sought centralization and a one-party vision where the Ćetniks 
were more interested in the status quo and a Greater Serbia (Malcolm 2002).  
Thus, Tito strategically sought to defeat Ćetnik competition for the territory. 
Eventually, with some tactical maneuvering and shifting alliances amongst the key four 
                                                 
38 Ćetnik is generally considered a pejorative term. It originates from a guerilla force that mobilized during 
World War II to defend against the Axis Powers, but that ultimately fought against the Partisans. This 
group is associated with the image of a white skull and cross bones superimposed on a black background 
(Malcolm 2002). Any further reference throughout this dissertation is not associated with any pejorative 
references. Further, I use Ćetniks and Chetnik interchangeably.  
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warring parties in the territory (Germans, Italians, Ćetniks, and Partisans), the Partisans 
did achieve the mission with Allied support (Malcolm 2002). As the Germans eventually 
withdrew from the region, Communist rule became the order of the day with King Peter39 
and the Allies encouraging the population to back Tito (Malcolm 2002).  
At the time, three primary groups comprised Bosnian territory – Bosnian Croats, 
Bosnian Serbs, and Bosnian Muslims. The position of the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian 
Serbs during WWII was fairly obvious given the context. While a minority supported the 
extreme Ustaša position, most Bosnian Croats were initially pleased with the formation 
of the NDH without fully embracing an extreme Ustaša ideology (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 
2002). However, after four terrible years of war, most Bosnian Croats abandoned support 
for the NDH and joined the now majority Partisans. Given that they were extreme targets 
during the war, Bosnian Serbs naturally aligned in opposition to the Ustaša and joined the 
Partisans in resistance at regular intervals throughout the war (Jancar-Webster 1990; 
Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).  
The Bosnian Muslim position during WWII was more complex than the other two 
groups. Given the historical nationalism from the Serbs, most Bosnian Muslims 
supported being led by Croatian leaders rather than leaders from Belgrade (Malcolm 
2002). Thus, at the start of the war, most aligned with the newly established NDH under 
the promise of religious freedom. However, the NDH was unable to credibly deliver on 
these commitments and the Bosnian Muslims became disenchanted with this alliance 
(Malcolm 2002). Yet, the alternative of joining the Ćetniks in resistance to the Ustaša 
                                                 
39 The last King of Yugoslavia. He was a monarch ruling in exile.  
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was equally vexing because of the ongoing violent conflicts between the Serbs and the 
Muslims.  
Under these circumstances, between 1941 and 1942, Bosnian Muslims began to 
slowly organize and fill the Partisan ranks (Malcolm 2002). Support for the Partisans was 
cautious given the rumored mistreatment of Muslims in other European Communist 
territories. Atheism also did not appeal to Muslim sensibilities, but the alternatives were 
even less of a draw. In certain regions of Bosnia, there were Ćetnik-Muslim alliances40, 
but these were less common than smaller Muslim defense units that organized to protect 
their interests and communities from all four of the primary fighting groups (Malcolm 
2002).  
Ultimately, as the war persisted, Bosnian Muslims sought German support to once 
again become an independent, autonomous territory separate from the Ustaša and the 
NDH. However, Germany would never acquiesce this request given the uproar it would 
cause from the Croatian perch (Malcolm 2002). But, human capital to wage war 
remained a critical and declining resource for the Germans and negotiations led to the 
formation of a Muslim SS unit called Hadžar, which was sent away from Bosnia for 
training (Malcolm 2002).  
This was highly distressing for the Muslims remaining in Bosnia and for those 
who volunteered for the Hadžar unit (Malcolm 2002). Volunteers believed they were 
joining to protect their communities and being sent away to train was not what they 
expected. Furthermore, while they were sent away, the Ustaša continued to commit 
atrocities against Muslims and Serbs throughout Bosnia (Malcolm 2002). Ultimately, and 
                                                 
40 Malcolm (2002) highlights the activities of one such unit in the area of Zenica (p. 188).  
  67 
after several requests, the Hadžar unit was sent back to Bosnia and upon their return, they 
committed indiscriminate violence against Bosnian Serbs in the north and eastern parts of 
Bosnia. It is estimated that anywhere between several hundred and several thousand 
Serbs were victims during this period of violence (Malcolm 2002).   
As the war persisted, German-Ćetnik agreements became more public and 
obvious, which left Bosnian Muslims suspicious of German intentions (Malcolm 2002). 
As 1944 drew to a close, the Partisan movement appeared to be the most ideal alliance 
for Bosnian Muslims and for the advancement of Muslim interests. Many of the Bosnian 
Muslims comprising the Hadžar unit defected to join the Partisans at this time (Malcolm 
2002).  In the end, for all the groups, most roads ultimately led to Partisan support and on 
April 6, 1945, Tito and the Partisans liberated Sarajevo and by the close of the month the 
territory of Bosnia was fully under Partisan control (Malcolm 2002).  
As was the case in all of the occupied territories, the close of WWII left 
devastating loss in its wake. In Bosnia, the human cost was significant. Of the one million 
Yugoslav's that died during the course of WWII, it is estimated that 8.1% of the total 
Bosnian Muslim population was killed (Malcolm 2002). Following closely behind were 
Serbs with a 7.3% loss of their total population (Malcolm 2002). Only Jews and Gypsies 
experienced greater loss of life. All groups faced death in many of the more infamous 
German concentration camps, but most of the death was perpetuated as Yugoslav upon 
Yugoslav acts of violence (Malcolm 2002).  It was under these grim conditions that the 
Titoist Yugoslav era was ushered in.  
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Bosnia, Yugoslavia, and the Age of Tito  (1945 – 1989) 
Josep Broz Tito (Marshall Tito) is often attributed for bringing peace and 
reconciliation and effective one-party rule to Yugoslavia after WWII. “Tito was not only 
a national hero,” Trošt (2014) noted, “he represented the unifying facet of Yugoslav 
identity (p. 147).” However, this unification came at a cost. Immediately following the 
war, Tito instituted strong-arm tactics in order to eliminate enemies and competition. 
Executions, forced death marches, and placement in concentration camps continued in 
the early Tito years in order to eliminate any competition or critics to Communist 
centralization (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).  
At the end of World War II, from roughly 1945 – 1946, Tito and the Partisans 
brutally established one party rule by eliminating any threats to the Partisan’s singular 
vision of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The establishment of the Yugoslav Communist 
Party resulted in 40 years of social training and indoctrination into a unified, socialist 
vision of Yugoslavia (Malcolm 2002). The vehicles for this indoctrination included 
schools, museums, and array of cultural sites that regularly and persistently reinforced the 
message of “brotherhood and unity (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 2002)41.”  
In 1946, Yugoslavia's federal constitution was rolled out and the indoctrination 
into the message of brotherhood and unity – one unified Yugoslavia – began in earnest. 
Notably, there was often a gap between the aspirational propaganda touted by the regime 
and actual practice. In order to achieve Tito's vision of brotherhood and unity, it required 
the tempering of distinctions based on ethnicity, nationality, and/or religious identity 
                                                 
41 Interview conducted on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo with a museum curator.  
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(Malcolm 2000). Yugoslav was to be the primary salient identity. In praxis, this was 
often a brutal process.  
In the early years of Tito's reign, targeted campaigns were waged against major 
religious institutions. During this time, many monasteries and other places of worship 
were shut down. Courts of Islamic law were also eliminated and laws forbidding wearing 
hijab were also instituted (Jelavich 1983). While the constitution guaranteed religious 
freedom, in practice the Communist party set out to regulate and control institutions that 
might challenge a one-party state (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).   
Over time, however, the most severe practices against religion were relaxed and 
promises of religious freedom were renewed. Ever the consummate politician, Tito 
recognized the strategic importance of religion as a remedy to some of Yugoslavia's more 
troubling economic and political challenges (Malcolm 2002). By allowing religious 
institutions to fill the gaps in the state resource capacity, Yugoslavia could more 
effectively focus on international matters. This allowed Tito to pit East against West 
while each courted Yugoslavia’s for favor. 
Up to this point in time, Muslim identity was restricted to religion and nationality 
and was essentially defined separately. The manner in which Muslims aligned with a 
separate and distinct national identity is demonstrated in the changing demographic 
categories listed on the census reports from 1948 and beyond (Malcolm 2002). In 1948, 
options for Muslim identification were limited to Muslim-Serb, Muslim-Croat, or 
Muslim-nationality undeclared (Malcolm 2002). Overwhelmingly, Muslims identified 
with the undeclared category (Malcolm 2002). This manner of identification with a 
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separate nationality for the Muslim population persisted and by the 1960's, Muslim 
became an equally recognized identity as Serb and Croat (Malcolm 2002).  
Notably, religious interests mobilized only a small portion of the Muslim 
community. It was, in fact, more of a politically motivated movement on the part of 
secular Muslims concerned about Muslim status under Communism (Jelavich 1983; 
Malcolm 2002). Through the 1950's and 1960's, Bosnia struggled under the Communist 
administration of Yugoslavia and lagged well behind Croatia and Serbia on nearly all 
economic indicators (Malcolm 2002). Some analysts argued that this was because Bosnia 
did not contain a homogenized sense of nationality, but rather a mix of their neighboring 
nations and one undefined nationality (Malcolm 2002). This state of affairs certainly 
provided motivation for Muslims to organize as a nationality in order to achieve effective 
political representation within the Communist administration (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 
2002).  
In concert with the solidification of Muslim nationality, after roughly two decades 
of strong centralization, in the 1970's reformation began in earnest in Yugoslavia 
(Malcolm 2002). The constitution was rewritten and each republic was given an 
increased degree of administrative autonomy (Malcolm 2002). Some negative 
externalities emerged from this shift. Partial decentralization led to increasing economic 
inefficiencies as industry was duplicated across the region and competition for 
government funding was mobilized based on ethno-national dimensions (Jelavich 1983; 
Malcolm 2002). The seeds for nationalist discontent were planted and both Serbia and 
Croatia leveraged complaints (Jelavich 1983; Malcolm 2002).  
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Serbian nationalism was particularly strong. A leaked memo, the Memorandum of 
the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SAUN memo) was highly controversial 
(Morus 2007). It was commissioned and authored by sixteen Serb intellectuals and shared 
a list of grievances against Yugoslav centralization. The SAUN memo notably claims 
that Serbs have historically and persistently been victims of a host of political ails 
including, but not limited to, religious persecution, forced assimilation, and cultural 
genocide (Morus 2007).  
In addition, territorial claims persistently remained a highly salient concern for 
Serbs. At the end of WWII, Tito established defined internal boundaries in the Yugoslav 
territory; two areas were declared autonomous territories of Serbia – Vojvodina and 
Kosovo. Both areas had a high, yet minority, concentration of Serbs within its borders, 
but many Serbs argued for Serbian historical claims on these land (Malcolm 2002). While 
these areas weren't really at issue during Tito's early years, post-decentralization was 
another matter entirely (Malcolm 2002). These territories enjoyed increased autonomy as 
an effect of constitutional reform, which threatened the minority Serb status in these 
areas. Conflicts broke out and by the early 1980's and Kosovo became a permanently 
militarized zone (Malcolm 2002)42.  
At this time, Tito-era Communism was in major decline mostly due to the 
crippling economic struggles the region faced (Malcolm 2002). These economic 
challenges created fissures to allow for ethno-national rhetoric and religious mobilization 
                                                 
42 The details of the dynamics between Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina are outside of the scope of this 
dissertation. However, it is important to note that Kosovo was (and is) comprised mainly of ethnic 
Albanians who religiously and secularly identify as Muslim. This increased Orthodox Serb resistance to 
Muslim political representation out of concern for Serb minorities in these territories (Malcolm 2002). This 
may have been another factor feeding into increasing Serb nationalism.  
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amongst the distinctive groups scattered across the territory. Malcolm (2002) describes 
the economic situation in the 1980's as follows:  
“The whole Titoist economic system – which has been aptly described as 'Self-
Mismanagement' – was in a state of terminal decline, with a steep and steady fall in real 
wages and a rise in absenteeism and strikes...Meanwhile, inflation rose to 120 per cent 
(sic) in 1987 and 250 per cent (sic) in 1988. By the end of that year, Yugoslavia's total 
foreign debt came to $33 billion, of which $20 billion was repayable in hard currencies to 
the West. In this way, the long-term legacy of Tito's economic policies had been to create 
an increasingly discontented and impoverished population – the perfect place for 
demagogues to get to work, stirring up the policies of resentment (p. 210).” 
 
It is here that the dissolution of a nation began in earnest. The combination of 
economic factors, cunning maneuvers of nationalist leaders, and policies borne of 
resentment ultimately led Yugoslavia on an inexorable march towards fragmentation.  
Bosnia and the Fall of Yugoslavia 1989 – 1992 
The causes for and build up to the war in Yugoslavia are many. Several different 
scholars highlight different explanations for the outbreak of violence. Both Cohen (2013) 
and Maksić (2017) argue that affective mobilization was facilitated by Serb party leaders 
to play on existential fears premised on the victimhood and persecution of the Serb nation 
by non-Serbs. However, this affective mobilization required a charismatic leader to 
facilitate and direct those energies. Meier (2005) argues that Slobodan Milošević 
perfectly fulfilled this role. 
The battlefield speech referenced at the start of this chapter given by Milošević is 
a prime example of elite mobilization of violence. Milošević played on fear and argued 
that the Serbs could not rule out armed battle for the survival of the Serb nation. This 
speech is simply one example of many of rhetoric stirring discontent during the years 
building up to the outbreak of violence. The speech exemplifies the combined effect of 
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charismatic leadership and affective mobilization in arguing for a Greater Serbia that led 
up to the outbreak of violence.  
  Economic explanations also serve as a primary cause for the violence. Certainly 
Lampe (2000) and Malcolm (2002) both highlight a host of economic concerns that 
festered in the wounds of an impoverished population. Pugh, Cooper, and Goodhand 
(2004) make the case for the pressure of the immediate economic situation leading to the 
jockeying of power on the part of the various parties in the political system. Little and 
Silber (1997) and Ramet (2005) argue that it was not only the immediately preceding 
economic conditions, but rather the troubles with the mismanagement of the Yugoslav 
state as a whole combined with Serb nationalist ambitions that resulted in the outbreak in 
violence.  
More than likely, part or all of these explanations holds some truth. As the 
historical review thus far reveals, the flames for a greater Serbia had been stoked in the 
political and economic structures of the failing Yugoslav state (Lampe 2000; Malcolm 
2002; Woodward 2003). However, existential fears were not simply premised on 
economic factors alone, but also on quantitative demographic superiority. Albanian 
families significantly outpaced the rhythm of Serb family rate growth. As such, party 
leaders called on Serb women to do their patriotic duty and reproduce the nation to 
stymie this threat (Cockburn 1998; Berry 2018).  
In any case, during this time both inflation and Serb nationalism continued to rise 
as Communism fell. Communist after communist became politically unseated allowing a 
multi-party system to emerge in Yugoslavia where several independent parties jockeyed 
for power (Malcolm 2002; Maksić 2017). It was evident that the Communist Party was in 
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decline and during the first multiparty elections in1990 several nationalist political parties 
won seats across all of the territory (Maksić 2017; Berry 2018). Emboldened by 
Communist decline and political rhetoric, the revival of the Serb Ćetnik movement came 
in force with a host of cultural nationalist symbols sweeping the landscape43. 
Under these conditions, tension continued to build in the region and debate 
persists to this day about which particular event is said to have been the ultimate catalyst 
for the pending outbreak of violence. There was a rebellion in Knin, situated close to the 
border of Bosnia in Croatia. As Croatia contemplated seceding and making a move for 
independence, the roughly 80% majority Serb population in Knin rebelled against Croatia 
and declared itself independent (Little and Silber 1997). The police chief at the time, 
Milan Martić44, was integral in facilitating this rebellion in what is now known as the Log 
Revolution, essentially blocking the south border of Knin with logs (Little and Silber 
1997). 
In addition to this, as both Slovenia and Croatia prepared for the multiparty 
elections in 1990, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) began confiscating the weapon 
stores of both Republics in order to avoid the building of internal armies that might lead 
to secession (Little and Silber 1997). The JNA commandeered roughly 70% of the 
weapon stores before Slovene President, Milan Kučan, ordered a stop to the process. 
(Little and Silber 1997) The JNA's campaign of arms reduction, particularly in Slovenia 
and Croatia led to secret and illegal arms procurement processes by Croatia that 
                                                 
43 Songs, uniforms, and flags from WWII were displayed. For more, see Berry (2018, p. 115).    
44 Martić was convicted on 16 counts and sentenced to 35 years in prison in 2007. As a leader of the Croat-
Serb paramilitary unit in Knin his crimes included murder, torture, deportation, attacks on civilians, crimes 
against humanity and violations of laws and customs of war (LOAC) (International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia 2007).  
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ultimately became public (Little and Silber 1997). Throughout 1990, tensions continued 
to rise as secret independence and partition talks occurred between key leaders of the 
Republics (Little and Silber 1997).  
 Zimmermann (1995) argues that Slovenia's referendum for independence at the 
end of 1990 was the key deathblow for Yugoslavia. This maneuver at the height of the 
crisis ultimately facilitated a domino effect of fractionalization. As soon as Slovenia 
declared independence, Croatia indicated that there could be no Yugoslavia without 
Slovenia and made their intent for independence clear (Little and Silber 1997; Berry  
2018). Croatia's claim for independence was untenable for Belgrade and full-scale war 
erupted shortly following the Croatian referendum.  
These events left Bosnia in a precarious position. Options were limited to 
remaining in a now Serb dominated Yugoslavia or to also pursue independence. Bosnian 
Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims began to organize into paramilitary groups 
in preparation for conflict. In the end, Bosnia's referendum for independence was 
approved by a significant margin45 and in April 1992 the international community 
recognized Bosnia as an independent sovereign state (Little and Silber 1997; Berry 
2018). On April 6, 1992, an organized anti-war rally comprised of 100,000 protestors of 
various nationalities poured onto the streets of Sarajevo (Little and Silber 1997). This 
peaceful protest turned deadly when Serb snipers indiscriminately shot at the crowd 
                                                 
45 Berry (2018) notes that 99% of the turnout voted for independence. However, Bosnian Serbs boycotted 
the referendum entirely, which means only 63% of eligible voters supported the referendum. In either case, 
the margin was still large for independence. These numbers, however, reflect the diversity in Bosnia and 
exemplifies why Bosnia is colloquially considered a mini-Yugoslavia.   
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killing several people46. War had officially come to Bosnia. None could predict how long 
it would stay and the terrible costs it would engender in its wake.   
A Brief History of Gender Roles in Bosnia 
In addition to understanding the standard historical processes that led to the 
outbreak of war in Bosnia (1992 – 1995), it is also critical to examine some of the historic 
gender norms and relations that developed and were shaped in this region over time. 
These gender roles and interactions, in conjunction with the other processes already 
described in this chapter, are the primer and the context under which sexualized violence 
was perpetrated during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Ramet (2010) argues that culture 
is central to politics, “and that a political history must, of necessity, take up cultural 
questions (p. 5).” In the historical review outlined in this chapter, gender equivocates to 
culture and women’s history leading up to the outbreak of the war is an essential part of 
the narrative.  
While some ancient Balkan practices demonstrate early gender distinctions, the 
gender examination here begins in modern history rather than ancient. However, an 
anecdote related to ancient Illyrian tattooing practices that carried through to the modern 
age seems particularly noteworthy and a reasonable place to begin. Durham (1979) 
studied the Illyrian tattooing practice in the 1920’s and observed that women were much 
more elaborately tattooed than men. The women she interviewed noted that they engaged 
the practice because it was their custom and that tattooing would make their hands 
                                                 
46 It remains debated who the first victims of the Bosnian war were. Serbs claim that the killing of a 
groom’s father during a wedding procession on the day of the referendum in May is the first victim. 
Bosniaks claim that two women protestors killed during the anti-war demonstration at Vrbanja Bridge are 
the first victims. Other accounts may vary. See Little and Silber (1997) for more on the causes for the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia.  
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prettier (p. 102). This was distinct compared to the tattoos of men. Here, we see that 
women and men behaved differently and were expected to engage customs differently 
from early on in Balkan history.   
It is fairly apparent that distinctions between men and women are evident 
throughout Balkan history. That these differences were shaped by the six distinct political 
systems that women and men lived in over the course of the twentieth century is equally 
clear. Of the six political arrangements, only the Titoist era of one-party rule expressed an 
explicit policy goal of gender equality (Jancar-Webster 2010). And yet while strides were 
made, this goal was largely unmet. The reason this was the case rests largely on 
understanding the gender dynamics amongst the South Slav communities.  
What better place to begin than with the family and the dynamics therein? 
Importantly, Simić (2010) highlights that Yugoslav culture is highly male-oriented and 
places emphasis on, “patrilineality, patrilocality, and male dominance (p. 13)”,47 as both 
common and cross-national features of South Slav society. Publicly, machismo is natural 
and expected. However, in the Yugoslav family, women derive their power and influence 
not from their role as wives, but rather from their role as mothers48. Here, mothers are 
able to exert influence on their sons, but this is done exclusively in private spaces. Thus, 
a public-private divide in gender power relations is operative in the social construction of 
the family and society at large. However, adherence to traditional sex-relations was (and 
                                                 
47 Andrei Simić's (2010) book chapter, Machismo and cryptomatriarchy: Power, affect, and authority in 
the traditional Yugoslav family, has some limitations. It is mostly an evaluation of the South Slav family 
from the Serbian and rural perspective. In the case of this dissertation, this is applicable to the second order 
of question raised related to the sources of differences between combatants – especially as it pertains to the 
rural/urban context as a dichotomy of interest.  
48 Nationalists mobilize the sanctity and power of motherhood later as a form of patriotism. Women are 
told that it is their patriotic duty to become mothers in order to advance the interests of the (Serb) nation 
Malcolm (2002). 
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is) of high importance for South Slav families throughout the twentieth century and 
building up to the war (Jancar-Webster 2010; Malcolm 2002).  
In the economic and public spheres of society, women experienced some 
moments of opportunity, but remained largely disadvantaged compared to their male 
counterparts. In the early twentieth century, women began working in earnest in the more 
advanced areas of the South Slav region and joined different unions to mobilize for their 
advancement. Importantly, war provided an opportunity structure previously unavailable 
to these women. As such, women’s economic advancement saw more significant gains 
during WWI as vacancies left by men who joined the defense ranks had to be filled 
(Berry 2018; Ramet 2010) . 
As the interwar period arrived, the hope that some of the opportunities provided 
by war would become more permanent was diminished. WWI had been incredibly costly 
and like the rest of the international community, Yugoslavia was the victim of an 
economic depression that left women particularly disadvantaged (Berry 2018). Suffrage 
had yet to be achieved and women’s wages were quite low. Importantly, women’s 
education was not a priority and illiteracy rates amongst women was quite high (Jancar-
Webster 1990; Berry 2018).  
The patrilineal organization of the family was evidenced in the rural areas in the 
social structure of the family zadruga. The zadruga was a multi-generation family unit 
controlled by a patriarch who defined the agricultural work, organized women’s labor, 
and owned the property (Cockburn 1998, p. 156; Jancar-Webster 1990, p. 27; Berry 
2018, p.107). Consistent with Simić’s (2010) assessment concerning the power of 
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motherhood, women were considered servant status until they bore male children (Jancar-
Webster 1990; Berry 2018).  
Women did leave the zadrugas to find other employment but remained 
disadvantaged in these spaces. Women joined collective action movements at this time 
and engaged in labor strikes and ultimately began joining communist parties49 in order to 
further their interests. Women remained involved in a host of social movement 
organizations and unions up to WWII.  
Much like the earlier effects of WWI, the Second World War once again provided 
an opportunity structure for women’s advancement.  Women’s participation in the 
Partisan-led Yugoslav National Liberation Movement (NOP) allowed women political 
participation as fighters and administrators in the political movement. Evidence that 
women performed equally as well as men is apparent in the research (Jancar-Webster 
2010). WWII served as a liberating and democratizing process for South Slav women 
during this era. The Partisans progressively allowed women the right to vote, recruited 
them for armed fighting positions, and allowed them to serve in public administrative and 
political roles (Jancar-Webster 2010). Yet, while these were progressive steps, patriarchy 
still defined the parameters and structure of women’s advancement in spite of their equal 
participation and performance in WWII.  
As the Titoist era of Communism was ushered in, the promise of equality for 
women was, as previously mentioned, a formal policy of the party. However, as is 
consistent with other Communist aspirational promises, the gap between policy and 
practice in this area was quite significant. While women made gains in literacy, basic 
                                                 
49 Women joined the Yugoslav Communist Party (KPJ) and Union of Communist Youth (SKOJ).  
  80 
education, and entrance into the labor market - they were underrepresented in leadership 
roles and fields like the hard sciences (Ramet 2010). Essentially, women engaged 
politically, socially, and economically, but the structure was based on patriarchy and 
stymied women’s full advancement (Jancar-Webster 2010; Ramet 2010).  
In the end, women were generally in a second-seat position compared to their 
male counterparts in most dimensions. Politically and economically, women were behind 
men in public life. In family life, women’s value was elevated only based on their mother 
identity. Power and power dynamics were the purview of the South Slav men. Critically, 
this chapter demonstrates clear distinctions in varied social identity groupings associated 
with Bosnian society. These social constructions are one element of the exogenous 
factors surrounding individual civilians and soldiers as war descended on Bosnia (1992 – 
1995). Thus, it is from this frame and context that the sexualized violence that 
characterized the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is evaluated in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 4 
OBSERVING PATTERNS IN WARTIME SEXUALIZED VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF 
THE BOSNIAN WAR (1992 - 1995) 
Introduction  
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is well-known for extreme rates of 
sexualized violence perpetrated during the course of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and 
the other secessionist wars that occurred during the fractionalization of Yugoslavia 
(Bouchard 2015; D. K. Cohen 2013; Lai and Ralph 1995). While estimates vary radically 
regarding how many rapes and acts of sexualized violence actually occurred during the 
war, it remains an accepted fact that this form of political violence particularly 
characterized this conflict. The fact that sexualized violence was seemingly committed 
with impunity led to intense scrutiny and attention from the international community, 
which transformed how sexualized violence within conflict is perceived and now 
analyzed.  
 Much like other entrenched gendered processes, prior to the dissolution of the 
former Yugoslavia, sexualized violence during and within conflict was deemed a private 
crime, not an act within the purview and adjudication of the public and political. Until the 
1990’s, the perception of sexualized violence within the framework of the public-private 
divide led to underdeveloped explorations of conflict-related sexual violence as a weapon 
in warfare and as a crime counter to the laws of armed conflict. Essentially, this form of 
violence was considered a “commonplace” and expected negative cost of war, but not a 
political act to which military leaders, political elites, and even individuals who 
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committed these offenses could be held responsible (Bouchard 2015; Hoover Green 
2011; Lai and Ralph 1995; E. J. Wood 2009a).  
 The war in the former Yugoslavia was a catalyst to facilitating change in this 
outlook and international organizations, along with other human rights monitoring 
groups, began in earnest to challenge the status quo in this area. In 1994, in a preliminary 
report from the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, the committee noted 
that, “(R)ape remains the least condemned war crime; throughout history, the rape of 
hundreds of thousands women and children in all regions of the world remains a bitter 
reality (Lai and Ralph 1995, p.64)50.  
Yet, in the time that has passed since the war, in Sikkink-esque fashion, post-hoc 
tribunals and other legal entities have mobilized based on several imperatives. One such 
impetus for change is defined in UN Resolution 1820, which more directly addresses 
sexual violence during wars (United Nations 2008).  This has led to indelible and rapid 
transformation in the norms surrounding this form of violence. These changes have 
allowed for more refined approaches in scholarship, has resulted in additional data for 
analysis, and allows for a deeper understanding of the processes that inform this type of 
violence in warfare.  
 In the case of the former Yugoslavia alone, under the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 78 individuals of the 
161 accused by the international court have been indicted for crimes of sexual violence 
                                                 
50 It should be noted that sexual violence during conflict is not limited to women and children only. As 
norms continue to shift in the reporting, investigating, and adjudicating of sexualized violence, more men 
have come forward to also report being victims of this violence (Interview conducted with a war crimes 
reporter and editor on 7/9/2018 for 1.5 hours). See also the ICTY (2016) for more on the delineations 
related to crimes of sexualized violence in conflict.  
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(ICTY 2016). This translates to roughly 48% of those accused receiving indictments for 
acts associated with conflict related sexualized violence. Additionally, more than one 
third have been found guilty for sexually violent crimes (ICTY 2016). These facts alone 
illustrate the pervasiveness of sexual violence in the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995).  
Due to the seemingly increasing prevalence of sexual violence in this and other 
wars51, the international community mobilized to respond to redress these crimes in a 
novel manner not pursued in the past. Notably, in spite of prior international treaties and 
conventions initially establishing norms surrounding sexualized violence in warfare52, 
both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) were among 
the first courts of its kind to prosecute cases of wartime sexual violence. Further, the 
ICTY was the first court to prosecute and secure convictions defining rape as torture and 
for sexual enslavement as a crime against humanity (ICTY 2016). These indictments and 
convictions provide clear evidence of the shifting norms, and the enforcement of these 
norms, in a relatively short timeframe (Amnesty International 2017; Sikkink 2011; 
United Nations 2015, 2008).  
                                                 
51 I state “seemingly increasing prevalence” with purpose here. While it may seem that sexual violence was 
increasing in conflicts, world attention and access to data and information was also transforming during this 
time. Sikkink (2011) describes the process of norm cascades, which suggests that these changes in norms 
and enforcement isn’t so much that the behaviors and crimes are increasing, but rather that the attention 
through international organizations are a catalyst for transforming this space. The number of human rights 
reports and reports from the tribunals and international mechanisms reviewed throughout this research 
suggest that these claims are accurate.  
52 See the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for more on treaties and information on Laws 
of Armed Conflict (LOAC). The ICTY notes that one of the earlier efforts to outlaw sexualized violence in 
warfare is found in the Hague Convention of 1907.  Yet, in spite of this, wars that occurred in the ensuing 
years failed to restrain and enforce the spirit of this Convention. This is notable in the failure of both the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals to indict and adjudicate cases of sexualized violence that clearly occurred 
during WWII. The Geneva Convention of 1949 more explicitly defined legal parameters concerning rape, 
prostitution, and other sexualized assaults. While it mainly addresses this in terms of women only, it is the 
framework and legal precedent from which the ICTY and ICTR were built.  
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Yet, in spite of these gains lauded by the tribunals and other actors in the 
international community, it is critical to note that there are varied acts of sexualized 
violence committed during the course of a conflict, which the indictments and 
convictions of the ICTY and other legal mechanisms cannot fully capture.  Political 
violence, including sexualized violence, is a process-oriented act that involves multiple 
factors. When analyzing the causes and conditions associated with sexualized violence in 
conflict, it is important to expand upon and define the distinctions concerning the 
variances in the form and function of this violence. In this way, a better understanding of 
the processes that lead to increases and decreases in this violence can be revealed. It is 
the aim of this dissertation to better understand the conditions surrounding not only what 
perpetuates this violence, but also to consider what may allow for restraint and restriction 
on the part of combatants.  
 In the Handbook on the Study of Multiple Perpetrator Rape, Wood (2015) 
describes some of the key variances in the patterns of sexualized violence in conflict. She 
notes that, “(w)hen sexual violence does occur during war, the pattern varies in targeting, 
form, and purpose, as well as frequency (p. 132).” In the case of Bosnia, variances in 
each of these dimensional areas existed and as such, it is important to break down these 
categories in order to provide a clear framework for the analysis of the Bosnian case 
employed in this study.  
Accordingly, in this chapter, I describe each of the variances referred to above 
and how they specifically apply to the Bosnian case in more detail.  I then close the 
chapter with examples from witness testimony, human rights reports, and direct interview 
responses highlighting soldiers’ efforts to either intervene or resist participation in these 
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violent acts. I perform this analysis to highlight that individual differences clearly exist, 
which suggests that these actors – the perpetrator, the non-perpetrator, and even the 
interventionist – are divergently motivated for violence. Thus, it is from this perch that 
the analysis of the hypotheses associated with the gender bias motive advanced in this 
dissertation can more effectively be analyzed in future chapters.  
Targeting  
In this section outlining targeting, it is important to elaborate on several key 
elements that coalesced to lead to different types of targets in the Bosnian case – 
individuals, groups, and geographical areas. Extensive background is provided out of 
necessity to better understand these categories and their relevance to this research.  
The actors engaged in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were many. The 
ethnic politics of the region were, and remain, quite complex. As explored previously, the 
convergence of ethno-nationalist and political changes over the course of time in this 
region were relatively frequent and certainly have impacted all of the Balkan states, but 
most especially, Bosnia. The political rearrangements that ensued in the era following the 
Great Wars deeply impacted political and demographic processes. Notably, the Partisan 
efforts during World War II, and the ensuing narrative of heroism in the defeat and 
deterrence of the Axis powers, brought about the appearance of a seemingly unified 
Yugoslavia. The cult of personality of Marshall Tito, maintained through a brilliant and 
effective public relations machine, allowed for the construction of a novel and often 
idealized national identity that superseded previously embedded ethnic identities 
(Pavasović Trošt 2014; Weber 1968).  
  86 
While the full story of Marshall Tito is outside of the scope of this work, as 
alluded to in the previous chapter, he was essential to the development and realization of 
the second Yugoslavia, which ultimately led to the primacy of the Yugoslavian identity 
over other ethno-religious identifiers for the majority of the citizens in the region. At the 
conclusion of World War II, the Balkan region was experiencing massive war fatigue and 
was primed to mobilize around the heroic image of the Partisan leader defeating the 
Goliath-like Axis Powers (Pavasović Trošt 2014).  Ethno-national identities, which were 
once preeminent before the World Wars, were now relegated to a backseat position to the 
Yugoslav identity. During the course of my interviews, it was apparent that there was a 
clear delineation between the older generation who were socialized during the era of Tito 
and the younger generation who were children during the war. Many who were raised 
during the era emphasized their previous Yugoslavian identity and still appeared to attach 
to that identity over other labels.  
Several respondents highlighted the one-party message that infiltrated social 
institutions throughout Yugoslavia after the Partisans ousted the Ustaše and the Axis 
powers at the end of World War II. One interviewee noted that museums, cultural sites, 
and schools were all utilized to generate and embed a collective narrative about socialism 
and the greater project of a singular Yugoslavia53. This agenda was an incredibly 
successful undertaking, and, on the surface, there existed an appearance of a unified, one-
party state that held strong throughout Tito's reign.  
However, a closer inspection reveals that there were fissures that were simply 
awaiting exploitation to expand into full-scale resentment and ultimately war. 
                                                 
53 Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo.  
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Respondents indicate that inside churches and mosques, religious leaders proselytized the 
importance of religious identities over all else54, which was a narrative that ran counter to 
the dominant Socialist agenda. Further, those who supported the Ustaše and/or the Axis 
Powers during the war continued to pay social costs in the years that followed.  
By way of example, during field research, an interviewee described an annual 
ceremony held in Tito’s honor called Štafeta Mladosti to illustrate processes employed by 
the state to encourage adherence to the one-party message. During this annual ritual, the 
youth of Yugoslavia participated in passing a baton across the region in homage to Tito 
each year. The participant selection process usually involved teachers identifying a 
student who was the embodiment of revered national qualities. It was considered a high 
honor to be chosen. One year, a Croatian student was selected from the Boban family 
line. This choice was considered entirely taboo and the selected child was restricted from 
participating. Furthermore, both the student and the teacher who selected him were 
sanctioned. In this way, and in many others, individuals and families associated with 
certain ethno-national identities and/or political positions experienced less than favorable 
conditions and opportunities in Tito's Yugoslavia55. In this way, deep-seated resentments 
swirled under the surface for those relegated to the periphery and simply awaited the 
opportunity to be voiced and exploited.  
After Tito died in 1980, Yugoslavia was hit by a series of political and economic 
crises that began to test the strength of Yugoslavian brotherhood and unity, which only 
served to deepen festering and unresolved resentment. In the years that followed, the 
politicization of previously latent ethno-nationalist identities began in earnest. For nearly 
                                                 
54 Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo. 
55 Interview conducted with a museum curator on 7/6/2018 for 2 hours in Sarajevo. 
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a decade, ethnic division in the autonomous province of Kosovo between the Albanians 
and the Kosovo Serbs intensified and became a harbinger for what was to come beyond 
those borders for the other republics across the region (Little and Silber 1997).  
As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, through a series of political 
machinations and skillful propaganda campaigns designed to exploit existing 
resentments, Slobodan Milosević began to consolidate power throughout Serbia, 
Montenegro, and the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, by 
aggressively pursuing centralization policies. These actions raised grave concern for 
many of the key political elites and republics comprising Yugoslavia. Tensions increased 
as rhetoric calling for a Greater Serbia began in earnest and the critical elements for 
revolution were in place to challenge the utopian one-party state ideal that had managed 
to mostly thrive during the golden era of Tito (Cohen 2018; Little and Silber 1997; 
Malcolm 2002). In the face of these factors, conflict seemed imminent.   
By 1989, Yugoslavia was primed for fracture. In the elections that followed the 
Milosević propaganda campaigns during the mid-1980's, stalwart socialist parties 
suffered heavy defeats throughout the country in favor of ethnic separatist parties who 
played on the existential fears of the voters (Maksić 2017). This resulted in increases in 
nationalist rhetoric that made the status quo untenable.  At the end of 1990, Slovenian 
voters resoundingly voted in favor of an independence referendum and prepared to break 
from the broader federation. Croatia followed suit shortly thereafter, although Croatian 
Serbs boycotted the vote and were highly opposed to the move (Malcolm 2002; Little and 
Silber 1997).  
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The nationalist calls for a Greater Serbia was unsettling for all of the republics 
across Yugoslavia, but most especially for Bosnia, given the high concentration of 
Bosnian Serbs residing in Bosnia who supported the vision proposed by Milosević and 
his allies, amongst a host of other factors. While Yugoslavia broadly speaking was 
considered a multi-ethnic region, for the most part, the various ethnic identities resided 
within territorial boundaries that nearly perfectly aligned with their ethno-national 
identity.  As illustrated in Figure 3 below - Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro - were 
almost exclusively comprised of individuals with the same ethnic identity as aligned with 
the associated territorial boundaries.  
However, Bosnia was distinct from her sister republics. Bosnians of varying 
ethnic identities interviewed during the course of this research have frequently referred to 
Bosnia as the 'little Yugoslavia' due to the demographics of the region. Even the most 
cursory glance at Figure 3 demonstrates the veracity of this claim. Demographically 
speaking, Bosnia was clearly the most ethnically diverse republic in the region, 
comprised of the three largest ethnic identities residing in Yugoslavia, along with several 
others.  The demographic breakdown in Bosnia included a mixture of Bosnian Muslims 
(heretofore Bosniaks) who comprised just over 43% of the population, while Bosnian 
Serbs made up an additional 31%, and Croats made up just under 18% of the total 
regional population (Amnesty International 1992; U.S. Central Intelligence Agency 
1992)56. 
It should be noted that during the parliamentary election held in November in 
1990, each of the three primary nationalities won the majority of the seats in parliament 
                                                 
56 See Figure 3 for the spread of these nationalities across the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  
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in proportion to their demographic representation. These three national parties would 
become key players in the war years ahead (Amnesty International 1992; Little and Silber 
1997; Malcolm 2002). The three main parties were the Party of Democratic Action 
(SDA), which is associated with the Muslim community, the Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS), which is supported by the Bosnian Serb community, and the Croatian Democratic 
Union (HDZ), which is an extenuation of the party of the same name in Croatia. Seats 
were won during this election proportional to their demographic representation 
throughout Bosnia, which ultimately left Alija Izetbegović as the President of the seven-
member Presidency of the broader federation (Amnesty International 1992; Malcolm 
2002).  
Yet, according to the 1991 census, while Muslims were the largest nationality 
represented in Bosnia, Serbs were far and away the largest ethnic group in Yugoslavia. 
Serbs comprised roughly 36% of the national population with those identifying as 
Muslim running a distant third demographically at well under 10% (U.S.Central 
Intelligence Agency 1992)57. Essentially, the Muslim population primarily resided within 
the borders of Bosnia and did not disperse across other regions in the federation, with a 
few key exceptions58. Comparative to Bosnia, most of the other republics were more 
homogenized in terms of ethnic identity, which ultimately made independence a less 
challenging option in those instances than was the case for Bosnia. 
 
 
                                                 
57 This census data must be considered with caution. See Hammel, Mason, and Stevanović (2010) for more 
on issues related to census collection during the Yugoslavian era and during the last census collection 
before the war in March of 1991. However, for the purposes of this research, the demographic spread is 
significantly different enough to effectively demonstrate the general trend, which is the aim here.  
58 Refer to Figure 3 once again to see the dispersion of Muslims across the region.  
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Figure 3: Majority Ethnic Distributions in Yugoslavia at the Municipality Level 
(1991)59 
 
Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg (CIA 1992)   
 
In any event, once Slovenia and Croatia declared independence formally in June 
of 1991, it was apparent that Yugoslavia was in full dissolution. Questions persisted 
concerning how the other republics would proceed. Presidential summits were held with 
                                                 
59 Map sourced from Hammel, Mason, and Stevanović (2010). The map data is also maintained at the url 
addresses listed below the map image. See CIA (1992) for this image.  
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the leaders of the republics in an attempt to negotiate the secessions without a call to war. 
However, Franjo Tuđman, Croatia’s president, famously described these meetings as, 
“conversations of the deaf (Little and Silber 1997, 147),” illustrating the discouraging 
outlook these negotiations engendered. While the initial fragmentation of the region was 
met with limited resistance and small skirmishes - for Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia - the 
break was bitter and negotiations tense as the parties marched inexorably closer to war 
(Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).  
Referring once again to Figure 3, the map highlights the concentration of Serbs 
located in both Croatia and Bosnia. Serbs living outside of the territorial boundaries of 
Serbia remained a pressing concern for Milosević as rising Serb nationalism called for a 
unified and centralized Serb state. As this was the case, Milosević and his allies did not 
contest the right for Slovenia and Croatia to pursue independence, but they maintained 
that Serbs residing within the boundaries of Croatia had a similar right to declare 
independence, which would require redrawing the boundaries established in 1945 at the 
end of World War II (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).  
Relinquishing territory was a less than preferred option for the leaders of the other 
republics and conflict intensified in spite of multiple negotiation efforts leveraged by the 
European Community (EC) and Germany to facilitate a peaceful transition. In the end, 
both Slovenia and Croatia received early recognition as independent states throwing a 
wrench into the negotiations and ultimately leaving Bosnia facing the dilemma of either 
likewise pursuing independence, which would undoubtedly lead to civil war within its 
borders, or being dominated by a Serbia with nationalist intent (Little and Silber 1997). 
These choices appeared bleak.  
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 Bosnian Serb political leadership strongly opposed a move for an independent 
Bosnia and warned leaders that there would be terrible consequences should Bosnia 
receive recognition as its own nation-state. The Bosnian parliament was aligned along 
ethnic lines - with the SDA, led by President Izetbegović, singularly representing Bosniak 
interests and the HDZ representing Croatian interests. The SDS, led by Radovan 
Karadžić, represented the Serbian opposition party and he warned that a move to separate 
would undoubtedly lead to war and existential threat to the Muslim community (Little 
and Silber 1997; Maksić 2017; Malcolm 2002). When it became apparent that an 
independence referendum would occur, Karadžić along with members of the Bosnian 
Serb assembly, declared Serb-dominated regions autonomous areas, no longer under the 
purview of the Bosnian government. These regions would later be known as Republika 
Srpska.  
 In a counter move, Bosnia’s government held a highly contested referendum for 
independence, which received nearly 100% support from the roughly 60% of the voters 
that turned out (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). Bosnian Serbs, having already 
formed the autonomous regions, boycotted the vote and refused to recognize the call for 
independence. Only a few short days after the vote, Bosnia declared independence and a 
month later was recognized as an independent state by the international community 
(Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the exact act that formally resulted in the 
full-scale outbreak of hostilities remains contested to this day. What is agreed upon is that 
several events served to hasten, rather than deter, hostilities. In the early days of March in 
1992, Sarajevo became partitioned by barricades and roadblocks established by the 
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opposing parties. Bosnian Serbs reportedly began erecting barricades following a 
shooting at a wedding where the father of the groom was killed and an Orthodox priest 
injured, now known as the Bloody Wedding (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002). 
Bosnian Serbs claim that this was a politically motivated act and hence, an act of war. 
The events at the Bloody Wedding incident also aligned with the timing of the 
independence referendum providing more fuel for the mounting tensions.   
Just one month later, as international recognition of Bosnian independence 
loomed on the horizon, the northeastern region became ground zero for hostilities. 
Bijeljina60 was the first municipality to fall fully under Serbian control in a campaign 
leveraged between April 1 – 2, 1992. The paramilitary unit, Arkan’s Tigers, under the 
command of Željko Ražnatović, began efforts to forcibly remove the non-Serb population 
from the city. By the close of April 2nd, approximately 48 Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian 
Croat men, women, and children were killed (ICTY 2019a). When images of the dead 
reached Izetbegović, it is reported that he began to realize that the crisis had intensified to 
proportions he had not fully anticipated (Little and Silber 1997).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 See Figure 4 for mapping and location. Bijelijna is located in close to the northeastern border of Bosnia 
and Serbia. Further along in this section, I describe the territorial aims that are closely related to the 
targeting associated with the sexual violence committed during this conflict.  
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Figure 4: Map of Bosnia Herzegovina – 1994 
  
Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/bosniaherzegovina.jpg (CIA 1994) 
 
“ It was unbelievable almost. The civilians being killed, pictures showed the dead bodies 
of women in the streets. I thought it was a photo-montage. I couldn’t believe my eyes. I 
couldn’t believe it was possible.” – Alija Izetbegović (Little and Silber 1997, 224) 
In realizing the scale of the emergency, Izetbegović reached out to a Serbianized 
JNA when he learned of the deaths and the flight of Muslims in the northeastern villages 
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and cities. Since the JNA had served as the army for all of Yugoslavia, Izetbegović 
turned to JNA generals for assistance to try to manage and resolve the hostilities in the 
northeast. As Little and Silber (1997) note, Izetbegović later acknowledged that, “(it was) 
like putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop (p. 224).” JNA forces did not appear to 
act as a neutral party and civilians were left with limited options, ultimately fleeing from 
Serb dominated areas in the northeast. As the situation worsened, on April 4, Izetbegović, 
along with support from Croatian representatives for President Tuđman61, issued a 
general mobilization call to the Bosnian territorial defense, the reserve military force 
(Amnesty International 1992; Little and Silber 1997).  
Leaders of the Serb opposition decried the move and both Karadžić and Momčilo 
Krajišnik, co-founder of the SDS, appealed to Izetbegović to reverse the decision. They 
noted that only Croats and Bosniaks would respond to the call and claimed that the 
maneuver was tantamount to an overt declaration of war. Izetbegović rejoined with the 
fact that he was left with little alternative. The escalating crisis was gaining momentum 
moment by moment.  
Finally, on April 5th,, the shooting death of Suada Dilberović at a highly attended 
(in the thousands), multi-national anti-war march may have also been the final catalyst to 
spark the flames of war (Little and Silber 1997). Sarajevo’s citizens, proud of their multi-
ethnic heritage and long history of peaceful coexistence took to the streets to denounce all 
of the leaders of the Bosnian parties. Individuals of all nationalities and identities 
                                                 
61 Croatia had already been engaged in active hostilities with the JNA and Serbian paramilitary units for a 
year. In the case of this dissertation, the focus is on the interactions primarily between Bosnian Muslims, 
Bosnian Serbs, and Serbs. As such, much of Croatian involvement in the conflict is left to the periphery in 
this examination. However, Croatian influence and participation in the conflict is referred to and noted 
occasionally throughout as they were key actors and a main party to the conflict.  
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comingled and marched peacefully together. As snipers shot into the crowd and hand 
grenades were thrown, the demonstrators began to realize that the war they once thought 
unimaginable was perhaps a reality (Little and Silber 1997; Malcolm 2002).  
The day after the antiwar march, the international community recognized Bosnia 
as an independent and autonomous state. Little and Silber (1997) describe Karadžić's 
predictions concerning Bosnia's future if independence was recognized:   
“Karadžić had warned that if Bosnia-Herzegovina won international recognition 
as an independent state, it would not last a single day. It would, as he put it, be 
still-born. On the afternoon of April 6, the European Community recognized 
Bosnia. (The United States followed suit the next day.) Karadžić kept his word. 
He proclaimed the independent ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,’ 
later to be renamed Republika Srpska, and announced that it would come into 
existence that night at midnight, with Sarajevo as its capital (and currently under 
enemy occupation) and himself as head of state. Bosnia, he said, had disintegrated 
the day it was recognized (p. 228 – 229).”  
 
No matter these initial causes, when Bosnia was recognized by the international 
community as an independent state on April 6, 1992, Karadžić delivered on his promise 
and rejoined by declaring the later named Republika Srpska regions fully independent 
and laid siege to Sarajevo (Little and Silber 1997). Figure 5 shows the fate of Sarajevo 
after the siege began and throughout the stalemate of the 44-month long offensive. As the 
siege began, Serbs were able to control mountain positions allowing for sniper fire into 
the city below. In order to achieve this position, in the early days of the conflict, Serbs 
strategically took Sarajevo’s police academy, which also allowed for a high vantage point 
and access to arms. 
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Figure 5: Siege of Sarajevo – Estimated front line locations and territorial control  
 
Source: Map secondarily sourced from BBC online news. Map is originally sourced from UN maps generated during the siege and it 
is possible that certain elements are incorrect. The news source reports that the UN maps are not readily available, so this is a 
recreation utilizing OpenStreetMap and Creative Commons-CC-BY-SA. (BBC 2012).   
 
An outbreak in conflict was simultaneously occurring in the villages and cities of 
eastern Bosnia that included a mixed population. Figure 4 illustrates the mapping of 
Bosnia building up to and during the war period. It lists the names of key villages and 
cities that were impacted during the war. Just days after the siege began in Sarajevo, on 
April 8th, Bosnian Serb paramilitary units and JNA62 forces began an offensive on the 
town of Zvornik, another municipality located on the northeastern border of Bosnia close 
to Serbia. (ICTY 2019a; Little and Silber 1997). As the map indicates, Zvornik is located 
just south of Bijelijna and northeast of Sarajevo, where violence had transpired the week 
                                                 
62 JNA is the acronym for the Yugoslav People’s Army. As Yugoslavia dissolved, the army was under the 
de facto control of Milosevic and aligned with paramilitary forces for the offensive in the both the Croatian 
and Bosnian wars for independence at various times. The Yugoslav People’s Army transitioned to the 
military formation of the newly formed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia , which was the combined 
territories of Serbia and Montenegro, at the end of May in 1992. This army had control of and maintained 
the weaponry and systems previously established by the JNA (Little and Silber 1997).   
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before. Arkan and his Tigers63, along with Serb police, descended on Zvornik and the 
town fell in just two days (Little and Silber 1997; Prosecutor of the Tribunal 1997; The 
Hague 2016). Zvornik, like Bijeljina, was of key military importance for the Serbs given 
a few critical factors – the location of the city on the northeastern border of Bosnia 
linking it directly to Serbia and the high concentration of Serbs living there (Little and 
Silber 1997). It also served as the midpoint to connect territory in western Bosnia towards 
Croatia back to Serbia in the east.  
Figure 6 illustrates the territorial dispensation at the conclusion of the conflict and 
the NATO-led Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) peacekeeping 
assignments. The red areas highlighted on the Bosnian portion of the map are areas that 
ultimately became Republika Srpska territory. During the early Serb-led offensives, the 
paramilitary units and police forces drove non-Serbs from Zvornik in the thousands 
(Little and Silber 1997; The Hague 2016). Once again, in terms of Serbian military 
strategy, the eastern border of Bosnia was critical to secure to create a sort of Serb bridge 
from Croatia across Bosnia to Serbia proper. Figure 6 highlights the bridge effect from 
Serbia into the eastern regions of Bosnia and ultimately extending northwest towards the 
Croatian border. Serbs gained territorial control of a significant portion of this region in 
the early to middle stages of the war (1992 – 1995).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 A particularly vicious paramilitary group led by Željko Ražnatović (aka Arkan) who was indicted for 
several atrocities including rape. Arkan died in Belgrade and was never brought to trial (ICTY 2019a)  
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Figure 6: Map of SFOR Areas of Responsibility  
 
Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1994. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, 
https://legacy.lib.utexas.edu/maps/bosnia/bosnia_sfor_97.jpg (CIA 1997) 
 
Once hostilities were formally declared and engaged in early April 1992, targeting 
began in earnest. While all parties to the conflict committed war crimes and sexually 
violent atrocities, the balance of military might was asymmetrical in the case of the 
Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Bosnian Serb paramilitary units were backed by the military 
complex of the former JNA and thus, had greater capacity to engage in violence 
compared to the fledgling and developing Army of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ARBiH). ARBiH suffered heavy deficiencies and lacked basic and 
essential resources to wage war.  
Initially, the JNA was seen as asymmetrically supporting the Bosnian Serbs, 
rather than acting as a neutral agent to mediate the outbreak in hostilities between the 
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nationalities. On May 4, 1992, Belgrade announced the intention to formally withdraw 
JNA forces from Bosnia, but simultaneously announced that soldiers declaring Bosnian 
origin would be able to stay in Bosnia (Amnesty International 1992). As a result, only a 
small contingent of soldiers withdrew and most of the equipment remained to support the 
newly formed VRS forces (Amnesty International 1992).   
The fighting units comprising the Bosnian Serb opposition included paramilitary 
units originating in Serbia and included Serbs from Bosnia and the newly reformed VRS. 
This fighting force also added the territorial defense reservists from Serbia and soldiers 
previously serving in the JNA. Because of these factors, their military capacity was far 
superior to ARBiH (Amnesty International 1992). This left Muslim, non-Serb, and even 
Serb civilians who were conscientious objectors, vulnerable to attacks and abuse.    
In the case of this conflict, Bosniaks were the primary targets of the aggressing 
Bosnian Serbs and Serbs64. As has been described above, the rise of Serb nationalism 
during the preceding decade was the raison d’etre mobilized by Milosević for a Greater 
Serbia. As the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) began in earnest, Bosnian Serbs and Serbs 
continued the call for a Greater Serbia and took actions to create a homogenous Serbian 
territory. This involved removing, forcing out, and eliminating non-Serbs from territorial 
areas of interest.  
In the case of the sexual violence engaged during this war, “enemy” women were 
the primary targets of this violence. However, there are several instances of men also 
experiencing sexual abuse. Case in point, in Zvornik, the ICTY (2019) notes that, 
“(b)etween 9 and 27 June 1992, over 30 non-Serb male prisoners were killed at the 
                                                 
64 Arguably, all non-Serbs were targets. Because Croats comprised much less of Bosnia’s population, the 
primary target were Bosniaks largely due to the demographic composition of the region.  
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Čelopek Culture House, others were beaten and on one occasion fathers and sons were 
forced to sexually abuse each other in the presence of other inmates (Zvornik information 
page)65.”  
Children and the elderly were also victims of sexualized violence during the 
conflict, but this was not the norm even though it did occur. Age ranges of the victims 
varied, although women of childbearing age made up the preponderance of the cases. In 
the early stages of reporting the human rights abuses during the conflict, Amnesty 
International (1992) conducted a field survey and attempted follow up interviews with 
victims. While this report indicates that the investigators received many reports of rape, 
due to the stigma associated with the act and the potential social costs and harm to 
families, victims were reluctant to formally report. However, this report generally 
covered April – August, 1992 and indicated that, “(t)here were numerous allegations that 
young women, mainly in their teens, were taken and raped at night by Serbian guards at 
the camp (p. 51).” This suggests that the primary targets were young women and women 
of childbearing age. In a UN report on the status of the sexual violence judgments, 
Oosthuizen (2009) reported that, “(t)he findings of relevant judgments show that women, 
children, and men were victims of sexual violence in the armed conflicts relevant to the 
ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL. They also underscore that the majority of victims of sexual 
violence identified in these cases at these courts are women (p. 24)66.” 
                                                 
65 The number of men victims is uncertain and difficult to gauge. As is the case for women victims, there is 
significant underreporting by men victims. Indeed, underreporting is expected to be greater for men 
victims. Further, men were killed more frequently throughout the conflict and whether or not men who 
were killed were also victims of conflict-related sexual violence remains undetermined (Withers 2017).  
66 The fact that women comprise the majority of reported cases and incidents provides some anecdotal 
support for hypotheses leveraged in this research concerning perpetrator negative views towards sex 
relations and desire for adherence to traditional interactions amongst the sexes.  
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As this section demonstrates, victims of sexualized violence during the Bosnian 
War (1992 – 1995) were civilian, non-Serb, primarily Bosniak, women of child-bearing 
age. However, ‘enemy’ men, elderly women, and children were also targets of this 
violence. Since there were multiple parties to the conflict, Serb and Croat women were 
also victims of such violence, but due to the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, Bosniak 
women were particularly vulnerable.  
Form 
The form that sexual violence took in the Bosnian case was manifold. For analysis 
purposes, this research draws on the definition defined by the Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict (SVAC) Dataset defined by Cohen and Nordås (2014). The conceptualization 
outlined by the dataset is a particularly ideal match for this research since it builds on the 
legal definition prescribed by the International Criminal Court (ICC) because these 
definitions were similarly mobilized by the ICTY. The following acts are considered to 
be sexual violence crimes according to the ICC: “1) rape, 2) sexual slavery, 3) forced 
prostitution, 4) forced pregnancy, 5) forced sterilization/abortion (Cohen and Nordås 
2014).” The SVAC Dataset also includes acts of sexual mutilation and sexual torture in 
keeping with Wood (2009).  
In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), most of the acts described above 
have been perpetrated against the civilian population, although some more so than others. 
The most commonly reported of these acts in the beginning of the war were multiple 
perpetrator and mass rapes against women. However, widespread sexual violence took a 
host of forms throughout the conflict as many academic, human rights and legal reports 
indicate (Amnesty International 1992; Bouchard 2015; ICTY 2016; Lai and Ralph 1995; 
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United Nations 2008).  In the Human Rights Watch Global Report on Women developed 
by Lai and Ralph (1995)  at the conclusion of the war, they indicate the following about 
the nature of the sexual violence perpetrated during their investigation of the conflict:  
 “Combatants for each of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina  
have raped women and girls in their homes, in front of family members and in the 
village square. Women have been arrested and raped during interrogation. In 
some villages and towns, women and girls have been gathered together and taken 
to holding centers - often schools or community sports halls - where they are 
raped, gang-raped and abused repeatedly, sometimes for days or even weeks at a 
time. Other women have been taken seemingly at random from their communities 
or out of a group of refugees with whom they are traveling and raped by 
soldiers…Women interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they were 
gang-raped, taunted with ethnic slurs and cursed by rapists who stated their 
intention to forcibly impregnate women as a haunting reminder of the rape and 
intensification of the trauma it inflicts (p. 10).”  
 
 In addition to these qualifying acts of sexual violence perpetrated against 
civilians, the judgment produced by the ICTY concerning Radomir Kovac, confirms that 
incidents of sexual slavery and forced prostitution also occurred regularly during the 
early years of the conflict  (Holthuis 2001). In a judgment leveraged by the ICTY, Kovac, 
along with his co-defendants, were convicted of forcibly detaining 4 young Bosniak girls, 
two of which were held for nearly a year and regularly sexually assaulted throughout, 
while also being shared with other soldiers and Serb civilians during this time. The time 
spent in Kovac’s apartment also included extreme acts of sexual degradation and 
humiliation (Holthuis 2001, 241–48).  
 Other patterns to consider include the form of sexualized violence in conjunction 
with other forms of political violence and the timing of the incidents during the conflict. 
The Annex IX Report from the UN Security Council revealed several key patterns that 
emerged after evaluating 1,100 incidents of alleged sexualized assault by all the main 
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parties to the conflict (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). First, sexual violence occurred 
during looting and intimidation campaigns prior to the outbreak of fighting in the area. 
Once fighting breaks out, women are often raped publicly in the direct conflict zones. 
Detainees were also sexually assaulted by individuals or small groups, and detention 
camps were developed for the sole purpose of sexual assault and perpetrator gratification 
(Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).  
 Detention camps were critical areas where sexual violence was deployed. Mass 
rapes regularly occurred at some of the more infamous camps. The Republika Srpska 
controlled territory near the town of Prijedor, which is located in the northwestern region 
of Bosnia close to the Croatian border, is in the corridor where Serbs aimed to bridge the 
territory to link back to Serbia proper67. This was the center for several camps where 
mass sexualized violence occurred (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Keraterm, 
Omarska, and Trnopolje Camps were all located near Prijedor68.  
In the Keraterm camp, some of the more severe abuses against men reportedly 
occurred while women were abused briefly there, but then quickly transferred to 
Omarska. Men faced different abuses than women, often forced to perform sexual acts on 
family members and were abused with objects (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). One 
early strategy of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary units was to roundup prominent members 
of the community early in the conflict. Omarska was a camp that housed these 
community leaders and was the site where some of the more extreme acts of sexual 
mutilation and humiliation were perpetrated against both men and women there along 
with the camp at Trnopolje (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).  
                                                 
67 Refer to Figure 6.  
68 These are some of the more infamous and well-known camps identified with the conflict.  
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Finally, there is evidence of a strategic approach to the camp compositions and 
locations. The Hotel Vilina Vlas in Višegrad, located east of Sarajevo towards the 
Serbian border, was the site where especially young women were detained. Estimates 
indicate that there may have been around 200 women kept at the hotel. Reports indicate 
that young women were brought to Vilina Vlas and older women were routed elsewhere 
(Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Further, the forces that were known to manage 
Višegrad were presumed to be Serb forces direct form Belgrade, distinct form the 
Bosnian Serb paramilitary units. At Hotel Vilina Vlas, there were efforts to impregnate 
women so that they would have ‘Chetnik’ babies (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). 
This section demonstrates that several different forms of sexualized violence were 
engaged during the war. Only four camps were reviewed here, but it should be noted 
there were roughly 162 detention sites in the former Yugoslavia where sexual violence 
was perpetrated by all parties to the conflict (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).  Of the 
162, it is estimated that 88 of those were run by Serbs (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). 
Accordingly, seven of the eight categories conceptualized meet the definition of sexually 
violent crimes in armed conflict and appear to have occurred during the course of this 
war. For the remaining category, there does not appear to be evidence of efforts to 
forcibly sterilize or forcibly abort a pregnancy. Indeed, efforts were taken with pregnant 
women to ensure the pregnancy came to term before these women were able to be 
released from detention sites (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 
1994; Lai and Ralph 1995).  
In this highly publicized case, researchers have been able to document the 
manifest forms of sexualized violence that occurred during the course of this war. Yet, 
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even with the amount of data available, it is likely that the abuses were even more severe 
than this picture can reveal. Undoubtedly, the abuses against men are underreported to an 
even greater extent than is the case for women. However, this data reviewed in this 
section has provided a general picture of the form these acts have taken throughout the 
course of the hostilities.  
Purpose 
 As has been alluded to in the section on targeting, the incommensurable 
differences between the ethno-nationalist parties led to the SDS, SDA, and HDZ 
becoming entrenched and immovable in their positions. The SDS wanted to be fully 
autonomous and integrated with Serbia. Their initial offer to Izetbegović and the SDA to 
cantonize Bosnia was simply inconceivable prior to the war. As Yugoslavia fell, the SDS 
and the political leadership in Belgrade wanted to ensure that all Serbs fell within the 
territorial authority of a Greater Serbia. Figure 6 illustrates the territorial overlap and the 
areas that sought to be absorbed into Serbian territory. Since Bosniaks and Croats, for the 
most part refused this proposition, Serbian forces broadly sought to displace non-Serbs 
from these areas through several strategies. Not surprisingly, most sexually violent 
crimes occurred in the regions under Republika Srpska control along the Serbian border 
and along the “bridge” towards Croatia.  
One effective way to discern the purpose of sexually violent crimes is by 
evaluating their timing in conjunction with other war crimes. The crimes of sexual 
violence perpetrated during the war often occurred in conjunction with detainment, 
looting, torture, and more (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). This suggests that these acts 
were allowed, ordered, ignored or encouraged by commanders. 
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Another means for ascertaining the intent of the perpetrators is by considering 
how the law evaluates this concept. In the case of the ICTY, judges were given the 
imperative to discern the intent the perpetrators had when enacting their crimes. For 
example, convictions associated with rape as torture require the trial panel to determine 
whether the intent to humiliate, cause pain or suffering, intimidate, or coerce victims 
through sexually violent acts can be determined (Oosthuizen 2009, p. 26). However, even 
if intent is determined, questions persist. For example, what is the broader purpose 
underlying the intent to humiliate, intimidate, and coerce victims? To what end does this 
serve?   
Ultimately, most of the reports concerning sexualized violence during the war in 
Bosnia agree that these acts were designed to move non-Serb individuals out of the 
territories Serbia wished to absorb. In the Annex IX report, the conclusion notes that, 
“(r)ape and other forms of sexual assault harm not only the body of the victim. The more 
significant harm is the feeling of total loss of control over the most intimate and personal 
decisions and bodily functions. This loss of control infringes on the victim’s human 
dignity and is what makes rape and sexual assault such an effective means of ‘ethnic 
cleansing.’ (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994).” While certainly not all cases reported 
were efforts to ethnically cleanse or forcibly displace victims from the area and there is 
undoubtedly more nuance to the intent behind these acts, there is strong evidence to 
suggest that some of the violence was consistent with an intentional pattern to move or 
eliminate the non-Serb population from areas of strategic interest (Bassiouni and 
McCormick 1994).  
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While the clearing of Serb territory of the non-Serb population may have been the 
broader goal of the master cleavage for a Greater Serbia, it is also apparent that individual 
soldiers and units enacted or did not enact sexual violence at various times. Indeed, 
during interviews, key informants noted clear distinctions between multiple perpetrator 
and multiple victim violence vis a vis single perpetrator and single victim violence. Key 
informants also noted delineation based on prior knowledge and associations between 
victims and perpetrators. Key informants further describe a highly emotional presentation 
of perpetrators during testimony in the single perpetrator and single victim war crimes 
cases that is noticeably distinct from the multiple perpetrator cases69.  
These observations highlight the complexity and nuance associated with the 
phenomenon of conflict-related sexual violence. Even in cases characterized by high 
severity sexual violence, when we examine the within case patterns more closely, critical 
distinctions signal that distinguishing motivations underlie the purpose of sexual 
violence. While military elites may have had one purpose, evidence of variations in the 
quality of sexual violence employed suggests that individual combatants and even 
civilians also have their own purpose and motivations that are separate from the 
overarching premise driving the conflict. This suggests a variation in the purpose for 
sexualized violence during and within conflict.  
Frequency   
Sexual violence outside of conflict spaces is notoriously underreported. The same 
pattern of underreporting exits within the politically conflicted space and is also the case 
of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Respondents indicate that the deterrents to 
                                                 
69 Interviews conducted on 7/9/2018 and 7/19/2018 with representatives associated with a war crimes 
reporting and monitoring organization.  
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reporting victimization are many, although reports continue to trickle in even in the two 
decades that have passed since ceasefire70.  
Estimates vary in terms of quantifying the number of victims of sexualized violence 
during the war (1992 – 1995). Reports range from anywhere between 12,000 – 50,000 
victims (Amnesty International 2017; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Lai and Ralph 
1995). For men, the number is conservatively estimated at 3,000, but it is likely that there 
were many more victims (Withers 2017). Psychologically, socially, and culturally 
speaking, there are several barriers for victims when considering reporting crimes of 
sexual violence, which leads to an obvious impact in terms of quantifiably verifying these 
acts of violence.  
 At the ICTY, 60 victims of sexually violent crimes testified during the tribunal 
(ICTY 2019a). This appears to be a shockingly low number considering the fact that over 
4,500 witnesses testified at the tribunal. Not to mention that it is believed that there was a 
minimum estimation of 12,000 victims (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). However, the 
erosion of the family system, a central societal underpinning in the region which was 
already in distress from the effects of war, is undoubtedly one of the primary social costs 
that did and continues to deter victims from reporting and testifying (ICTY 2019b). Also, 
reporting during the war was challenging at best71. It seems possible that the longer it 
takes to report the crime, the less motivated a victim feels to do so.  
                                                 
70 Interviews conducted from 6/22/2018 – 8/7/2018 in and around the territory of the former Yugoslavia.  
71 During an interview with a Bosniak commandier, I inquired about the procedures for reporting sexual 
violence during the conflict. More than one ARBiH soldier I interviewed noted that once an individual was 
in government-controlled territory, they were able to connect alleged victims with the police department. 
However, given that the government was engaged in a massive defense, it was unlikely that these crimes 
could be fully investigated at the time. The Head of the Office for the Residual Mechanism, who worked 
directly with refugees in Tuzla during active conflict, also noted that only two individuals ever reported this 
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However, the number of victims is not the only frequency factor to consider. 
Frequency also includes the number of incidents for a single victim and the time period 
over which the victimization occurred. In geographical analysis alone, there are over 57 
villages, towns, and cities in Bosnia where acts of rape and sexual violence occurred 
(Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). Within each of these towns and regions, there were 
often multiple sites where sexual violence was employed by perpetrators.  
Returning to the previous example of Prijedor, not only were different forms of rape 
engaged in, but also there were multiple locations utilized for this violence. To illustrate, 
there were 33 reported incidents of public and private sexually violent acts that occurred 
in conjunction with fighting. These incidents occurred in 14 villages in the vicinity of 
Prijedor. But, there were also at least six camps in the Prijedor vicinity where mass and 
multiple perpetrator rapes occurred (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994). In the Annex IX 
Report, only 178 incidents were documented in Prijedor, but it is easy to imagine that the 
number of incidents is much higher than this artificial number accounts for (Bassiouni 
and McCormick 1994). Add to that, Prijedor is only one of the 56 regions that were 
targeted with this form of violence. This is evidence that the frequency was quite high in 
the affected areas. 
 Another, and the final, frequency factor considered in this section is the timeframe 
within which this violence was deployed. Following the formal start of hostilities in April 
of 1992, the development of the detention/rape camps followed shortly thereafter. There 
is agreement across various reporting sources that rapes occurred with high frequency 
from the Spring – Fall of 1992 (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 
                                                                                                                                                 
type of violence to her. While it was known to be occurring, it was unspoken or expressed in generalities. 
(Interview conducted on 6/22/18 in Sarajevo for 1.5 hours).  
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1994; Lai and Ralph 1995).  The Head of the Sarajevo Field Office for the UN Residual 
Mechanism for the International Tribunal also confirmed this observation and noted that 
sexual violence was primarily perpetrated between 1992 – 199372.  
Indeed, as was the case with Višegrad, once non-Serbs effectively fled the Republika 
Srpska regions, reports of sexual violence decreased significantly (Amnesty International 
1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Lai and Ralph 1995). Arguably, this is another 
piece of evidence linking back to the purpose of these crimes. Since the reporting of rape 
was linked with multi-ethnic cities at the start of the war, this suggests that ethnic 
cleansing was one of the primary purposes of the sexualized violence and may explain 
why this is a high severity case when compared cross-nationally to other political 
conflicts.  
 Regardless of underreporting, there is evidence in this case of frequent acts of 
sexualized violence. While the intensity and frequency is seemingly limited to the early 
years of the war, this was a conflict where all parties to the conflict deployed sexual 
violence, albeit at varying rates as a mechanism to wage war. In spite of this, there were 
many who intervened, resisted, and restrained themselves and others from this violence.  
Evidence of Soldiers’ Efforts to Intervene, Resist, or Refrain 
 The Bosnian case appears to meet all the required elements of a case 
characterized by highly severe rates of sexualized violence. The merging of the JNA, 
Serb special forces, conscripted and reluctant Bosnian Serb civilians and Bosnian Serb 
forces into a cohesive and connected fighting unit likely required some group 
socialization and fraternalization practices (D. K. Cohen 2013; E. J. Wood 2009a). 
                                                 
72 Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 6/22/2018 for 1.5 hours.  
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Additionally, while there remains limited direct evidence of overt commands given by 
military leaders to engage in sexualized violence in order to ethnically cleanse the region 
of non-Serbs, the command structure definitely did not enforce norms to refrain from this 
violence and may have passively or overtly supported this violence (Hoover Green 2011). 
Indeed, of the 32 individuals convicted by the tribunal, four were found to have superior 
responsibility under Article 7(3) (ICTY 2016).  
 And yet, in spite of this, there is regular and obvious evidence in witness 
testimony, reports from international organizations, and from field interviews conducted 
during this research that soldiers often did not participate or attempted to intervene. I 
outline a few examples here:  
1) “Mohamed Kaltak came out of his house in the Dobrinja suburb of Sarajevo 
early in the morning of 12 May 1992 when a group of about 25 Serbian soldiers 
(whom he referred to as Cetniks) came to the area ostensibly searching for 
weapons. The soldiers took him with others to a Serb-owned house about 1.5km 
away in the suburb of Lukavica. A shot was fired from a nearby building as the 
group were taken into the house (sic), killing one of the Serbian soldiers. They 
returned fire after taking the prisoners into the house. Here the journalist noted 
Mohamed Kaltak's words (Mohamed Kaltak implies in the reported statement 
below that he was not himself a combatant): ‘We were a group of 20 - four 
Croats, five Serbs and 11 Muslims. They were 25 Cetniks. They took us to one 
room and separated Serbs on one side and Muslims and Croats on the other. At 
the beginning they threatened only Serbs. They said they would kill [us]. They 
told these Serbs that we were good Croats and Muslims because we didn't join the 
army of Alija [referring to the Bosnian President, Alija Izetbegovic], but they 
were bad Serbs because they didn't fight for the Serbian cause. They were heavily 
beaten by these Cetniks." The group were held for about two hours before the 
detained Serbs were taken away (sic) (Mohamed Kaltak speculated that they were 
taken to be enlisted in the Serbian forces) and the Muslims and Croats were taken 
to a detention centre at Kula, apparently a public building. Upon their arrival, they 
were beaten outside the building; one of the men allegedly lost all his teeth. A 
Serbian officer shouted to the soldiers to stop the beatings, but they threatened the 
officer and ignored the order (Amnesty International 1992, 32 - 33).”  
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 A few factors relevant to this research are demonstrated in this witness report to a 
reporter from the British Broadcasting Company (BBC) in 1992. Note that Serbs who had 
not already joined the fight were likely forcibly conscripted. Many Bosnian Serb 
civilians, especially those from Sarajevo, identified as Sarajevan or even Yugoslavian 
before identifying as Serb. These individuals objected to the conflict and provide an 
example of civilian resistance. More importantly, in this testimony, a Serbian officer not 
only objected to the behavior of the soldiers, he attempted to intervene. While his 
intervention was in vain, the effort was there.  
2) “The article reports an interview with three Serbian women in Novigrad. The 
first, 37-year-old Ljubica Leši, stated that one night (the date was not specified, 
but was apparently in July or August) she and three other women were abducted 
and taken to a nearby house by Croatian neighbours who had previously accused 
them of hiding Cetniks. Fifteen uniformed men were waiting, they reportedly told 
the women that they were to be raped because Cetniks had raped 150 women 
(presumably Croats). Seven men (all neighbours according to Ljubica Leši) raped 
the women in the course of five hours. The following night another woman, a 37-
year-old named Smilja (her surname was not reported), who was apparently 
sheltering with Ljubica Leši, was taken away in a van by militiamen, one of who 
she knew well, together with a 45-year-old woman from another house. Croatian 
military policemen reportedly tried to intervene upon hearing the women's 
screams but failed when the van drove off (Amnesty International 1992, 51–52).” 
 
In this example, there is an attempt on the part of Croatian military police to 
intervene upon hearing the distress of the women. Of importance, the military police did 
not participate in the sexual violence and further took efforts to intervene.  
3) “There also are many cases where female victims are protected by someone 
from the same ethnic group as their attackers. Men take women out of camps to 
protect them from rape or sexual assault, tell other guards or soldiers that the 
women are “taken,” or help them escape. Women hide other women or bring 
them contraceptives (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994, Under Section C. -  
Summary Analysis).73” 
                                                 
73 Interestingly, the Annex IX findings indicate that there is insufficient reporting of sexual violence 
perpetrated against men to determine whether a similar pattern of intervention exists. However, this 
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The Annex IX Report from the UN Security Council on Rape and Sexual Assault 
in BiH, Croatia, and Serbia is a rich source of data. Their methodology involved a multi-
methodological approach including documentary evidence from the International Human 
Rights Law Institute (IHRLI), extensive field interviews, and additional government 
collected data that was not included the in IHRLI database. Interestingly, with the 1,100 
reported cases of rape and sexual assault, the contributors found that, “many victims are 
protected by someone from the same ethnic group as their attacker…” The language here 
suggests that intervention is not uncommon. Review of the examples provided here 
provides anecdotal evidence of a pattern that is at the heart of this research.  
4) “One report states that girls and women were raped only once at Trnopolje 
camp. That report states that drunk Chetniks burst into a hall, holding women and 
children. Some guards tried to protect the younger girls, wresting them from the 
arms of the Chetniks and saying the girls were theirs. The girls who returned 
stated that they had been raped. The commander apologized for the actions of the 
Chetniks and posted an armed guard around the women for a few days. He stated 
that he personally guaranteed their safety (Bassiouni and McCormick 1994, 
Trnopilje Section).”  
 
 This is a direct example of the intervention described in Example 3. Here, a 
commander intervened to the extent that he ordered armed guards to ensure ongoing 
safety, in spite of being unable to fully deliver on safety previously. However, what is 
important is that in spite of systematic rape and sexual violence occurring throughout 
Republika Srpska controlled territories, many soldiers existed who did not appear to 
participate. In this case, the commander and the armed guard resisted the influence of the 
social norms forming and being implemented across their comrades within the same 
milieu.  
                                                                                                                                                 
distinction indicates that there may be some gendered processes at work in the areas of non-participation 
and intervention during incidents of sexual violence involving men.  
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5) “All the attackers participate even though not all sexually assault. The first 
pattern occurs before any widespread or generalized fighting breaks out in a 
region. This type of rape and sexual assault is accompanied by looting, 
intimidation, and beatings. Tensions in an area grow, and members of the ethnic 
group controlling the regional government begin to terrorize their neighbours by 
intimidation, looting and beatings. Two or more men reportedly break into a 
house, intimidate the residents, steal their property, beat them, and often rape and 
sexually assault female residents. Some of the reported rapes and sexual assaults 
are singular and some are multiple. In either case, there is often a gang 
atmosphere where all the abuses are part of the same event, and all the attackers 
participate in the event, even if they do not sexually assault the victims (Bassiouni 
and McCormick 1994, Summary Analysis Section).”  
 
Actual intervention on behalf of the victims is one of the subtext considerations in 
this research as is the bystander or the non-participant. The Annex IX Report once again 
highlights a pattern of violence discovered through their analysis. Interestingly, in this 
example, the contributors indicate that all the attackers participate in the event, but not all 
participate in the sexual assault. In this case, the soldier may loot, physically abuse the 
victim, or even serve as a lookout, but they refrain from participating in sexual 
violence74.   
                                                 
74 In this example, it is difficult to determine whether or not the soldier who refrains in a given situation, 
also refrained throughout the conflict. While it is undoubtedly the case that not every soldier who 
committed sexual violence did so every day and at every opportunity, it is also the case that a significant 
number of soldiers refrained from sexual violence through the course of the conflict. This research does not 
account for the soldier who commits violence one day and refrains from doing so on another. That is 
outside the scope conditions of this argument. Further, some many argue that gender bias or gender 
inequality may be linked to political violence broadly (see Caprioli (2005a) for the links between societal 
gender inequality predicting conflict onset). While this may be true in the aggregate, the individual 
difference theory I advance in this dissertation argues that the differential individual internalizations of 
gender bias predicts combatants’ sexually violent behavior during civil war given that it is a gendered form 
of violence. Indeed, there are cases where combatants, as described in these examples, choose to intervene 
or refrain from sexualized violence, but they are engaged in other forms of political violence by the very 
nature of their presence during these violent episodes. During an interview with a Victim’s Advocate for 
the War Crimes Chamber for the Sud Bosne conducted on 8/6/2018, this key respondent described several 
victim accounts of soldiers not engaging in violence even though the opportunity was available. In one 
account, the key respondent noted that a victim in a camp had a soldier come into the room where she was 
being assaulted and coach the victim to scream and pretend that she he was assaulting her. In this case, the 
soldier was participating in violence at the camp but was purposefully avoiding sexual violence. While the 
motivations for restraint are not empirically explored in this dissertation, this evidence of restraint suggests 
that there are different individual motivations for committing sexual violence, which is what the individual 
difference theory addresses.  
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6) “I.T., a married woman with two children, describes how she was raped:  
On the third of May 1993, a group of Serbs came to our house; they all wore 
uniforms of the Serbian Army. I was on the second floor when they surrounded 
the house, broke the main entrance and came upstairs. I was in the bedroom with 
my children and our neighbors - a husband, his wife and their daughter. The Serbs 
wore black ski masks which covered their faces (sic), but in spite of that, I 
recognized Mišo Trivić our neighbor who was in the Serbian Army; he used to 
come into the shop where I worked for many years. They [the soldiers] told us to 
lie down on the floor, after which they covered us with blankets. Mišo asked me 
to give him our money. I told him we had 1,400 German marks [approximately 
US $875] and brought it to him. He cursed me all the time. Then Trivić and three 
other soldiers took me into the living room and raped me there. The name of the 
second man was Siniša Milovčić; the third man I didn't know. The fourth man left 
the room; he didn't rape me. My neighbor was raped too. – Interview conducted in 
Croatia on February 27 – 28, 1994 (Lai and Ralph 1995, 14–15).” 
 
 This final illustration is similar to what the Annex IX Report describes in Example 
5. While four men came into the room, only three remained to participate in the violence. 
The victim clearly states that the 4th man left the room and did not rape her. While there 
is no “heroic” action on the part of this soldier to prevent or intervene, he did not remain 
in the room and participate in this violence.  
In this final section, examples are outlined of overt intervention and passive 
inaction on the part of soldiers concerning sexual violence. All are examples of non-
participation in violence and of actors that have not been fully accounted for in previous 
analyses of sexualized violence in conflict. Importantly, these witness accounts and 
reports are not striving to highlight this behavior. The reports of these actions are 
generally unprompted since the aim in these interviews is to understand the act of 
sexualized violence rather than restraint of the same. Undoubtedly, this is a meaningful 
pattern that deserves closer attention and analysis. 
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Conclusion  
 In this chapter, the framework for conflict-related sexual violence during the 
Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) is laid out. The complexity of the multi-ethnic dynamics is 
elaborated on and attention given to the process of targeting victims, examining the forms 
of sexualized violence, understanding the intent and purpose of the perpetrators, and 
considering the effects and multiple dimensions of frequency of sexualized violence 
during the course of this conflict. The chapter concludes with anecdotal evidence of the 
non-perpetration of sexualized violence by combatants in witness accounts and victim 
testimony. It is evident that clear examples of individual combatant differences on violent 
behavior as a pattern exists. To evaluate what motivates a combatant to commit 
sexualized violence, in the next chapter I turn to a cross-conflict empirical analysis of the 
potential sources of gender bias. Here, I evaluate whether or not the effects of gender 
inequalities in societal institutions link to sexual violence and are observable in the 
aggregate.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF SOCIETAL INEQUALITIES: GENDER ROLE 
SOCIALIZATION AND WARTIME RAPE 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed some of the significant patterns of sexualized 
violence that took place throughout the course of the conflict within the region of the 
former Yugoslavia. I provided an overview of the targets, form, purpose, and frequency 
by which acts of sexual violence occurred during the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). 
Importantly, the review of sexual violence committed in the Bosnian case provides 
anecdotal evidence that there are clear differences in individual combatant behavior. 
However, the main purpose of the sexual violence overview is to emphasize some of the 
exogenous contextual factors discussed in the individual difference theoretical 
framework75.  
 The individual difference theory developed in this dissertation argues that gender 
(in)equality76 and sexual violence in conflict are linked. In this chapter, I explore societal 
sources of gender (in)equality and examine their effects at the aggregate level of analysis. 
While a case specific study remains the ideal analytical approach for the questions 
explored in this project, in an effort to ensure conceptual clarity while also avoiding path 
dependence, an examination of the broader cross-conflict patterns is equally important 
(Bennett and Elman 2006; Humphreys and Jacobs 2015; Lieberman 2005). Indeed, in 
                                                 
75 These include, but are not limited to – the strategic agendas of the warring parties, military resources and 
territorial aims, interest from the international community, and the influence of the master cleavages 
engaged in the conflict. These factors are extrinsic to the individual. A key assumption of this dissertation 
is that the individual combatant internalizes these, along with other factors evaluated in this chapter and 
dissertation, differentially.   
76 In this chapter, following Karim and Hill (2018) I stylistically refer to gender (in)equality to connote both 
dimensions – equality and inequality.  
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order to better understand the social effects on the psychology of the combatant that is 
described by the individual difference theory, an analysis of socially constructed 
(in)equalities and their effects is an ideal endeavor. 
Thus, keeping in mind the two primary inquiries underpinning this research, in 
this chapter, I analyze the effects of gender (in)equality found in societal structures as an 
exogenous factor shaping gender bias.  The individual difference theory agrees that 
particular societal-level contextual factors, amongst others, shape the formation of a 
person’s self-construal and ultimately attitudes and beliefs generated from these social 
identities. Nevertheless, the argument maintains that the primary impact is not necessarily 
observable only in societal structures, but are perhaps more discernible in how 
individuals internalize these structural influences and then enacts them.  
While the individual difference theory agrees that the social structures under 
which an individual develops informs the ways in which an individual, in this case a 
combatant, views the world, this is not considered a singularly influential argument. 
Accordingly, in this chapter, I explore societal gender (in)equalities and consider if/how 
these (in)equalities inform upon the environment under which combatants are socialized 
and ultimately operate.  
I begin by discussing the leading arguments explaining cross-conflict variations in 
sexualized violence. I then provide a sub-theoretical account, the gender role 
socialization theory, for the ways in which gender (in)equality reflects patterns of 
discrimination related to gender roles in society. This theory is absorbed under the 
broader individual difference theory in that the gender role socialization theory suggests a 
potential source for (in)equalities by further accounting for external contextual factors 
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under which combatants develop identities, beliefs and attitudes, and judgments and 
motivations77.  
These (in)equalities reveal shared ideas and expectations concerning masculinity 
and femininity at the societal level. In this sub-theoretical framework, I outline the means 
by which notions of gender hierarchies integrate in societal structures during the early 
childhood socialization period of combatants. I then discuss the potential implications 
this has for enacting sexualized violence during war. In the final section, I conduct a 
cross-conflict analysis exploring linkages between gender (in)equality, combatant 
socialization processes, and variations in wartime rape in order to evaluate whether or not 
structural socializing factors alone can account for variations in violence.  
Variations in Cross-Conflict Sexualized Violence  
Because the unit of analysis shifts away from the individual in this chapter, I first 
provide a brief outline of the variations in sexualized violence across conflicts, not just in 
the Bosnian case. Drawing on the universe of intrastate conflicts from Fearon and Laitin 
(2003, 2011) established from 1980 – 2009, Cohen (2013) determined rape severity for a 
total of 86 conflicts covering 984 conflict-years78.  Cohen's (2013) analysis reveals that 
roughly 22% of conflicts evaluated meet highly severe standards, with 40% reaching 
moderately severe standards. Conversely, just fewer than 20% of conflicts are 
characterized as less severe and 17% were not associated with wartime rape at all.  
As an aside, this identified pattern challenges any residual claim that conflict-
related sexual violence in war is simply an expected part of the conflict process across all 
cases. A clear pattern of variation is observable across conflicts, much like the anecdotal 
                                                 
77 See Figure 2 for more.  
78 Discussed further in the methods section of this chapter.  
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and descriptive analysis of the within conflict variation associated with the Bosnian case 
identified in this dissertation. Further, these observed patterns demands deeper evaluation 
into the causes and mechanisms at work.  
To date, several key contributions have improved our understanding about the 
factors that are likely to lead to high levels of sexualized violence across conflict settings. 
Amongst these are structural accounts linking the weakening of the state, changes in 
resources, along with opportunistic actions on the part of combatants to higher levels of 
sexualized violence in conflict (Goldstein 2003; Mueller 2000; Weinstein 2005, 2006).  
Other explanations claim that organizational processes related to combat group cohesion 
and military codes and norm enforcement impacts variations in sexualized violence 
(Cohen 2013; Hoover Green 2011, 2018; Wood 2006, 2009a)79. Finally, broader gender 
(in)equality arguments suggest that entrenched gender (in)equalities in societal and 
political structures impacts patterns of wartime rape and sexualized violence (Enloe 
2004; Green 2006; Hansen 2001; Seifert 1996). The latter structural explanation, 
combined with individual and group socialization processes, is explored in more depth in 
this chapter.  
Group and Military Socialization Processes 
An essential line of argumentation in the current literature related to this 
dissertation holds that group cohesion and socialization processes can explain the 
variance in wartime rape across conflicts (Cohen 2013; Wood 2006, 2008, 2008)80. 
Cohen (2013) theorizes that low group solidarity/cohesion amongst fighting units is 
                                                 
79 Covered in more depth in Chapter 2.  
80 A review of this literature is important to the gender role socialization sub-theory developed in this 
chapter. This is an alternative explanation of the patterns of difference this dissertation tackles.   
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correlated to higher rates of wartime rape amongst these groups, which she further links 
to the military recruitment strategy of combatants. In this argument, combat groups that 
have been constructed as a result of abduction or conscription are believed to enact rape 
more often than voluntary armies. This, Cohen (2013) suggests, can explain variance in 
wartime rape patterns across civil wars. However, an explanation as to why enacting rape 
should serve to shore up group cohesion amongst low solidarity combat groups has yet to 
be fully developed and tested, which this dissertation indirectly seeks to remedy.  
Another organizational factor that is believed to shape combatant behavior in 
conflict is the effectiveness of military norm enforcement and command structure 
(Hoover Green 2011, 2018). Here, commanders face a crucial dilemma – sanctioning the 
use of violence and moderating it simultaneously (Hoover Green 2011, 2018). Thus, 
limited or ineffective norm enforcement ultimately permits the use of violence even if not 
sanctioned.  In this way, a permissive environment is created via weak institutional 
arrangements, which allows combatants the opportunity to commit to violence.  
In another, but similar line of theorizing, Wood (2008) discusses distinct social 
processes that are disrupted by civil war, which indelibly impacts and reshapes social 
networks. Two social processes unpacked by Wood are military socialization and 
transformation of gender roles, which have important implications for the hypotheses 
later leveraged in this chapter81. Wood’s (2008) evaluation of military socialization is at 
                                                 
81 My treatment of Wood’s (2008) social processes argument is partial. Wood (2008) fully unpacks six 
processes that she claims are interactive using four nation-states as case studies (Peru, El Salvador, Sri 
Lanka, Sierra Leone). Other processes evaluated by Wood (2008), and not referred to above, include 
political mobilization, polarizaiton of social identities, militarization of the local authorities, and 
fragmentation of the political economy. I take liberty here to address the particular processes that are 
directly related to my main hypotheses.  
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the heart of Cohen’s (2013) argument and is of particular relevance concerning why rape 
might be used to create cohesion amongst a fighting group/unit.  
In terms of building cohesion, Wood (2008) describes the rituals of military 
training as formal and informal processes of hazing and initiation, along with drills and 
the ‘tearing down and building up’ of the individual soldier. This socialization, in part 
designed to prepare combatants for the unique context of conflict, builds cohesion 
amongst the group in order to wage war effectively as a unit. In essence, these groups 
create a combat readiness culture that increases certainty and trust within combat groups 
that have engaged in these rituals, which is critically valuable during the crisis of battle.  
However, while this explanation is compelling, why sexualized violence should 
serve as the socializing factor for combat units in spite of the opportunity for an array of 
alternative options to perform the same cohering function remains undetermined. The 
argument leveraged in this chapter, and throughout the dissertation, suggests that 
sexualized violence may serve to build group solidarity because of the norms of 
masculinity that are communicated through these acts. I previously posited that 
combatants who hold higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit sexualized 
violence in conflict. In conjunction with this hypothesis, it follows that combatants who 
have higher levels of gender bias are likely to nonconsciously engage sexualized violence 
as a means of signaling commitment to the group by demonstrating/performing 
‘masculinity.’ In this way, individual processes link to group processes in relationship to 
outcomes associated with sexualized violence in conflict.  
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Gender (In)equality  
  The presence of gender asymmetries cross-nationally and the potential effects of 
these (in)equalities is an important link to evaluate when explaining wartime rape and 
processes associated with sexualized violence in conflict. However, the scholarship in the 
area of gender and conflict is fairly vast and operates from several distinct perches in 
relationship to the role gender (in)equality plays in explaining sexualized violence during 
war. Perhaps the most prevalent are arguments claiming that the presence of patriarchal 
structures alone is sufficient to explain rape (Cohn and Enloe 2003; Koo 2002). While it 
is important to consider patriarchy broadly, it is not sufficient ipso facto to explain the 
variance that exists across conflicts. In many ways, this position is difficult to falsify as 
generalized, sweeping statements about patriarchal structures and their effects on violent 
behavior in conflict can be challenging to disprove.  
In addition, some social systems are in fact patriarchal, and yet do not engage in 
collective and/or wartime rape. Consider, for example, that while Bosniak women were 
victims of systematic rape, Bosniak fighters did not on the whole in turn employ rape as a 
weapon of war82. Further, as the historical processes addressed in Chapter 3 illustrates, 
while there is significant diversity across the Balkans, many of the social and political 
structures at the time of the conflict were unified83. In any case, because the notion of 
                                                 
82 Bosniak soldiers did commit wartime rape and other atrocities throughout the course of this conflict. This 
is not to say that some soldiers did not engage. It was, however, asymmetrical in terms of scale committed 
compared to other parties to the conflict. Another example of the relative absence of sexualized violence is 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both group identities engaged in the conflict have fairly prescribed roles for 
men and women in society, yet this conflict is not characterized by the extreme levels of wartime rape 
observed in many other conflicts. In this way, patriarchal processes and structures alone cannot explain the 
absence of sexualized violence in this case.  
83 It may also be relevant to consider whether or not combatants are in the aggressor or defender role as 
these roles might also be couched in gendered terms as power dynamics often split along gendered lines. 
However, a more robust exploration of this is outside the parameters of this project.  
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patriarchy is an umbrella term, precisely testing its effects requires a high degree of 
conceptual clarity about patriarchy itself. 
There are other arguments that explore gender within the conflict space that are 
indirectly relevant to the argument leveraged in this chapter. While the body of research I 
refer to here does not draw direct connections between gender and wartime rape, it does 
explore gender and gender roles within the ecology of conflict. For example, Wood 
(2008) examines whether or not gender roles are static in times of civil war. She notes 
that women have often become part of insurgencies, sometimes as fighters, but more 
often take on head of household roles that had previously been reserved for men. This is 
in large part out of necessity, but Wood (2008) contends that the features of civil war 
create radical displacement of gender roles. Still other scholars have effectively 
demonstrated opportunity structures that emerge out of the byproduct of restructuring in 
the conflict space (Berry 2018).   
These transformations and opportunity structures are indeed noteworthy. 
However, while it is true that the pace of some social transformations is expedited during 
conflict, these changes are still constrained. For example, while historically there have 
been some all-female insurgent groups (i.e. LTTE)84, and some mixed-gender insurgency 
groups, this is hardly the rule (E. J. Wood 2008). Goldstein (2003) finds that on the whole 
there are extremely few women fighters, which is indicative of persistent and embedded 
gender asymmetries pertaining to war. Additionally, Goldstein (2003) notes that women 
                                                 
84 LTTE refers to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam. The common reference to the rebel group is the 
Tamil Tigers. LTTE was a rebel separatist group active in Sri Lanka from around 1976 to approximately 
2009 See the Department Of State Human Rights Report on Sri Lanka from 2009 for more.   
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often support war by reinforcing soldiers’ masculinity, thusly limiting some changes in 
gender norms and roles despite appearances.  
Another important variant of the gender (in)equality argument coalesces with the 
socialization arguments described in the previous section and in Chapter 2.  Processes of 
military socialization and group cohesion have undoubtedly advanced our knowledge 
significantly regarding cross-conflict patterns in sexualized violence. Yet, questions 
remain as it pertains to the effect norms surrounding masculinity and femininity have 
within and around these socialization processes broadly.  
Indeed, Cohen (2013) tested a gender (in)equality hypothesis and found that the 
coefficient representing gender (in)equality was consistently positively correlated, 
although not found to be significant in her model. This finding, or rather non-finding, 
along with anecdotal evidence of gendered effects, leads to questions about the exact 
nature of the presence of gender (in)equality in relationship to wartime rape. In this 
chapter, I examine if there is sufficient variation in gender (in)equality in the aggregate in 
order to capture the broader socialization environment individual combatants formulated 
certain social identities in.  
A Theory of Gender Role Socialization 
Early Childhood Identification of Gender Differentiation 
A critical difficulty that is apparent in the approach previous scholars have taken 
to test gender (in)equality cross-nationally pertains to the ways in which they have 
conceived of the relevance of its presence. It is important to consider that other scholars 
have already made the link between the presence of gender (in)equality and conflict onset 
(Caprioli 2005a; Fearon 2011), but equally significant and substantive links between 
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gender (in)equality and wartime rape remain elusive. I contend that the challenge 
associated with measuring the presence of gender (in)equality at the time of war is that it 
misses key socializing dimensions related to gender, essentially rendering prior processes 
entirely exogenous to the phenomenon of wartime rape.  
Further, the individual difference theory outlined in Chapter 2 argues that it is 
combatants’ self-construal that facilitates biased beliefs that closely relate to the 
likelihood that combatants’ will commit sexualized violence within a conflict. One 
potential source for the development of biased beliefs about masculinity and femininity is 
the nature of the gendered environment during combatants’ formative years. In this cross-
national analysis, I argue that observed societal-level gender hierarchies during 
combatants’ childhood matters. The question remains at what level of analysis the effects 
of this process can be perceived.  
Importantly, as early as three years of age, children are able to identify their own 
gender and that of others and further feel some pressure to follow the expected behavior 
ascribed to the gender role the individual has been assigned to (Blakemore, Berenbaum, 
and Liben 2008; Bussey and Bandura 1999). Interestingly, much of this gender role 
identification occurs prior to the period of earliest available memory recall, thusly 
resulting in individuals’ tacit acceptance of gender norms with few exceptions.  
 Although it by no means can be argued that gender role socialization is a fixed 
and complete process at three years old, certain orienting principles become difficult to 
unravel since the individual presumably has little cause to question what is considered to 
be a ‘social fact.’ For example, Parsons (1968) discusses the composition of social 
structures through which the individual is simultaneously shaped and shapes. He further 
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asserts that the theorizing of both Durkheim and Piaget suggest that moral attitudes and 
logical thought are largely developed during socialization as a child (Parsons 1968, 401), 
which affirms that periods of early childhood are essential forming grounds in terms of 
the development of an individual’s assessment of gender differentiation and the 
development of values associated with these differences. As discussed in Chapter 2, no 
human is value free and it is the internalization and assignment of value to a social 
category where bias is generated.   
Despite the fact that Bussey and Bandura (1999) assert that socio-cognitive 
development occurs across a lifetime, they also suggest that modeling of gender-linked 
roles leads to early gender differentiation identification, although ages can range 
somewhere between three and seven across various gender role development theories. 
Regardless, within these formative years a conceptual map is constructed by which future 
behavior is mobilized.  
Gender Hierarchies 
 Hudson and Brinton (2007), paraphrasing French Philosopher Sylviane 
Agacinski, observe that gender is the first social difference identified as a child and is the 
frame by which other social and structural distinctions are understood. Exemplary of the 
claims made by Hale (2004) outlined in Chapter 2, social identities are developed as 
points of personal reference in order to ease navigation of the social world. Gender then, 
as the first social grouping, is fundamental socially.  
 Returning to the earlier, albeit brief discussion of social facts, this argument can 
thus be oriented to the inherent problem of the social facts surrounding gender 
asymmetries. They exist exogenous to the individual and are not per se created by the 
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individual, but rather are reenacted and as such recreated into a version of social reality. 
The assumption that gender distinctions are “natural” as advanced in some capacity by 
Gottschall (2004) is to effectively fail to investigate the sources and historical process of 
these distinctions85. Enloe (2004) argues that “(a)ny power arrangement that is imagined 
to be legitimate, timeless, and inevitable is pretty well fortified (pg. 3),”  which is 
undoubtedly the case with asymmetrical gender distinctions. Yet, these distinctions are 
not necessarily facts and it is likely that combatants internalize these social imperatives 
differently, which is a chief claim of this dissertation.  
Before examining how these hierarchies might explain patterns of wartime rape in 
intrastate conflict, I consider Lasswell’s (1950) exposition on the study of politics and the 
influential. He states that “politics (is) who gets what, when, (and) how,” and that power 
dynamics largely shapes this process. Situating gender hierarchies within the frame of 
this series of questions serves to demonstrate how perceived gender asymmetries might 
have implications for wartime rape. Answering these questions within the framework of 
recognizing the latent effects that are initiated concerning gender distinctions illustrates 
how gender (in)equality and wartime rape are linked.  
Simone de Beauvoir (1978) and Agacinski (2001) identify critical societal and 
structural features at the heart of gender hierarchies being accepted as social facts. First, 
de Beauvoir (1978) addresses what she describes as the duality of Self and Other, which 
has implications for how both men and women process gender roles. She states, in part, 
                                                 
85 Gottschall (2004) offers an evolutionary explanation for wartime rape. See his article for a more robust 
discussion on the evolutionary determinants of wartime rape. Notably, even if some of his assertions hold 
true, it still does not explain the substantial number of combatants who refrain from committing violence as 
they are exposed to the same evolutionary imperatives as their counterparts. Further, Chapters 3 of this 
dissertation highlights the historical development of identities and their construction in to ‘social facts.’  
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that women are “nothing other than what man decides; she is thus called ‘the sex,’ 
meaning that the male sees her essentially as a sexed being; for him she is sex, so she is it 
in the absolute. She is determined and differentiated in relation to man, while he is not in 
relation to her; she is the inessential in front of the essential. He is the Subject; he is the 
Absolute. She is the Other (1978, 6) 86.” Agacinski (2001) moves the argument a step 
further when she asserts that within hierarchical structures, “woman is neither the other 
nor different, but only an incomplete being, inferior or mutilated (x).” 
Keeping in mind the relegation of women to an inferior space, Goldstein’s (2003) 
confirmed hypothesis concerning the feminization of enemies further supports the claim 
raised in this argument that the value individual soldiers assign to gender categories has 
implications for variance in wartime rape across conflicts87. Furthermore, the gendered 
value assignment is linked to the measure of structural gender (in)equalities present 
during early childhood socialization. These structures are so profoundly a part of daily 
life that they are in fact, the mortar with which individual beliefs about their social world 
are built. They are deeply foundational and nearly impossible to shift once grounded into 
the psyche as social fact. 
For example, Goldstein (2003) draws on the Melian Dialogue to historically 
illustrate the various means utilized in the feminzation of the enemy (357), but this 
example also serves as evidence of systemic gender hierarchies over time88. In the 
Dialogue, Thucydides describes the role of women as private property and spoils of war, 
                                                 
86 In her treatment of the self and other in this discussion, de Beauvoir (1978) asserts that both men and 
women internalize this message equally. Women see themselves as object in relation to the male subject 
and men see the same.  
87 Because this chapter is a cross-conflict analysis, I focus on that level in this discussion. However, a key 
assumption in this structural modeling is that most soldiers associated with a given conflict internalize 
societal norms concerning gender relatively equally. This may not be borne out.  
88 See Thucydides (2013) for the Melian Dialogue, heretofore The Dialogue.  
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which is still relevant today in the normalization of wartime rape as a routine, and often 
expected part of conflict. However, other means of the feminization of the enemy, which 
includes castration, acts of homosexual rape, simulating positions of domination, and 
insults and intimidation leveled in gendered terms, further substantiates the problem of 
gender hierarchies in wartime violence (Goldstein 2003). These forms of “symbolic 
domination” demonstrate the implicit and normative assumption of the feminine as 
inferior and the masculine as superior. Enloe (2004) asserts that gendering the political 
further apprehends this asymmetry. Nationalism is equated with the masculine in-group 
and the feminine with the rebel out-group89.  
 Applying the structural imperatives concerning gender outlined here to Lasswell’s 
(1950) political question series, the following answers might be framed. Men get power 
during war by leveling wartime rape against women (and men) as a symbolic attack on 
the “manhood” of the enemy. Additionally, groups with low social cohesion gain group 
solidarity by enacting wartime rape as an act of power and domination90, thereby 
affirming superiority from the perch of masculinity and its associated values. Also, 
women get victimized and subjugated during wartime rape by the reenactment of 
asymmetrical scripts concerning gender roles. Finally, men get (or pursue) power through 
                                                 
89 Consider the following excerpt from Enloe (2004) concerning a Serbian militia fighter, Borislav Herak 
who was indicted for being a part of perpetuating the systematic rape during the conflict in former 
Yugoslavia in 1991. Enloe interviewed Herak and found some of these themes to be present in his 
responses: “He was a man. More to the point, he was a man raised in the 1960’s, ‘70’s, and ‘80’s to think 
of himself as masculine. Or perhaps it is more useful to say that Borislav was a man raised to think of 
himself as needing to be masculine. If we leave this process out of the story, if we treat it as unproblematic, 
then we leave out the exploration of the gendered politics of nationalism. With such a gaping omission, we 
will have a hard time arriving at a satisfactory explanation of why a factory worker became a militarized 
rapist (p. 101).” This example is illustrative of the value assignment to gendered categories and some of the 
critical intersections with these values.  
90 Power and domination are gender-biased values evaluated in one of the main hypotheses generated from 
the individual difference theory.  
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wartime rape and sexualized violence as a result of being socialized into particular 
notions of gender hierarchies during childhood.  
Of course exceptions always apply – women are often complicit in violence and 
oppression, not only in terms of themselves, but also others (C. Enloe 2004)91.  However, 
these incidents are typically the exception and not entirely the rule. In any case, examples 
of women oppressing other women and men can be attributed to a sort of false 
consciousness that the gendered processes described in this theory are likely to foster92.  
Thus, the potential implications of a theory of gender role socialization, combined 
with gender value hierarchies, and soldiers’ conduct concerning wartime rape calls for an 
empirical test of the claims posited here. I further contend that gender (in)equality, as 
theorized in this chapter, is connected to the group and military socialization processes 
explored by other scholars. As such, I hypothesize that the presence of gender 
(in)equality, in conjunction with combat unit cohesion, is linked to the severity of 
wartime rape.  
Hypothesis (1): Greater measures of gender (in)equality present with combat unit 
cohesion is positively associated with rape during civil war. Hypothesis (2): Greater 
measures of gender (in)equality during combatants’ formative years present with combat 
unit cohesion is positively associated with rape during civil war.  
 Table 2 outlines the logic of the expected effect gender (in)equality has in 
relationship with wartime rape. While it is clear that combat units require cohesion to 
                                                 
91 See Abu Gharib and Guantánamo, along with women of Rwanda inciting rape (United Nations 2013).  
92 Consider Franz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth (2004) for more on the notion of the identification of the 
oppressed with the oppressor. Fanon articulates the problem of colonization in the psychology of the 
colonized as believing in the identity prescribed by the oppressor. Ceteris paribus, women and men are 
equally socialized into asymmetrical values related to masculinity and femininity.  
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effectively wage war, and that the ways in which combatants arrive to a unit impacts the 
level of unit solidarity, it is still unclear as to why wartime rape serves as the solidarity 
building function for combat units. Table 2 visualizes and describes gender (in)equality 
as a factor in this process.  
Table 2: Predicted Relationship - Gender (In)equality and Sexualized Violence 
Conditioned for violence: Gender role socialization and violent outcomes 
Degree of gender (in)equality Outcome 
Low levels of gender (in)equality during 
combatants’ formative years 
Infrequent acts of wartime rape to build 
group solidarity 
Higher levels of gender (in)equality 
during combatants’ formative years 
Frequent acts of wartime rape to build 
group solidarity 
 
Data and Methods  
 This design draws heavily upon an existing dataset developed by Cohen (2013) 
that measures the severity of wartime rape by conflict year. I rely on this dataset and a 
portion of the modeling and hypothesis testing employed by Cohen (2013) in order to test 
the effect of gender (in)equality as conceptualized in this theory in conjunction with 
military socialization and combat unit solidarity. The most effective way to test these 
relationships is to replicate Cohen’s (2013) existing model with the addition of the gender 
(in)equality variables related to the theory developed in this chapter. In addition to 
Cohen’s (2013) dataset and modeling, several different datasets and sources have been 
utilized to develop proxies for the independent variables and to empirically test the 
gender role socialization theory, which is described in more detail below.  
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Cohen’s (2013) wartime rape severity dataset was the first of its kind to 
systematically collect and code data regarding wartime rape to this scale93.  Cohen’s 
(2013) collection effort includes the coding of rape severity for 86 major civil wars 
occurring between 1980 – 2009. Cohen (2013) built this data from the existing 
framework of Fearon and Laitin (2003), from a more developed dataset from Fearon and 
Laitin (2011) to identity active civil wars from 1980 - 200994. Cohen (2013) then coded 
the dependent variable, rape severity, by following a similar coding schema established 
by Butler, Gluch, and Mitchell (2007) premised on the widely used Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) from (Gibney, Cornett, and Wood 2011)95.  
To capture rape severity, Cohen (2013) coded U.S. Department of State96 reports 
for mentions of rape severity across active conflicts occurring between 1980 – 2009. 
Cohen’s (2013) unit of analysis is actor type-conflict-year. I utilize the same unit of 
analysis in keeping with her procedure, but I model only one of the five dependent 
variables Cohen (2013) evaluates. I evaluate at the conflict level instead of refining by 
actor in the modeling effort explored in this chapter. I do this because I assume that each 
of the actors - insurgent group or state military combatants - will have generally been 
                                                 
93 Cohen (2013) acknowledges several early efforts to both create datasets on wartime sexual violence (Farr 
2009; Green 2006) and in-depth case studies of the same (Leiby 2009; Sharlach 2000; E. J. Wood 2009a). 
This is list is not exhaustive. See Cohen (2013) for more.   
94 A more recent and robust dataset is the Cohen and Nordås (2014) that covers more conflicts (both minor 
and major interstate and intrastate conflicts) and a more nuanced conceptualization of sexual violence. 
However, because I am interested in seeing if/how gender inequality interacts with group 
solidarity/cohesion processes, Cohen’s (2013) dataset appears to be a more appropriate match to evaluate 
this relationship.  
95 For more information on the coding procedures utilized in the original and the development of the 
dependent variable, please see Explaining Rape During Civil War: Cross-National Evidence (1980 – 2009).  
96 Henceforth State Department.  
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socialized under similar structural conditions due to the fact that these are intrastate 
conflicts97. Thus, I evaluate only at the conflict level in this chapter.  
Dependent Variable: Severity of Rape during Conflict  
The severity of rape during conflict is the dependent variable in this chapter.  
Drawing on Butler et al. (2007), Cohen (2013) establishes a four-point rape severity 
scale, with three being “massive” or “systematic” rape and zero being no mention of rape, 
for each actor (insurgent group or state military) during a conflict year. To score this, 
Cohen (2013) codes State Department Human Rights Country reports to assess for rape 
severity98. The severity of rape determined for a conflict in a given conflict year is the 
high score by any actor (insurgent group or state military) in a conflict year.  
Combatants’ Childhood Socialization  
 Several options were considered to account for the childhood socialization periods 
for combatants99. This argument raises a key conceptual distinction from other gender 
(in)equality arguments leveraged at the conflict-level concerning wartime rape – namely, 
that time matters. Given that gender role socialization largely occurs between ages three - 
seven, I employ a lag period to account for the time range when gender (in)equality ought 
to have an effect. This lag effectively captures the developmental era for most soldiers 
                                                 
97 This is a significant assumption and one of many reasons why micro-foundational analysis is required to 
effectively explore the processes advanced in this dissertation. Arguably, soldiers may have been exposed 
to similar conditions that are built into public institutions. However, the variation in gender processes at the 
regional and individual level is missing in this analysis. These variations are likely not insignificant. 
Factors such as religion, urban/rural divides, SES, amongst others, undoubtedly impact gender role 
socialization processes.  
98 While the Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset is coded using more human rights 
organization sources, including Amnesty International (AI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) (D. K. 
Cohen and Nordås 2014b); in supplementary materials, Cohen (2013) identifies close agreement between 
the two coding processes such that she is able to determine that the State Department source is sufficiently 
comprehensive and closely matches both AI and HRW. 
99 One option included an effort to code military data from the CIA World Factbook covering the same year 
range (1980 – 2009) as Cohen’s (2013) dataset. However, this effort did not yield significant enough data 
to establish proportional measures reflective of the state military machinery engaged in conflict.  
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who engage in active conflict processes. While shifts in the indicators could vary 
significantly over two decades, annual shifts tend to be less substantive, which allows for 
this lag period to account for the general societal climate during the socialization period 
of interest100.  For two of the proxy variables used to test for gender (in)equality - fertility 
rates and the difference between male and female life expectancy - I run the model both 
at the time of conflict and at a 15-year lag prior to the conflict year101. For a third and 
final (in)equality variable, ratio of female to male secondary education enrollment, I lag 
across three points in time – 15 years, 10 years, and at the time of conflict102.  
Indicators  
 Debates are rampant concerning how to effectively measure the presence of 
gender (in)equality. While many efforts have been advanced to create various indices 
reflective of the lived experience of women and men, data availability for the time period 
of interest does not allow for the utilization of those more developed indices. The lag 
period needed to account for childhood socialization ranges rules out several robust data 
indicators as a means of measurement103.  
                                                 
100 Some of the conflicts coded are characterized by the use of child soldiers, which this lag period does not 
account for. However, even if child soldiers are utilized, these conflicts are still comprised of soldiers of the 
typical war waging age. 
101 I choose to lag 15 years only because data for both variables is available to test back to a time that may 
more fully capture the socialization environment considering the age range across combat soldiers. The 
number of observations is not greatly reduced due to unavailable or missing data.  
102 I choose to test at three points in time due to loss of observations related to missing data as the lag 
lengthens. As Table 3 results reveal, the difference in lost observations between the lag time of this 
indicator alone is fairly marginal.  
103 For example, CIRI's Human Rights Data Project has a section of data available that captures women’s 
economic, social, and political rights. However, this data lags back to 1981, which is not sufficient to 
capture the socialization context evaluated in this section. In addition, the Womanstats data collection 
project offers valuable data capturing women’s economic, social, and political rights, but it is not 
systematized in a manner fit for this modeling.  
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In the literature, both Fearon (2011) and Carprioli (2007) describe the use of 
fertility rates as a good proxy to capture elements of women’s inclusion and rights at a 
national level. Both scholars have further employed this indicator to reveal substantive 
links between the presence of gender (in)equality and conflict onset (Caprioli 2005b; 
Fearon 2011). Caprioli (2005) notes that, “(a)lthough gender roles change over time and 
are culturally dependent, gender is used as a benchmark to determine access and power, 
and is the rubric under which inequality is justified and maintained (165) .” As such, 
essential to the argument being raised here is the assumption that gender role 
socialization does indeed change over time and that the proxy variables employed to 
represent gender (in)equities ought to effectively serve as indicators representative of the 
relationship between gender hierarchies and access and power.  
Caprioli (2005) further claims that fertility rates serve as a direct indicator of 
gender (in)equality and a robust indicator for lower levels of education, employment, and 
decision-making power (169)104. As such, in this chapter and consistent with Cohen’s 
(2013) effort to test for the effects of gender (in)equality in predicting the severity of 
sexual violence in conflict, I utilize fertility rate data collected by the World Bank over 
the lag period explored in this design105.  
While Caprioli (2005) indicates that fertility rates can effectively proxy for many 
dimensions of gender (in)equality, it is an imperfect proxy at best given that it captures 
only some of the elements of women’s lived experiences. Fertility rates address complex 
issues related to maternal health, but other indicators are potentially superior as a measure 
                                                 
104 For more, see Caprioli (2005) Primed for Violence: The Role of Gender Inequality. 
105 See World Development Indicators for more.  
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of gender (in)equality106. Thus, for robustness and in an effort to capture as many 
dimensions of gender (in)equality as possible, I mobilize two other predictors to proxy 
for gender (in)equality.  
To capture equity in women’s health and perceived societal value, I develop a 
measure based on Amartya Sen's (1990) missing women hypothesis. Sen (1990) 
established a calculation arguing that, ipso facto, women should outnumber men and 
should live longer. Building on Sen’s (1990) hypothesis, I develop a life expectancy 
difference variable by accounting for the life expectancy difference between men and 
women by nation. Because Sen’s (1990) hypothesis focuses on the physical well-being of 
women (maternal death rates, infanticide, planned gendered abortions, etc.), this variable 
provides a general sense of the physical integrity of women. Again, I rely on the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) to collect this data for analysis.  
The final indicator I use to evaluate the effects of gender (in)equality during 
combatants’ formative years leading to sexualized violence in conflict is a ratio of female 
to male secondary education enrollment. This predictor is more robust than the others as 
it more directly assesses the degree of women’s inclusion and participation in society 
where the others more indirectly capture gender (in)equality. Several scholars have 
employed education related variables to evaluate the effects of gender (in)equality along 
several key political dimensions107. Additionally, because the overarching theory guiding 
                                                 
106 While Caprioli (2005) and Fearon (2011) both raise sound arguments for the use of fertility rates, 
problems remain with this predictor. Examples include China’s one child policy and the high fertility rates 
in Ireland due to religious imperatives. Other predictors, particularly education rates are far superior.  
107 See Shair-Rosenfield and Wood (2017) who use a secondary education measure to evaluate the 
relationship between female representation in parliament and prolonged peace in post-conflict environs. 
Also, Karim and Beardsley (2016) use a primary education measure, along with others, to assess the effects 
of gender inequality on sexual exploitation and abuse on UN peacekeeping missions. Both Gray, Kittilson, 
and Sandholtz (2006) and Simmons (2009) use education/literacy related variables in their models related 
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this project argues that combatants who exhibit a higher need for power, hold a negative 
view of the opposite sex, and adhere to strong belief’s regarding traditional gender roles, 
women’s (non)participation in higher levels of education more closely relates to these 
dimensions of (in)equality explored both in this chapter and in this project broadly. Thus, 
it is an ideal proxy for determining the effects of gender (in)equality.  
 Consequently, the independent variables under analysis create a multi-
dimensional picture of the presence of gender inequality during combatants’ formative 
years. By employing lagged fertility rates, difference between male and female life 
expectancy, and a secondary education ratio accounting for the gender socialization 
period of combatants’ engaged in conflict, a comprehensive multivariate statistical model 
representing the earlier theorizing outlined serves as an empirical test of the argument 
described.  
Data Limitations  
Accurate data on wartime rape and sexual violence, both case specific and in the 
aggregate, is difficult to obtain. Cohen (2013) notes that the reliability of the true values 
of rape reports is not wholly available. Problems of potential overrepresentation of rape 
in a given conflict due to media attention associated with conflict events, along with 
problems of victim underreporting, plagues a research agenda engaging questions 
surrounding wartime rape. With that being said, the consensus amongst scholars is that it 
is acceptable to rely on data that demonstrates significant enough patterns indicative of 
validity. As such, the limitations of the data should not wholly undermine the analysis 
employed in this design.  
                                                                                                                                                 
to gender equality. Suffice to say, scholars agree that education variables are an excellent proxy variable for 
women’s inclusion and participation in society.  
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In coding severity of wartime rape, Cohen (2013) exclusively utilizes State 
Department reports, and although robustness checks were performed within the sample 
by verifying through other sources, the limitations surrounding data collection cannot be 
understated. Factors such as time, resources, and access, amongst a host of other issues 
constrains the full accuracy of this data.  
Regardless, Cohen (2013) and Wood (2009) both maintain that it is unlikely that 
the, “variation in reporting and the reality of the occurrence of rape confound the 
extraction of meaningful information (Cohen 2013, p. 467).” This is to say that the four-
point scale used to measure severity and magnitude is effective in that it is probable that 
those regions experiencing high rates of rape likely did in spite of the lack of a precise 
quantifier. Similarly, a region identified as experiencing no rape is unlikely to have the 
presence of systematic rape. While this does not account for what is unobservable, it does 
create a rough picture of the general patterns. 
Further, data availability to account for the lag time to effectively capture the 
climate of combatants’ socialization period is lacking. Reliable data that lags back far 
enough remains inconsistent with missing years interspersed through the 29-year range 
analyzed using Cohen’s (2013) dataset.   
Control Variables 
 In this analysis, I am interested in adding a link to the conceptual map already 
established by Cohen (2013) and Wood (2005, 2008). Cohen (2013) argues that wartime 
rape serves as a cohering function for combat groups with low social cohesion, largely 
due to the ways by which they were recruited for combat. While this explanation makes 
an important contribution, I add to this by exploring how and why wartime rape should 
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improve group solidarity. Because of this, the control variables used in the series of 
regressions modeled below include the controls utilized in Cohen’s (2013) conflict-level 
model108.  
I use the same controls for Cohen’s (2013) conflict level model population (log) 
from the Penn World Tables 7, ethnic war109 to assess whether or not the conflict was 
based on ethnic claims, and conflict aim controls for whether or not the war was 
secessionist, regime change, or mixed110.  Finally, because the observations are not 
statistically independent from each other, I cluster the analysis by conflict111. 
TABLE 3. Gender Socialization and Rape During Civil War: Ordered Probit Results112 
 Dependent variable: 
 Severity of Rape – Conflict Level 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Ethnic War -0.062 -0.062 -0.064 -0.181 -0.144 -0.155 -0.106 
 (0.114) (0.118) (0.157) (0.128) (0.140) (0.127) (0.118) 
        
Magnitude of State Failure  0.061 0.061 -0.351 0.151 0.283 0.046 0.051 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.303) (0.138) (0.161) (0.107) (0.110) 
        
Conflict Aim  -0.212 -0.211 -0.170 -0.169 -0.255 -0.126** -0.143 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.125) (0.123) (0.148) (0.114) (0.116) 
        
Difference between 
male/female life expectancy  
-0.001       
 (0.025)       
        
Difference between  -3.68      
                                                 
108 See Cohen’s (2013) Model 1 for more on the control variables used. I describe them in text above. I 
choose to utilize the conflict level model because the effects of gender inequality should be generally static 
across the region. This model should sufficiently operationalize the process hypothesized in this chapter.  
109 From Fearon’s original coding schema 
110 From Fearon’s original coding schema 
111 I also clustered by country with similar results.  
112 See raw STATA tables in Appendix E.  
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male/female life expectancy 
(Lag 15 years)   (0.033)      
        
Secondary Education    0.00002     
   (0.003)     
        
Secondary Education (Lag 
10 years)  
   -0.005    
    (0.004)    
        
Secondary Education (Lag 
15 years)  
    -0.004   
     (0.004)   
        
Fertility Rate       0.114  
      (0.076)  
        
Fertility Rate (Lag 15 years)       0.115 
       (0.074) 
        
Extrajudicial Killings 0.287* 0.287* 0.319* 0.297** 0.216 0.269* 0.278* 
 (0.121) (0.117) (0.128) (0.111) (0.136) (0.117) (0.119) 
        
Polity2 -0.021 -0.021 -0.020 -0.017 -0.003 -0.014 -0.012 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) 
        
Duration  -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.0003 -0.0005 0.0003 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) 
        
Year 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.073*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) 
        
Population (log) 0.157* 0.157* 0.102 0.164* 0.169 0.195** 0.178** 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.082) (0.081) (0.091) (0.071) (0.066) 
 
Observations 854 854 549 496 440 854 854 
Pseudo R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.17 
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Note: *p**p***p<0.01 
Table 2: Summary NOTE: Values represent ordered probit parameter estimates with robust 
standard errors, clustered by conflict, in parentheses.  *p <  0: 05, **p <  0: 01, ***p <  0: 001 
 
Interpretation  
Table 3 describes the results from the ordered probit analysis conducted using the 
three different proxy indicators for gender (in)equality. While the coefficients for nearly 
of all of the gender (in)equality variables mostly directionally correlate as predicted with 
conflict level rape severity, none of the predictors are statistically significant. However, 
even though the movement is marginal, it appears that lag time may matter for each of 
the gender (in)equality predictors as hypothesized. In this way, the model performs 
similar to the version run by Cohen (2013) to test for the effects of gender (in)equality.  
This null result is intriguing and suggests that variation is not readily observable 
in societal level structures. While there are clear gender (in)equalities in societal 
institutions and structures, the effects of those (in)equalities likely interact at the group 
and individual levels. The key difference is not in the existence of gender (in)equalities in 
societal level structures, but rather in the differential manner by which combatants 
internalize and then act on these differences. In many ways, the results here are also 
limited related to challenges with data availability to effectively and directly capture the 
relationships between structural gender (in)equalities and combatants internalization of 
these (in)equalities. In order to overcome problems associated with data availability and 
with conceptual precision in variables representing gender (in)equality, individual-level 
qualitative analysis related to combatant attitudes associated with gender (in)equality and 
gender bias is a valuable endeavor. I perform just such an analysis in the following 
chapter.  
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Conclusion 
 How and in what way gender (in)equalities link to sexualized violence remains 
undetermined in this analysis. The relationship is not readily observable in the aggregate. 
Further, the null result supports the premise made by the overarching theory guiding this 
project – that important differences in gender biased beliefs and attitudes exist at the 
individual level of analysis.  Given this, it is critical to test how and in what ways the key 
differences theorized about throughout this dissertation link to the likelihood that a 
combatant would commit sexualized violence in conflict.  
 In this chapter, I investigated a potential relationship between societal gender 
(in)equalities and wartime rape. The null result suggests that the effect of socialization 
and gender bias is more observable at the group and individual levels of analysis. Case 
study analysis that explores these intersections is critical in enhancing our knowledge 
surrounding this phenomenon. The fact that some combatants within the same conflict 
and within the same combat unit do refrain from committing sexualized violence is 
undeniable. The individual difference theory suggests that the important differences and 
variations between combatants are motivated at the individual level. Thus, the effects of 
structural gender (in)equalities are discerned between individuals.  The results of this 
analysis are consistent with that postulation. In the next chapter, I more directly evaluate 
the links between gender bias and combatants’ sexually violent behavior in conflict.  
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CHAPTER 6 
COMPARING COMBATANTS: ANALYZING ATTITUDES, MOTIVATIONS, AND 
JUDGMENTS  
Introduction 
In keeping with the dualism theme woven throughout this dissertation, I now 
make a purposeful shift in both tone and analysis. As discussed in the introduction of this 
dissertation, there are two orders of inquiry evaluated throughout this project – 1) what 
are the sources of individual differences between combatants, and 2) in what ways do 
they motivate sexualized violence in political conflict? To address these overarching 
questions, I similarly employ two distinct analytical methods to evaluate them. In this 
way, this project is ordered from a multi-method, binary approach.  
Moving from the regression analysis conducted in the previous chapter, I now 
outline the results from field research trips conducted in Bosnia in the summers of 2014 
and 2018. During these journeys, I became familiarized with the Bosnian case through 
inductively driven research that involved trips around the region to rural and urban areas 
where impacts from the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) were deeply felt. These trips not 
only included interviewing experts, civilians, soldiers, and victims from the war period, 
but they also involved becoming familiar with the cultural constellations unique to 
Bosnia, particularly as it pertains to the theory of gender bias that is central to this 
research.  
However, before we begin the qualitative shift, I first review what has been 
covered in this dissertation thus far. In Chapter 2, I outlined the framework for the 
individual difference theory as an argument addressing the aforementioned pair of 
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questions guiding this project. Indeed, I assume that individual differences related to 
gender bias exist and matter related to committing conflict-related sexual violence. In the 
individual difference theory, I suggest that a combination of social identity factors, 
attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations are mediated by exogenous 
socializing factors, which then relates to the likelihood that a combatant will commit 
sexualized violence in conflict. I particularly highlight that not all social identity factors, 
attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations are relevant to combatants’ 
propensity to commit sexualized violence, but rather that factors related to gender are the 
primary distinctions between combatants related to a sexually violent behavioral 
outcome.  
Drawing on the case study of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), I began an analysis 
of the individual difference theory in the chapters that followed. In these chapters, I 
assume a more positivist tone and provide clear evidence of differences in individual 
combatant behavior is observed in human rights reports and direct investigations of 
sexual violence and rape in the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) (Bassiouni and McCormick 
1994).  In addition, I process trace the historical formation of ethno-national and gender 
distinctions woven into Bosnian society across time and space as part of the sources 
feeding into the individual gender differentiation that shapes sexual violence in conflict. 
In the last chapter, I evaluated the relationship between societal-level gender 
(in)equalities and the severity of wartime rape. The result of that analysis offers support 
for the main premise of the individual difference theory and points to the value of 
evaluating gender differentiation at the individual-level of analysis, which is the aim of 
this chapter.  
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Accordingly, in this chapter, I explore distinctions in gendered beliefs and 
attitudes between combatants and I also evaluate how those beliefs and attitudes are set 
into motion. In the previous chapters, the writing style employed was distant and clinical 
as typical of a more positivist tone and reflective of the nature that approach to empirical 
analysis. In this chapter, I shift to a more evocative tone that reflects the intimate quality 
of the ethnographic analytical approach engaged in this chapter. In this way, I begin this 
chapter by painting a picture of Bosnia twenty years post-conflict. Following that, I 
illustrate the main gender biased themes analyzed in this section through a soldier’s 
narrative. This is followed with a brief review of the theoretical structure predicating this 
project and a review of the main hypotheses explored in this chapter. Following that, I 
describe the methodology employed to evaluate the theory and the primary hypotheses 
tested and the importance of the qualitative method as a means of capturing the 
individual-level factors related to this project. I then outline the key findings from the 
qualitative research.  
Setting the Stage 
I begin the day113 in the Novo Sarajevo municipality, located just a short distance 
from the famed Holiday Inn114, once home and place of comfort for visiting foreign war 
correspondents, diplomats, and policymakers during the interminably long Siege of 
Sarajevo115. On this July morning, I look down on the bustling streets from my temporary 
home in a 4th story flat in the center of Sarajevo, which provides a birds-eye view of the 
activity below. The tram stop located just steps beyond the building entrance, along with 
                                                 
113 Friday, July 6, 2018  
114 Now renamed Hotel Holiday.  
115 The siege lasted 1425-days – nearly four years.  
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a beloved local bakery offering a variety of Bosanski burek – a filo pastry pie filled with 
any combination of meat, cheeses, and spinach – facilitates the constant activity outside 
the flat.  
On this day, I meet my research assistant and translator close to the tram stop to 
drive to a highly anticipated interview with a former Bosniak116 police officer, soldier and 
commander. We begin to drive the route to a local soldier’s organization, which was once 
the first Bosniak paramilitary unit formed in Bosnia to defend against JNA forces as the 
former Yugoslavia began its inevitable disintegration117. I take in the view of Mount 
Trebević to my left and of the many high-rise Tito-era buildings surrounding the roadway 
as we pass by.  
Evidence of the atrocities of the past pepper buildings of various ages as we move 
along what was once known as ‘Sniper Alley’ towards our interview destination. Stark 
reminders of the siege demand my attention as buildings scarred by mortar shells and 
bullets from nearly two decades ago await repair118. I am reminded of what was once a 
retirement home for the elderly, Retirement Home Nedžarići, now a shell of itself, and 
yet somehow transformed into a piece of structural art. My research assistant educates me 
                                                 
116 Bosniak refers to a person identifying as Bosnian Muslim.  
117 Today, this soldier’s organization celebrates various anniversaries from the Bosnian War and provides 
financial support to the veteran population from the war period (1992 – 1995). Political and economic 
challenges make reparations a fraught landscape in Bosnia. Hronešová (2016) highlights the differential 
power between various veterans and victims’ groups and the potential for material reparations to more 
deeply entrench social and ethnic cleavages. However, the purpose of connecting with this soldier’s 
organization is unrelated to their social and reparation work in the community. It is, rather, to collect data 
from a combat soldier’s perspective.   
118 (Martín-Díaz 2014) reports that 74% - 96% of buildings across three out the four municipalities in 
Sarajevo incurred damage throughout the course of the three-and-a-half-year long siege. The urban 
reconstruction of the city has been significant. Yet, even 20+ years later, the damage of the war remains 
observable throughout the city and Bosnia as a whole.  
  150 
on that section of the city and particularly notes that this building will not be repaired, but 
instead will serve as a stark reminder of what transpired two decades ago.  
Indeed, this very building seems to capture the soul of this city in its current post-
war state. The building is a skeleton of its former self, stripped down completely to just 
the concrete structure, and yet the concrete serves as a canvas for the sprayed-on art that 
refuses to be ignored. More powerfully still, green and verdant life grows up throughout 
the building, rising through the concrete all the way to what would be the sixth and 
highest floor. Each of these individual elements seems to capture a facet of Sarajevo’s 
post-war journey. She is the same and yet different – wildly artistic, filled with the drive 
to survive in spite of assorted barriers and obstacles, and yet deeply wounded to this day.  
I am filled with this sense of place as we approach our destination. Stories from 
the war are close to the surface of this community. Indeed, art exhibitions, war 
memorials, and testimonials are plentiful.  From my perspective, there is a strong sense 
that the war period is now a living, breathing part of the DNA of Sarajevo119. In some 
ways, it is as if the conflict occurred just yesterday.  
Perhaps it feels this way because the ICTY only completed its mandate in 2017 
and the residual mechanism continues to manage appeals and other legal filings related to 
the adjudicated cases (ICTY 2019b; United Nations International Residual Mechanism 
for Criminal Tribunals 2019). Or perhaps, it is the continued work of the Court of 
Bosnia120 and other domestic courts charged to process unresolved war crimes complaints 
(OSCE 2017). Or conceivably, it is the effects of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) 
                                                 
119 While I conducted interviews in some of the rural areas of Bosnia and in smaller municipalities, I did 
not spend significant enough time in these areas to make this assertion for all of Bosnia.  
120 Locally, SUD Bosne i Hercegovine  
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that resulted in a complex, Lijphart-esque consociational agreement that parsed Bosnia 
into two entities  – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska – 
along with the arbitrated district of Brčko. It may also be the continued presence of 
various international organizations that serve to mediate the uneasy alliance between 
these entities. No matter which of these causes, the effect is certainly felt.  
We arrive to the interview early and are greeted by the Director’s assistant who, 
in typical Bosnian tradition, kindly escorts us into a conference room and offers coffee121. 
As we await our respondent, I reflect on some of the key questions underpinning this 
research. What drives a soldier to commit sexualized violence in conflict? Are there 
perhaps unseen patterns in the beliefs, attitudes, and motivations of those combatants that 
do commit sexualized violence compared to those who do not? How can we better 
understand the individual differences between combatants who do and do not commit 
conflict-related sexualized violence? And, who better to ask about these questions than a 
soldier122.  
As a means of evaluating and analyzing these questions, the individual difference 
theoretical framework outlined earlier in this dissertation provides a sketch of combatant 
qualities and attributes I propose makes certain politically violent behaviors more likely 
to occur. In this way, building on literatures in political and social psychology, political 
                                                 
121 The Ottoman influence on the region is no better observed than in the coffee culture. Bosnian Coffee, 
never to be labeled otherwise, is a staple. Coffee is served in a variety of ways in the sidewalk cafes that 
line the road to Baščaršija and throughout the city. Bosnian coffee is unique in the manner by which it is 
prepared and served. It is a cultural symbol of hospitality and community. Typically, it is served on a tray 
in a long-stemmed pot with small ceramic cups similar in size to a demitasse. Sugar cubes and Turkish 
delights are also often served on the coffee tray. In the case of this setting, just the coffee was served 
without some of the other elaborations.  
122 I did not exclusively interview soldiers. Respondent demographics are discussed in more detail further 
along in the chapter. While the soldier population was a great resource, other key respondents are also 
uniquely positioned to offer important insight.  
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behavior, and sociology I explore notions of power and dominance, beliefs about 
masculinity and femininity, and the interplay between these biased attitudinal states123. I 
then evaluate how these biased beliefs and attitudes become operative, primarily through 
constraints on individual judgments and motivations, to then be mobilized into sexually 
violent behavioral outcomes.  
 With these questions in mind, I meet with the Director of the soldier’s 
organization124. A career soldier, the Director was conscripted into the JNA forces in 
1978. Like all Yugoslavian men of his generation, he was committed to eight years of 
service to the military. In the Director’s case, he went to military school and became a 
commander of a thirty-man troop and ultimately exceeded his conscription commitment 
by serving ten years before transitioning. He left the military in 1988 and entered police 
service just as nationalistic tendencies began to foment and entrench across the 
countryside. 
 As these tensions began to mobilize into outright skirmishes, the Director 
reported that managing civilian defense became a complex issue as the police force along 
with grassroots community organizations collaborated to defend against the pending 
onslaught. The Director was an active combatant during the siege and while he denied 
having witnessed sexual violence firsthand during the conflict, he helped many victims 
make reports who were fleeing some of the eastern territories into Sarajevo125.  
                                                 
123 The literature for building this analysis is extensive and diverse. I include a condensed list of key 
citations consulted for conceptualizing the individual attitudes and beliefs of interest here. (Anderson, 
Cooper, and Okamura 1997; Bargh et al. 1995; Bargh and Williams 2006; Bussey and Bandura 1999; 
Cossins 2000; Deutsch 2007; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2010; Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Malamuth 1986, 
1989, 1996).  
124 Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/6/2018 for 2.5 hours.  
125 The Director was stationed on Mount Igman on the outskirts of Sarajevo. He described many women 
fleeing Foča, a village that fell quickly under Bosnian Serb control through a premeditated military 
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During our interview, the Director spoke about his impressions of those soldiers 
who committed sexualized violence during the war. He highlighted that he felt that those 
who did engage in this form of violence, also exhibited “bad behavior” before the 
outbreak of hostilities. He noted a sense of inferiority amongst some of the opposition. 
Here the Director observed that power was undoubtedly an operative factor in 
committing sexualized violence. He attributed power as a conduit, “to show a man’s 
face,” and that power is a factor that reveals the, “nature of a man’s character.”  
To illustrate his assertions, the Director described a neighbor he knew and 
socialized with for an extended time during the prewar period. They were close enough to 
regularly play futbol together and he felt that he knew his neighbor fairly well. The 
Director described his neighbor as having a low education resulting in work as a laborer 
in the logging industry. According to the Director, he believed his neighbor felt insecure 
and inferior concerning these life conditions. He went on to observe that his neighbor was 
highly religious and, “displayed no respect for his wife.”  
Once the war began, the Director conveyed an image of his neighbor behaving in 
an, “unnecessarily vicious,” manner. He described his neighbor beating the elderly 
unprovoked and he noted that, “power was a weapon he got,” and he wielded it 
                                                                                                                                                 
takeover beginning on April 7, 1992 (Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project 1998). A combination 
of Serbian forces from Serbia proper and Montenegro and localized paramilitary forces identified as 
Bosnian Serb soldiers managed the takeover and expulsion of non-Serbs from Foča (Human Rights Watch 
Women’s Rights Project 1998). During the takeover, men and women were separated and primarily non-
Serb women were sent to various detention sites around Foča and were allegedly systematically raped. The 
ICRC was prevented from entering Foča from the time of the military takeover in April of 1992 until 
October of the same year. As forcible deportations occurred, civilians were forced northwest towards 
Sarajevo (See Figures 4 and 6 for mapping). It is here where the Director assisted civilian women with 
making reports. Seven combatants indicted by the ICTY for sexual violence crimes in the Foča area have 
since been convicted and sentenced to no less than 12 years and upwards to 34 years in prison for crimes 
associated with rape and torture (Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project 1998; ICTY 2019a). Foča 
is, in fact, known for housing some of the more infamous rape camps during the course of the Bosnian War 
(1992 – 1995).      
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indiscriminately once he occupied a superior position. The Director noted that his 
neighbor was aggressive and when the inquiry was made as to how he thought his 
neighbor viewed men and women respectively, he indicated that, from his neighbor’s 
perspective, “women were objects of lesser value.” While the Director’s observations are 
anecdotal when examined alone, his responses covey an image of some of the key 
attitudes and beliefs of interest in this dissertation, which is where I posit that the key 
differences between individuals exist.  
The Director’s account broadly describes the gender-biased attitudes and beliefs 
hypothesized to increase the likelihood that a combatant will commit sexualized violence 
in this dissertation. The neighbor in the Director’s account demonstrated a desire for 
power as he struggled with a sense of inferiority. Indeed, the conditions of conflict 
facilitated his expression of power and dominance in a manner distinct from peacetime. 
The Director’s neighbor further demonstrated an adherence towards traditional gender 
roles in his marriage and appeared to hold a more negative attitude towards women by 
seeing them as, “objects of lesser value.”  
These gender-biased beliefs and attitudes exhibited by the neighbor are the areas 
of interest evaluated explicitly in this chapter. In what follows, I evaluate through 
interview analysis whether or not there is an observable pattern of these gender-biased 
attitudes amongst those who perpetrated sexual violence in the Bosnian War (1992 – 
1995). But first, in the next section, I describe the methodology employed to accomplish 
this end.  
 
 
  155 
Methods 
 Individual Difference Theory Revisited  
In the previous chapters, I provide evidence for the importance of micro-level 
analysis in adding to our current knowledge of the processes believed to be associated 
with sexualized violence in conflict. As previously noted, group-level and structural 
accounts have made meaningful contributions to the political violence literature. 
However, as demonstrated frequently throughout this dissertation, these accounts cannot 
effectively account for the consequential number of combatants refrain from committing 
sexualized violence in spite of the opportunity structure to do so. The evidence of their 
existence suggests that combatants are differently motivated for violent and non-violent 
behavior. In this chapter, I evaluate what individuating factors makes sexual violence 
more likely.  
In Chapter 4, several examples illustrate a pattern of non-participation in 
sexualized violence in spite of exposure to similar conditions expected to result in 
sexualized violence. Notably, the illustrations reviewed are not exhaustive and only 
scratch the surface of the phenomenon of restraint and non-participation. In addition to 
this evidence, all respondents interviewed during the course of this research endorsed that 
non-participation and, at times, intervention absolutely occurred during violent episodes 
and events throughout the conflict. Again, these conditions indicate that there are 
important individual-level differences that deserve deeper evaluation and analysis.  
In the previous chapter, in order to effectually apprehend these differences 
between soldiers, I explored how gender inequalities impact the social milieu under 
which combatants are reared through cross-conflict analysis. The null result of that 
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examination, similar to that of Cohen (2013), produces compelling evidence that the 
effects of gender inequalities are difficult to capture in the aggregate. Consequently, the 
current chapter seeks to provide a closer examination in order to evaluate how and in 
what ways gender bias and inequalities at the individual level relate to the likelihood a 
combatant will engage in sexualized violence in conflict.  
The individual difference theory posits that there are certain attitudes and beliefs 
held by the individual combatant that are necessary, but not independently sufficient, to 
commit sexualized violence during conflict. These key biased attitudes 
and beliefs interact with other factors – such as, structural, organizational, and social 
influences – to then result in combatants’ either committing or refraining from 
committing sexualized violence. Please refer to Figure 1 found in Chapter 2 to recall the 
theoretical formula behind this analysis.  
The determining factors then probed in this research are further divisible into two 
categories - individual and contextual factors. Subsumed under each of these broader 
categories are component parts that comprise elements of both the individual and the 
context. Table 1 found in Chapter 2 features these categories and the subdivided 
component parts.  
Thus far, in the previous chapters and in findings already established in the 
existing literature, the contextual influences have been explored126. In this chapter, I 
primarily hone in on the individual and the component parts highlighted under this 
category.  
                                                 
126 See (Balcells 2010; Downes 2006; Kalyvas 2006) for more on types of violence. See Cohen 2013; 
Hoover Green 2011; Wood 2006, 2009 for more on military organizational and group cohesion factors. See 
(Baaz and Stern 2013; Carpenter 2006; Davies and True 2015; C. Enloe 2000) for more on structural 
contextual accounts.  
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Individual Level Analysis and the Qualitative Method 
When exploring individual-level distinctions, it is essential to select a method of 
analysis that most effectively aligns with the nature of the research question and the 
hypotheses generated. Several potential methodological approaches for evaluating the 
questions examined in this project were considered.  Ultimately, while a mixed-method 
approach is utilized throughout the broader project, the main tool of analysis is 
qualitatively driven  – both in terms of theory development and in theory testing 
(Mahoney 2010; Tarrow 2004).  
In the case of assessing combatants’ motivations for sexualized violence in 
conflict, qualitative field interviews were conducted in order to effectually capture and 
understand combatant beliefs and attitudes and the processes associated with those beliefs 
and attitudes (Dilley 2003; Rubin and Rubin 2011). In keeping with the qualitative 
tradition, exploratory field research conducted in the summer of 2014 in Bosnia 
facilitated initial theory development regarding the potential influence of gendered beliefs 
and attitudes in the perpetration of sexualized violence in warfare127.  
During the field research trip in 2014, I conducted extensive interviews with 
leaders of the demographically dominant ethno-religious groups in Bosnia at the time of 
war (1992 – 1995). This included Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks), Orthodox Bosnian Serbs, 
and Croatian Catholics. In addition to meeting with these religious leaders, I also 
conducted interviews with adults who were children during the war, civilians, soldiers, 
and representatives of an array of non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and cultural 
institutions. Through semi-structured interviews, I explored gender norms and identity 
                                                 
127 See Appendix A for IRB approved interview schedule for field research conducted in 2014. Note: Only 
an English version of the interview questions was developed for the 2014 exploratory research.  
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formation in Bosnian society - both contemporaneously and historically and to the lead 
up to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995). Interviews lasted no shorter than two hours with 
some extending over five hours in length. Interviews occurred in homes, cafes, at NGO’s, 
and in churches and mosques.  
During this initial exploration in 2014, interviewees identified clearly defined 
gender roles and norms across ethno-national and religious boundaries. And yet, during 
interviews, differences between combatants were revealed frequently enough to 
sufficiently require a deeper investigation into these differences. Consequently, following 
the 2014 research trip, I delved deeper into secondary and archival sources regarding 
incidents of wartime sexualized violence in order to see if there was more evidence of 
individual variations observable in reports of human rights violations and sexual assault 
cases (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; ICTY 2016) . 
Undeniably, the “deviant case” of the non-perpetrator became more and more observable 
in various witness accounts of violence (Mahoney 2007)128.  
Although the non-perpetrator was not explicitly represented in these narratives, 
inferences to such actors were woven into the disclosures concerning this form of 
violence. The initial research conducted in 2014 provided the impetus to begin to 
consider individual distinctions more closely. The ensuing research revealed compelling 
enough anecdotal evidence that there are a significant number of combatants that do not 
conform to existing theoretical expectations regarding expected patterns of sexualized 
violence in conflict. In this way, the principles of a “deviant case study” underlies the 
                                                 
128 Secondary sources include the array of human rights reports and recorded victim accounts regarding 
sexualized violence. See (Amnesty International 1992; Bassiouni and McCormick 1994; Human Rights 
Watch 1995; Human Rights Watch Women’s Rights Project 1998) for more on direct accounts of 
sexualized violence.  
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theory development in this project and specifically this chapter (Emigh 1997; George and 
Bennett 2005; Lijphart 1971; Mahoney 2007). The presence of non-perpetrators is 
important in that their very existence provides evidence that differences exist between 
them and perpetrators. They are categorically distinct from each other suggesting that 
individual-level differences matter within the context of political conflict. While I was 
constrained from empirically evaluating the motivations of the non-perpetrator in this 
dissertation, their existence allowed for the development of theoretical distinctions 
between those who do and do not perpetrate sexual violence129. In this dissertation, I 
focus on a theoretical account for those who do commit sexualized violence.  
Following the initial exploratory research, I reentered into the field in the summer 
of 2018 armed with several deductively pre-established hypotheses gleaned from the 
theory developed post the 2014 research trip. As outlined in the theory section of this 
dissertation, the hypotheses generated were determined based on the theorized biased 
beliefs and attitudes held by combatants that I posit are necessary to commit sexualized 
violence during conflict. They are as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 As discussed in the introduction, while I attempted to gather data on the motivations of the non-
perpetrator, the experts I interviewed were unable to provide meaningful information about the non-
perpetrator – other than accounts of their existence and their restraint in conflict. The experts I interviewed 
were able to speak intelligently and at length about the motivations and behavior of perpetrators, but were 
relatively silent about the motivations of the non-perpetrator in spite of efforts made through probing 
questions. This limitation is intriguing. First, it suggests that our collective focus has been on the causes 
and conditions associated with the perpetration of sexualized violence. Additionally, it emphasizes the 
importance of empirically engaging the unknown motivations associated combatant restraint in future 
research. I address this area in the conclusion.  
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Table 4: Deductive Gendered Attitudes and Beliefs Hypotheses  
(H1) Ceteris Paribus, combatants who have higher levels of gender bias are more likely to commit 
acts of conflict-related sexual violence. 
(Sub-H1.a) Combatants who have a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to 
commit acts of conflict-related sexual violence.  
(Sub-H1.b) Combatants who have a higher need to adhere to traditional sex relations are more 
likely to commit acts of conflict-related sexualized violence.  
(Sub-H1.c) Combatants who hold a more negative view of the opposite sex are more likely to 
commit conflict-related sexualized violence.  
 
 In order to analyze the validity of the individual difference theory, I developed a 
semi-structured interview tool to conceptually capture and operationalize each of the 
requisite variables included in the hypotheses outlined in Table 4130.  Then, equipped 
with developed analytical tools to empirically test the individual difference theory, I 
returned to Bosnia for a second research trip in summer of 2018.  
 Conducting research related to war crimes is complex and filled with ethical 
considerations. In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995), Bosnian Serb soldiers are 
notably silent regarding the discussion of war crimes and violence perpetrated during the 
course of the war. Further, ethical questions persist related to interviewing individual 
soldiers directly about their own behavior during the war.131 How, then, should a 
researcher approach assessing individual-level motivations for committing sexualized 
violence?  
 In this case, I selected to interview experts on the subject matter – conflict-related 
sexual violence – and on the unit of analysis of interest – soldiers. The Bosnian War 
(1992 – 1995) is an ideal case to explore these questions given the high severity of 
sexualized violence reported during the war and the number of experts working in the 
                                                 
130 See Appendix B for the IRB Interview Schedule in both English and translated to BCS.  
131 Questions of validity are relevant. For example, social desirability bias is undoubtedly an issue in 
exacting valid responses from soldiers regarding their violent behavior during war. For more on social 
desirability bias see Nederhof (1985).  
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region with impressions of individual combatant motivations. In this way, I sought 
interviews with psychologists with expertise in working with victims and perpetrators of 
sexualized violence during the war. I also sought interviews with NGO’s with direct 
experience with war crimes cases associated with sexualized violence. I further sought 
interviews with combat soldiers and with human rights and media watch groups with 
specific expertise in conflict-related sexual violence. In this way, these key informants 
and interviewees are uniquely positioned to formulate clear impressions regarding the 
attitudinal proclivities and beliefs of perpetrators of sexualized violence they have 
interacted with and observed.  
 Given this approach, I developed an interview schedule specifically matched to 
the categorical expertise of each respondent and their knowledge or association with a 
perpetrator132. The question set was constructed from the deductively developed 
hypotheses outlined in Table 4. While this was not survey research, I honored a similar 
methodological rigor to developing and then implementing the questions during 
interviews. For example, the question set is not leading and broadly engages the concepts 
of gender bias and other differences of interest outlined in the individual difference 
theory. In this way, I avoid demand characteristics and confirmation and social 
desirability biases by designing the interview structure to allow for open expression of 
impressions and expertise on the part of respondents.  
 From the hypotheses and interview questions, I developed a code sheet for the 
themes of each of the gender inequality hypotheses. To evaluate each of these 
hypotheses, I developed a code sheet of terms and language associated with and 
                                                 
132 See Appendix B for the interview schedule. Questions were categorized based on expertise. 
Judges/psychologists/attorneys; combatants; family members of combatants.  
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contradictory to each of the concepts in the hypotheses prior to analyzing the interviews. 
In this way, I evaluated for confirmation or falsification of the individual difference 
hypotheses outlined in Table 4133.  In addition to the gender-biased terms related to the 
hypotheses in Table 4, I also coded for terms associated with judgment and motivation as 
described in the individual difference theory in Chapter 2.   
 The primary data generated for this analysis was through two research trips in 
Bosnia in 2014 and 2018. During these two trips, I conducted a total of 41 in country, 
semi-structured interviews with key informants and respondents. Sixteen of the 41 
interviews occurred in 2014134. The 2014 interviews, while key in identifying the 
research question and the individual difference theory developed to guide this project, are 
not substantively included in the analysis below.  
Accordingly, data analysis in this chapter is limited to the 25 in country and one 
additional interview conducted between 2018 and 2019135. Throughout this research 
period, I spent a total of 43.25 hours in direct interviews. I interviewed a cross-section of 
key informants and respondents with varying expertise and direct knowledge related to 
combatants’ beliefs and attitudes as described above. Respectively, the interview 
                                                 
133 See Appendix D for code sheet with terms endorsing and falsifying the hypotheses.  
134 Because the research conducted in 2014 did not engage respondents in questions directly related to most 
of the hypotheses explored in this chapter, I did not code these interviews in the same manner. That being 
said, I do refer to the 2014 research when addressing social identity and gender roles as that research 
provided important insight concerning societal distinctions related to ethno-religious and gender roles. 
However, direct insights garnered from that research is primarily limited to that section and is not 
calculated in the coding results found in Appendix C and D.    
135 Three interviews included two respondents, which increases the number of participants to 29 through the 
course of the research. The number of hours engaged in interviews is determined according to the 26 total 
interviews conducted in 2018. One of the 26 interviews was conducted in the United States.   
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schedule found in Appendix B demonstrates the recruitment of participants with specific 
expertise and knowledge based on their current role and/or role during the war136.  
Thus, participants in this research are many and varied. 38% of respondents and 
informants work for international organizations or NGO’s that serve as monitors related 
to war crimes and human rights abuses. Three key informants are associated with the 
domestic high court of Bosnia charged with adjudicating war crimes cases now that the 
ICTY has completed its mandate. Each of these informants has direct expertise related to 
war crimes cases and crimes associated with sexual violence in conflict137. 20% of 
respondents are psychotherapists or psychiatrists that have treated both victims and 
perpetrators during the aftermath of the war138. Finally, 20% are combat veterans of the 
Bosnian War139.  
                                                 
136 Notably, while I have assigned a primary role designation that seems most appropriately aligned to the 
participant in terms of their presentation during the interview, several participants occupy multiple roles 
related to their knowledge of the war. For example, one interview conducted with a senior official 
associated with the ICTY and the Residual Mechanism revealed that this official also had first-hand 
experience of the war through on the ground humanitarian intervention. This key informant first worked 
with Médecins Sans Frontiéres (MSF) and then took an assignment with the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Tuzla and Brčko during the war period analyzed in this research. Thus, this informant, while 
an expert as a senior official, also offered critical knowledge as a field worker interacting with both victims 
and perpetrators alike during the conflict and into the post-conflict reconstruction period (Interview 
conducted on 6/22/2019 in Sarajevo). Similarly, several other informants and respondents occupy multiple 
perches related to their experiences and knowledge of the war.  
137 Two informants related to SUD Bosnia are victim’s advocates. One respondent is a judge specifically 
working for the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) who has ruled on cases involving sexualized violence. This 
key informant reports that the WCC has, at the time of the interview, heard 192 war crimes cased involving 
302 defendants. He conservatively estimates that 30% - 40% of these cases involve sexual violence 
(Interview conducted at SUD Bosnia in Sarajevo on 7/25/2019 for 1.5 hours).  
138 One key informant, a psychologist once stationed at a military hospital but without direct military 
experience, has conservatively treated over 1000 combat veterans in Serbia (Interview conducted via Skype 
on 7/20/18. Sarajevo to respondent location in Belgrade). Others have solely treated victims and others still 
have treated both when seeking emergency services related to PTSD.  
139 Two respondents were commanders. All soldiers interviewed were associated with ARBiH. While their 
observations offer important insights and are critical to this research, representation of Bosnian Serb 
soldiers is lacking in this project. This is not surprising. The Bosnian Serb soldier population is notably 
silent and reluctant to interview due to ongoing political complexity related to the DPA and the ensuing 
political system. Several recruitment efforts were made to attempt to interview three different candidates, 
but these interviews did not materialize. One interview was scheduled, but was cancelled due to a 
  164 
A potential concern associated with small-N studies is related to problems 
associated with selecting on the dependent variable (Mahoney 2007) – in this case the 
likelihood a combatant will commit sexualized violence . While it is unfortunate that 
respondents had difficulty directly speaking to the attitudes and beliefs associated with 
non-perpetrators and interventionists in spite of efforts made to probe in these areas, the 
analysis that follows reveals that there are clear patterns that emerged across respondent 
reports to support evidence of identified variation on the dependent variable140.  
 In terms of the analysis of the interviews, I follow the tenets of grounded theory in 
the sense that the theory generation and testing process followed in this section is an 
iterative process that has been updated based on novel empirical observations (Bennett 
and Elman 2006; Charmaz and Belgrave 2015; Rubin and Rubin 2011). In this sense, I 
engage in an interactive process between both deductive and inductive reasoning to 
capture the best representation and test of the theoretical model posited141.  
  George and Bennett (2005), highlight that one benefit of the qualitative approach 
is its capacity to recognize new variables of interest that serve to sharpen theoretical 
                                                                                                                                                 
scheduling conflict identified by the soldier. Ideally, future research will include this important and absent 
narrative.  
140 In fact, this very issue in and of itself provides support as to why ongoing research in this area is a 
fruitful endeavor. Conflict scholars and experts in sexualized violence in conflict have begun to articulate 
the need for more refined analysis and attention to the nuances related to this form of violence (Crawford 
2015; Crawford, Hoover Green, and Parkinson 2014). It appeared challenging for respondents to adjust to 
speaking about the non-perpetrator. This required effort, likely due to the means by which the current 
narrative regarding sexualized violence is mobilized. Continuing to evaluate the non-perpetrator is an 
important future research agenda. However, I remain diligent about the scope conditions related to this 
study. Analysis here is not generalizable to all combatants across time and space. Further, I am limited to 
evaluating which individual differences increase the likelihood of sexualized violence. Thus, the empirical 
analysis here remains focused on the perpetrator.  
141 While deductively developed hypotheses anchored this research prior to engaging the field research, 
while in the field and during the course of the interviews, several new variables of interest emerged as 
concepts deserving representation in the analysis. However, these variables were not fully deductively 
drawn per se, but rather inductively generated as empirical, in field observations. I outline these “left out” 
variables towards the conclusion of the chapter.  
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precision when they state, “Unless statistical researchers do their own archival work, 
interviews, or face-to-face surveys with open-ended questions in order to measure the 
values of the variables in their model, they have no unproblematic inductive means of 
identifying left out variables (p. 21).” In this way, I discovered “left out” variables that 
are examined more fully in the final section.  
Finally, I elaborate once more on an additional element in the coding 
procedure142. In the coding schema, I focus on both frequency of mentions and 
substantive relationship to the concepts examined. In this way, I coded interview data for 
the essential themes and concepts associated with the main hypotheses and the broader 
theoretical model (Rubin and Rubin 2011). The analysis of these variables, the 
hypotheses, and theory testing follows below.  
Theory Testing and Analysis  
 In this section, I organize the data according to the divisions established under the 
individual category of the theoretical model. An analysis of the following sub-categories 
– social identity factors, attitudes and beliefs, and judgments and motivations – is 
conducted to demonstrate support or lack thereof related to the strength of the individual 
difference theory. In addition, I address some, but not all, of the additional concepts and 
patterns that are revealed through interview analysis143.  
 However, before delving into evaluation and interpretation, I offer a note on 
validity and reliability. Each respondent and key informant interviewed is uniquely 
situated to effectually draw conclusions regarding combatants’ motivations through direct 
                                                 
142 See Appendix D for code sheet.  
143 See Appendix D for code sheet and section titled: “Additional Patterns, Themes, Concepts, Variables 
Identified During Coding.” 
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experience with both perpetrators and victims alike. In this way, these participants 
provide one degree of separation from firsthand testimony from both perpetrators and 
victims. Through the process of comparison, it is striking how many statements related to 
key concepts of interest are nearly identical yet unprompted based on interview 
questions. The repeatable nature of these statements offers a degree of reliability. This 
will be highlighted and discussed in more detail in the subsections that follow.  
Social Identity Categories  
“Why do people have ‘identities?’” queries (Hale 2004) in his 2004 article, 
Explaining Ethnicity (p. 462). (Hale 2004) By way of one response, he states, “It is, in a 
certain way, a kind of social radar, a perceptual device through which people come to see 
where they stand in relation to the human environment (p. 463).”  
Indeed, it is this notion of identity that is foundational to understanding the 
presence and effects of individual differences on combatant behavior in conflict settings. 
As posited by the individual difference theory, it is from these identities - which serve as 
organizing principles for social interactions - that biased attitudes, beliefs, and 
preferences are formed and ultimately mobilized into actions. However, not all identities 
are especially salient within the conflict context. In the case of the Bosnian War (1992 – 
1995), the central case of this project, three identity categories are notable in shaping 
behavior – gender, ethno-national, and religious identities. As a reminder, the individual 
difference theory argues that the internalization of what it means to be a man or a woman 
and the attitudes and beliefs that formulate from this grouping, is a critical part of 
developing differentiation.  
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During interviews conducted in 2014, the questions explored during that research 
period primarily dealt with role expectations surrounding gender and notions of 
womanhood and manhood in Bosnian society. Nearly all respondents endorsed the 
existence of differentiated gender role expectations in Bosnian society. However, while 
respondents observed that differentiation between the sexes existed, they similarly noted 
that there were gradations in these differences based on several factors. These 
preliminary observations invited deeper analysis into notions of masculinity and 
femininity in Bosnia and how these vary individually.  
The gender role socialization theory identified in Chapter 4 suggests that the 
social environment within which the self-construal of the individual combatant is shaped 
likely has important implications related to the formation of gender identity144. 
Accordingly, it is incumbent to explore the gendered role expectations in Bosnia during 
the socialization period of combatants engaged in the conflict (1992 – 1995).  
The formation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the 
aftermath of World War II ushered in an era of constitutional and legal equality for all – 
regardless of gender or ethnicity. Yet, in spite of this women remained on the periphery 
of power and full inclusion. In an analysis of Balkan women from suffrage in 1946 
through the war years (1992 – 1995), Spahić-Šiljak (2010) demonstrates that women 
                                                 
144 The cross-national analysis evaluates at a structural level only. A key assumption of the individual 
difference theory is that heterogeneity in gender (in)equality exists outside of structural influences. 
Structural accounts presume that all members of a given society are generally exposed homogeneously to 
(in)equality. From this perch, (in)equality is built equally into the system, thus variation within the system 
is difficult to evaluate at this level of analysis only. Yet, variations do indeed exist. As outlined in the 
Chapter 2, I assume that gender (in)equality is a multi-level system and that important variation exists at 
other levels- namely the interactional and individual. I discuss structural gender factors here under the 
assumption that the internalization of these (in)equalities varies for the individual combatant. This is the 
key and critical site of variation. For more on the system of gender (in)equality, see (Deutsch 2007; 
Ridgeway and Correll 2004).  
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were expected to be mothers and wives in spite of the supposed egalitarianism of Tito’s 
socialist era. The role of mother and wife was afforded primacy in comparison to any 
other role women aspired to.  
While women were afforded the identity of “worker” or “Communist,” ultimately 
efforts to organize as coalitions in these areas were thwarted, which various movement 
leaders attributed to a deeply entrenched system of patriarchy (Spahić-Šiljak 2010)145. 
During SFYR’s economic downturn following the oil crisis in the 1980’s, women were 
the first to be removed from public positions146. Evidence of the lack of women’s full 
inclusion is revealed, not only in terms of the labor market, but also in political 
representation. Women achieved a high of 24% of elected political positions, but they 
remained on the fringe of high-level decision-making and political power (Spahić-Šiljak 
2010). Accordingly, while women were formally afforded rights of inclusion, a system of 
difference persisted presumably privileging men over women.  
In a similar trend, the SFYR proffered a message of “brotherhood and unity” 
effectively stymieing the ethno-nationalist tensions that the region grappled with for 
centuries147. In leading the way for a Partisan victory against fascist forces during World 
War II, Tito shaped a government that demanded allegiance to Yugoslavia above all148. 
The curator for a museum in Sarajevo emphasized the essential role of cultural sites, 
                                                 
145 The leading women’s movement immediately following WWII was the Antifascist Front of Women 
(AFW). While the movement sought to keep women’s lived issues at the center of their work, it dissolved 
just ten years following WWII in spite of messages of equality espoused by the Communist Party (CP) 
(Spahić-Šiljak 2010).  
146 Following Tito’s death, the economic downturn in the 1980’s was significant. These economic 
conditions led to job loss and women were the first to be released and the last to be offered opportunities 
for rehire (Spahić-Šiljak 2010).  
147 See Chapter 3 for more on historical socialization processes in Bosnia.  
148 Ustaše and Ćetnik sympathizers were dealt with harshly in the aftermath of World War II. Mass 
executions and imprisonment were the method of the day and resistors were sent to reeducation camps that 
drove in the Tito imperative (Borneman and Borneman 2004; Malcolm 2002).  
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museums, and social institutions in communicating the, “greatness of socialism and the 
greater project of a unified Yugoslavia149.” He further described a message of socialism 
not only facilitating indoctrination through the cultural spaces in Yugoslavian society, but 
also in education, the sciences, basically in all institutions. For this respondent, he 
indicated that he did not believe the message was wrong, but he also described a process 
by which community narratives interactively created a message of collectiveness that 
indelibly shaped the socialization process of all Yugoslavians.  
During interviews, respondents that grew up during Tito’s reign were quick to 
identify as Yugoslavian before claiming other ethnic or religious identities. One 
respondent stated that he doesn’t place value on his ethnic identity, although he endorsed 
identifying as ethnically Serb. But, he qualified this by stating, “This is number 11 or not 
even on my list of identities. I am Bosnian or Yugoslavian150.”  
However, this same respondent identified the reemergence and the mobilization 
of ethno-nationalist identities as being a chief cause of the outbreak of hostilities (1992 – 
1995). While he articulated little attachment to his ethnic identity, he endorsed the 
salience of these identities for others. How these once latent identities became relevant 
once again is the subject of extensive exploration in the literature (Cohen 2018; Guss and 
Siroky 2012; Little and Silber 1997; Maksić 2017; Oberschall 2000), but it is accepted 
that ethnic politics played a central role in the conflict.  
Thus, what it means to be a Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak), Bosnian Serb, or Croat 
played a role in the ultimate formation of individual attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of 
                                                 
149 Interview conducted on 7/6/2019 in Sarajevo for 2 hours.  
150 Interview conducted on 7/13/2019 with the Director of a soldier’s organization in Sarajevo for 2 hours.  
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conflict actors151. Some respondents argued that rhetoric voiced by religious leaders in 
churches, mosques, and other religious institutions provided the kindling for political 
elites to light 152. In this way, religious institutions served as an interactional site for 
mobilization of these social identity categories.  
Researches have also asserted that gender and ethno-nationalist identities 
coalesced in the buildup to the war (1992 – 1995) (Sofos 1996; Spahić-Šiljak 2010). In 
this line of argumentation, women in Bosnia, regardless of ethnic identity, remained 
subjects of a system of patriarchy in that their value as mothers and reproducers of the 
nation became more explicit in religious discourses and public rhetoric respectively 
(Sofos 1996; Spahić-Šiljak 2010). Indeed, interviews conducted in 2014 with religious 
leaders endorses that religious imperatives based on gender are inherent in the messages 
for religious adherents of each of the major religions153.  
Women’s bodies served as fodder in nationalist propaganda and women’s value 
was ultimately reduced to fulfilling their reproductive capacity (Sofos 1996; Spahić-
Šiljak 2010). Pro-life campaigns were mobilized institutionally and politically154. As 
tensions between the parties intensified, discourse deepened surrounding women’s bodies 
as a symbol of national value. During an interview with the head of a war crimes 
monitoring NGO, she stated, “The body of women was recognized as a symbol of how 
                                                 
151 See both the Bosnian History and Sexual Violence Chapters for more on the rise of the SDS, HVO, and 
SDA nationalist parties and the mobilization of ethnic identities in the buildup to conflict onset (1992 – 
1995).  
152 Interview conducted on 7/6/2018 in Sarajevo with the curator of an historical museum in Sarajevo for 2 
hours.  
153 Muslim, Orthodox, and Catholic.  
154 See Spahić-Šiljak (2010, p. 218) for more on the various campaigns from the Croatian Catholic, Serbian 
Orthodox, and Bosnian Muslim religious leaders. Notably, these campaigns encouraged families to 
reproduce at certain rates as a form of patriotism to their nation.  
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you can hurt one society, one family, one nation.155” In this way, ethno-national, 
religious, and gender identities fused to form a symbiotic relationship. Accordingly, this 
was the social and political climate the individual combatant was internalizing as conflict 
onset approached.  
However, returning to the prevailing assumption rooting this research, the ways in 
which these cultural and political constructions are internalized and enacted by the 
individual is not singular. In spite of the framework rendered in creating ideals of 
Yugoslavian womanhood and manhood, I assert that individuals vary in how these ideas 
manifest into mobilizing biased beliefs, attitudes, and preferences.   
Attitudes and Beliefs 
 Why do attitudes and beliefs matter? What purpose do they serve? Importantly, 
how do beliefs and attitudes shape political behavior? By way of response, Jervis (2006) 
advises, “People adopt opinions not only to understand the world, but also to meet the 
psychological and social needs to live with themselves and others (p. 641).”  
In the case of sexualized violence in conflict, certain attitudes and beliefs held by 
individuals are more relevant within this context than others. For soldiers engaged in 
combat, certain biased beliefs and attitudes are more likely to emerge in order to 
effectually manage pervasive existential threats raised within the active conflict 
context156. These attitudes, beliefs, and preference serve as a prime from which decisions 
                                                 
155 Interview held on July 26, 2018 in Sarajevo for 1.25 hours.  
156 Some questions may arise concerning the fixed nature of attitudes, preferences and beliefs. While 
attitudes and beliefs may be adjusted and updated, this requires some conscious effort. Further, I contend 
that not all beliefs and attitudes function the same and certain beliefs are more deeply entrenched than 
others. Because gender binaries is one of the first dichotomies a human identifies during development, it 
follows that the values, beliefs, and attitudes that are constructed out of this orienting principle becomes 
deeply anchored in order to assist with navigating the social world. Further, when a belief system provides 
a benefit (i.e. power), it is more likely to be fixed. This contention is supported by Kray et al. (2017) who 
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are ultimately made (Sanbonmatsu 2003). Particularly within the context of political 
conflict, decision-making processes can often appear instantaneous, but there are 
processes involved in the making of the decision. In fact, attitudes and beliefs precede 
judgment and motivation and ultimately decisions to act. Given this, it is critical to 
evaluate, the biased attitudes and beliefs theorized to be relevant to combatant behavior.  
 Beginning with needs for power and dominance, I evaluated each of the twenty-
six interviews for references to terms associated with power and dominance157. I coded 
the interview as supportive of sub-H1.a if a respondent directly referenced power and 
dominance as a factor related to sexualized violence158. In addition, if there was a more 
robust discussion and frequent mentions of power and dominance, I added one value (1) 
to the frequency of mentions of the concept159  
 Of all the hypotheses evaluated, combatants demonstrating a need for power and 
dominance received the most support. 73.08% of respondents used language endorsing 
the need for power or dominance as a factor for combatants who committed sexualized 
violence. Language respondents used with striking similarity included, “inferiority 
complex,” “aggressive,” and “desire to humiliate.160” One key informant stated that it is 
                                                                                                                                                 
find that men hold more fixed beliefs about gender roles, likely motivated to maintain the status quo given 
their membership in a higher status group compared to women. The Bosnian case matches this criterion in 
that it supports a history of clearly differentiated gender role expectations with men occupying the higher 
status social group.  
157 See the code sheet and the section titled H1.a in Appendix D for the list of terms identified as matches 
for references to power and dominance.  
158 Note: I followed the same coding schema for subH1.b and subH1.c in what follows.  
159 I did not record interviews, so the frequency measure is an approximation. Procedurally, I took hand 
written notes during each interview and scheduled interviews to allow for time to immediately transcribe 
and document the totality of the interview. I measure frequency as a way to test for the strength of the 
measure. A single mention of the concept in interviews offers some evidence of support for the hypotheses, 
but when a respondent expounds and unpacks the concept further, this improves the strength of support for 
the concepts and hypotheses.  
160 Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, 
Zenica, and Vareš.  
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an, “act of humiliation, power, and revenge161.” Several respondents endorsed a personal 
revenge motive, a vendetta of sorts, related to a desire to avenge perceived slights and 
grievances.  
 There appears to be a consensus that combatants who committed sexualized 
violence may have felt powerless or inferior before the start of the war. Once they were 
in a position of power, they weaponized their inferiority in order to humiliate where they 
may have once felt humiliation162. As an example, an Assistant Professor referred to a 
discourse of Serb victimization and identified that some Serb-aggressors may have felt 
“second-rate” or subjugated163.  
 Aggression was also a term used with great frequency. Respondents not only 
referred broadly to the conflict as a war of aggression, but also to sexualized violence as 
extreme acts of aggression. One respondent indicated that high levels of aggression were 
a key factor in order for combatants to commit rape164. A Victim’s Advocate with the 
Court of Bosnia stated, “There are people who are more innately aggressive that select 
into sexual violence. There is something dormant that waits for the moment to be 
released165.”  
 In addition, I coded a minimum number of 41 mentions related to subH1.a. This 
combined with the rate of endorsements across interviews along with the nature of the 
                                                 
161 Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist specializing in Serbian combat veterans via 
Skype from Sarajevo to Belgrade.  
162 While I speak indirectly here related to combatant attitudes of power and dominance in relationship to 
acts of sexualized violence, responses across interviews spoke consistently of this humiliation relating to a 
need for power and dominance, which ultimately translated into acts of sexualized violence.  
163 He referred to Ćela Kula (translates to Skull Tower) in Niš, Serbia. In this tower, the skulls of 956 
vanquished Serbian warriors were used to construct and mount the walls (The Skull Tower of Nis – Niš, 
Serbia - Atlas Obscura) (Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/16/2018). Perhaps the tower serves as a 
reminder of past “humiliations” leading to a need for power and dominance.  
164 Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist via Skype from Sarajevo to Belgrade.  
165 Interview conducted in Sarajevo at the Court of Bosnia on 8/6/2018.  
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qualitative responses provided by respondents and key informants provides support for 
subH1.a. A leader of a local NGO dealing directly with legal issues associated with 
sexual violence as a war crime illustrates these concepts when she states, “Power for a 
man comes from the top. Man is recognized such that he can do whatever he wants166.” 
The combination of evidence suggests that a need for power and dominance as a 
reinforcement of masculinity is observable and finds support in the responses.  
One respondent who served as a war crimes court observer for a media outlet 
noted that she has directly observed well over 20 perpetrators by following all court 
appearances167. I asked her the following question: What were your impressions of the 
combatants you worked with who did commit sexualized violence? She replied that she 
believes that individuals who commit this form of violence have some, “sort of 
complex.” She further stated that she believes it is a sort of, “inferiority complex.” She 
noted that there might be something that occurs for the individual in childhood that 
creates this feeling of inferiority. Because of this inferiority and because, “we are a very 
traditional society,” she believes rape was used by those experiencing this sense of 
inferiority as a means of humiliation. She further articulated that culturally speaking, the 
opposition understood the annihilation to both the individual and family identity 
associated with the act of rape, which is another way that rape and sexualized violence 
serves as an act of humiliation.  
This example leads to an evaluation of traditional sex relations within the Bosnian 
context. Turning now to the need to adhere to traditional sex relations, 42.31% of 
                                                 
166 Interview conducted in Sarajevo with a war crimes monitoring NGO on 7/26/2018.  
167 When pressed for a number, she noted that she could not count. When I asked if it was more than 20, 
she noted that it is likely much higher.  
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respondents and key informants endorsed this concept in responses. While there is a drop 
in quantifiable support for this hypothesis, the depth of some of the qualitative responses 
around this key concept, in combination with some of the additional variables and themes 
that emerged throughout this research, provides some support for this hypothesis. I begin 
with an illustration from an interview:  
 “We are a very traditional society…Men are stronger, the pillar of the 
family…Women, in the villages, were housewives, they cooked and took care of the 
children…Men provide money, respect, authority, like afraid of your father when he 
comes in the room (sic).168”  
 
This response highlights the importance of tradition in parts of Bosnian society. 
Importantly, many participants identified that this traditional nature crosses ethno-
national and religious identifiers. However, one factor to consider in terms of variation in 
these traditional views is related to a rural/urban divide. Returning to the code sheet once 
again,169 exactly 50% of respondents associated the concept of adherence to more 
traditional relations between the sexes to being from rural communities. It is here - the 
rural region vis a vis more urbanized communities – where variation appears to exist.  
A victim’s advocate noted, “You have to know we live in a community where we 
have very specific roles with (sic) women and men. Especially in our culture. Patriarchy 
exists, especially in rural villages170.” And, in a similar vein, a psychotherapist in Zenica 
noted, “There is deep stigmatization. Patriarchal roots are important and the rural areas 
are more exposed and more vulnerable to this stigmatization171.” Here, respondents 
                                                 
168 Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/9/2018.  
169 See Appendix D 
170 Interview conducted in Sarajevo at SUD Bosnia on 8/6/18.  
171 Interview conducted in Sarajevo via Skype to Zenica on 7/30/18.  
  176 
identify a relationship between an adherence to traditional sex relations and a rural-urban 
divide.  
Some terms or short statements employed by respondents that attests to the 
independent variable in this hypothesis are: “primitive domination of the man above his 
wife,” “rural men raised in a situation of violence,” “violence becomes normalized when 
he (soldier) observes his father treating his mother poorly,” “patriarchy oriented in a lot 
of rural regions with a lot folklore habits,” and “norms of traditional masculinity.” 
Notably, many of these statements include mentions of violence. This is not to say that 
the current hypothesis presupposes that violence is inherently associated with an 
adherence to more traditional roles between the sexes. Yet, during interviews, these 
concepts appeared to intersect frequently172.  
Importantly, there were frequent mentions of family identity as an important 
factor. One respondent who worked with a family focused NGO after the war stated that 
he believes that family is the microcosm for broader society. He noted that soldiers who 
viewed violence and aggression in their family – “for example, the father hitting the 
mother,” – that violence would be more acceptable or accessible for that individual. 
While traditional sex relations may not be fully associated with acts of familial violence, 
several psychotherapists frequently mentioned domestic violence in the family of origin 
of perpetrators as a factor. Marital violence historically remained a private concern, 
which may suggest a more “traditional” means of marital interaction. One key informant 
and psychotherapist stated that a, “rural man is grown in a situation of violence.” He 
                                                 
172 I do not mean to infer here that rural men are inherently more violent. This would be a misrepresentation 
of the data here. There are other factors related to being from a rural community that may impact adherence 
to traditional sex relations and also ultimately beliefs and behaviors around violence.  
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continued the discussion of the rural man by stating that often in the conditions during 
formative years, gender violence becomes normalized. He describes a child witnessing a 
father directing violence towards his mother as a influential factor in the development of 
gender biased beliefs and attitudes.  
Additionally, another variant of the adherence to traditional sex relations question 
pertains to the perception by the opposition of the victims. For example, psychotherapists 
working with Vive Žene and Medica Zenica noted stigmatization of rural women in 
being victims of rape. According to these respondents, women often do not report 
sexualized violence from the war period for fear of being expelled by their husbands and 
families for being perceived as unclean. Thus, it is not only the perpetrators’ own 
adherence to traditional sex relations, but also their perception and assumption that the 
opposition will reject their family members that may also motivate their behavior.  
Given the pattern of these responses, there is evidence that supports Sub-H1.b. I 
also scored for frequency of mentions related to adherence to traditional sex relations 
correlating with committing sexualized violence. While there were multiple mentions in a 
total of four interviews, I also consider the role of the respondent who endorsed this 
concept. The WCC judge and several psychotherapists and the victim’s advocate all 
clearly identified this as a factor. This suggests support for this hypothesis given their 
direct experience with perpetrators.  
Lastly, I evaluate negative views towards the opposite sex. There is diminished 
quantitative support for this attitudinal position in comparison to the other two 
hypotheses. Only 27% of respondents, or 7 participants, directly affirmed negative 
attitudes about the opposite sex relating to acts of sexualized violence. While one key 
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informant stated, “negative views of women – this is necessary173,” when speaking about 
attitudinal positions of the combatant who commits sexualized violence, there is limited 
direct support for Sub-H1.c throughout the totality of the interviews.  
One key informant who observes war crimes trials shared the story, and his own 
observations, of a convicted perpetrator that anecdotally captures these hypotheses within 
the narrative174. Radovan Stankovic, was born in 1969 in the village of Trebića in Foča, a 
town on the eastern border of Bosnia near Serbia with a mixed population. Stankovic, a 
soldier in the Miljevina Battalion, was indicted for criminal responsibility related to 
crimes enumerated in Article 7.1 of the ICTY Statute (TRIAL Internaional 2014). These 
crimes included four counts of violating the laws and customs of war related to Article 3 
– rape and outrages upon personal dignity, and four counts of crimes against humanity 
related to Article 5 - enslavement and rape (TRIAL Internaional 2014). Ultimately, the 
Stankovic indictment was the first to be referred by the ICTY to the national jurisdiction 
of the WCC of the Court of Bosnia (The Hague 2005; TRIAL Internaional 2014).  
When Stankovic appeared before Court of Bosnia to make his initial plea, TRIAL 
International reports that, “(H)e asserted that the indictment was a sham and had been 
fabricated by the Bosnian Muslim secret service. The judges concluded that his protest 
was tantamount to a not guilty plea (2014, Fact Sheet).”  As the respondent shared the 
story of Stankovic, he noted that he was known to yell at the judge, to use profanity in the 
courtroom, and to make overtly nationalist comments during court proceedings. “He was 
aggressive,” the respondent claimed. Ultimately, he was expelled from the court 
proceedings due to his behavior.  
                                                 
173 Interview conducted on 7/30/2018 with a psychotherapist in Sarajevo and Belgrade via Skype.  
174 Interview conducted in Sarajevo on 7/19/2018.  
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At the conclusion of his trial, Stankovic was convicted and sentenced to 16 years 
in prison, which was increased to 20 years following an effort to appeal (TRIAL 
Internaional 2014).  Stankovic famously escaped from prison in May of 2007 and it took 
nearly five years to apprehend him (Taušan 2012). The respondent referred to a strong 
adherence to traditional sex relations in how Stankovic perceived the obligations of his 
wife, which is reportedly related to his ultimate recapture175.  
This story captures some of the key elements related to the attitudes and beliefs 
that I posit impacts the likelihood for a combatant to commit sexualized violence. 
Stankovic clearly demonstrated a need for power and dominance – even engaging in 
power struggles with the judges that ultimately led to his expulsion from the courtroom. 
Cleverly, he managed to escape and was able to maintain freedom for nearly five years, 
but presumably sacrificed his freedom by returning to Foča out of expectations related to 
adherence to the traditional gender roles within his marriage.  
Judgments and Motivations 
 Now, I turn briefly to judgment and motivation. As a reminder, the context of 
political conflict is a unique environment that undoubtedly impacts and shapes human 
behavior. It is not solely enough that perpetrators hold gender biased beliefs and attitudes. 
If this were so, then we would likely see similar acts of violence committed around the 
same rates during peacetime. Given that this is not the case, I contend that the conditions 
of conflict facilitate the enactment of biased attitudes and beliefs. I argue that diminished 
judgment and constraints on motivation are essential.  
                                                 
175 Interview conducted with the Editor in Chief of a war crimes monitoring media outlet in Sarajevo on 
7/19/2018.  
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The individual difference theory posits that decisions and behavioral outcomes, 
such as committing or not committing sexualized violence in conflict, are associated with 
automated internal processes that are triggered by external factors and the environment 
within which these decisions about behaviors are made (Bargh and Williams 2006).  
While individuals can be aware of their attitudes and beliefs, on the whole, 
attitudes and beliefs simplify information and create shortcuts to effectively navigate the 
social world while managing the effort required for that navigation. Essentially, they also 
operate nonconsciously and automatically. Bargh and Williams (2011) identify an 
important benefit to automaticity:  
“As do all nonconscious forms of self-regulation, these automatic, evaluative 
processes keep the person adaptively tied to his or her current environment while 
conscious attention and thought might be elsewhere (e.g. focused on the person’s current 
goal pursuits) (p. 430).”  
 
During interview analysis, two key factors related to the automaticity of 
motivation and judgment were endorsed - uncertainty and substance use176. During the 
course of interviews, several respondents referred to the contextual factor of uncertainty 
and noted that existential threat informed how individuals responded. These conditions of 
uncertainty, generated by the context of political conflict, arguably impacts which 
attitudinal scripts an individual draws on to act.  
The notion that conditions of uncertainty constrains the way an individual 
approaches choices is consistent with research that demonstrates that social behavior is 
informed by choices made available within the ecological environment (Cesario et al. 
2010). In environments rife with uncertainty, individuals draw on heuristics in order to 
                                                 
176 Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, 
Zenica, and Vareš. 
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reduce complexity that could be incredibly costly (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). The 
politically conflicted environment frequently requires individuals to make quick 
judgments in order to survive. A psychotherapist described the politically conflicted 
context as, “terrifying.”  
Impressions matter in this pressured environment. Social psychologists have 
identified multiple pathways by which an individual makes impressions about the 
environment that surrounds them. While there are varied means by which individuals 
form impressions (Fiske and Neuberg 1990), the context of violent conflict requires 
individuals to draw on categorization techniques rather than the more individuating 
option of attribute-oriented impression formation. Attribute-oriented impression 
formation is an individuating impression formation procedure that requires the perceiver 
to evaluate beyond an initial categorization process (Fiske and Neuberg 1990). In the case 
of political conflict, this requires time, which is potentially costly. As such, the initial 
categorization process, which is based on stereotypes of a particular social group and is 
incredibly rapid (Fiske and Neuberg 1990), is usually relied on.  
In the case of this research, the established beliefs and attitudinal proclivities of 
the individual combatant assessed in the previous section are associated impressions 
about gender groups. The conditions of uncertainty referred to by respondents during 
interviews suggests that it is even more likely that individual combatants will draw on the 
attitudinal positions defined above when determining their behavioral choice because the 
attitudes are categorically driven. Thus, the conditions of uncertainty only serve to 
strengthen support for the hypotheses evaluated. However, it is likely that all combatants 
within a unit are equally exposed to the same or similar conditions of uncertainty and 
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approach decision-making under those same conditions. Thus, conditions of uncertainty 
provide even more evidence supporting the claim that variance is observed in the gender 
biased attitudes and beliefs held by combatants.  
Much like uncertainty, substance use deeply impacts judgment and decision-
making. Nearly all of the soldiers interviewed during this research identified alcohol use 
as an important factor related to whether or not a combatant commits sexualized violence 
in conflict. Research has demonstrated that alcohol and other substance use has been a 
factor, not only in the Bosnian case, but also in other wartime efforts (Olusanya 2013; 
Plavljanić and Mijić 1997).  
Indeed, it is a well-established finding that alcohol affects judgment (Friedman, 
Robinson, and Yelland 2011; Jellinek and McFarland 1940; Maylor, Rabbitt, and 
Connolly 1989). While many of these studies focus on perceptual reasoning and response 
time, there is evidence that other dimensions related to judgment are affected with 
alcohol use. Another, more cautionary finding, is the relationship between alcohol use 
and violence (Bard and Zacker 1974; Lipsey et al. 1997; Maldonado-Molina, Reingle, 
and Jennings 2011). While it cannot be said that a causal relationship exists between 
alcohol and violence, there is evidence that violence occurs more frequently when 
alcohol uses is involved (Maldonado-Molina, Reingle, and Jennings 2011).  
Further, risk perception and impulse control are both affected by alcohol use 
(Gidycz et al. 2007; Leigh 1999). In this way, alcohol interferes with key decision-
making functions in an environment that is already fraught with constraining factors. 
Given that respondents strongly endorsed the alcohol factor, thusly adding another factor 
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facilitating reliance on nonconscious processes, additional support is offered for the 
hypotheses advanced in the attitudes and beliefs section of this chapter.  
Additional Concepts  
 As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, qualitative research lends itself to 
an inductively driven knowledge generation process. During interview analysis, several 
additional concepts and themes were revealed in responses that bear mentioning. While 
some of these do not directly address the theory and hypotheses advanced throughout this 
dissertation, they may be avenues for additional research or future theory refinement177.  
 Referring to the code sheet a final time178, I discuss four themes described by 
respondents related to the individual combatant and sexual violence in conflict. These are 
– psychiatric disorders and pathology, denial/implied consent, stranger vis a vis known 
perpetrator, and perpetrator trauma and time in conflict. I begin this discussion with 
psychiatric disorders and pathology. Seven respondents, mostly psychotherapists, 
endorsed an abnormal psychological presentation in association with many of the 
combatants who committed some of the more atrocious acts of sexualized violence.  
In this way, respondents referred to the conflict space as providing an opportunity 
structure for sociopathic combatants to exploit. Various accounts of opportunistic 
violence have been explored in the research (Balcells 2010; Hoover Green 2011; Kalyvas 
2003, 2006; Tarrow 2007; Tilly 2003; R. M. Wood 2010). While most of these accounts 
evaluate at the group level and thus, do not consider the individual combatant per se, the 
                                                 
177 Nearly all of these concepts have some indirect connection to the hypotheses. Hence, they require some 
unpacking here.  
178 See Appendix D.  
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logic that a combatant with psychopathy would embrace the opportunity structure 
afforded by conflict follows the argumentation advanced by similar group-level accounts.  
 Another important factor discovered during the course of this research is the tacit 
denial by perpetrators regarding acts of sexualized violence. Legal experts noted that 
combatants admit to killing and even acts of atrocity associated with killing. However, in 
the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), perpetrators have remained collectively consistent in 
their outright denial related to acts of sexualized violence. Frequently, convicted sexual 
violence perpetrators claimed consent as their legal defense. Further complexity arises 
when the victim knows the perpetrator, which is frequent. Legal experts identify that 
testimony in these cases are highly emotional and contentious179.  
 Finally, I offer a short discussion on traumatized soldiers. I include trauma and 
time in combat even though only two key informants referred to this as a factor related to 
the perpetrator. One of the two key informants who endorsed this concept has worked 
with over one thousand combat veterans and discussed this issue as a potential causal 
factor at length180. During the course of interviews, trauma was frequently mentioned, but 
it was almost exclusively discussed as singularly experienced by victims of political and 
sexualized violence.  
 Grossman (2001, 2014) claims that most soldiers have an aversion to killing and 
that the act of killing is innately abhorrent to them. While Grossman’s (2001, 2014) 
dependent variable is enemy kills rather than acts of sexualized violence, the effect of 
                                                 
179 Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, 
Zenica, and Vareš.  
180 Interview conducted in Sarajevo and Belgrade via Skype on 7/30/2019 for 1.25 hours. Qualitative 
consideration is extended given this key informant’s expertise and work with Serbian and Bosnian Serbian 
soldiers.  
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combatant trauma and its relationship with sexualized violence may be an important 
future research area181.  
By way of example, during an interview with an ARBiH commander, he 
described the first time he killed a man in combat in graphic and vivid detail and reported 
vomiting immediately after and being haunted to this day182. He shared that after he fired 
his weapon he instantly thought, “What is this animality in me?” He further describes 
drinking a liter of alcohol a night in order to stop the nightmares to try to sleep. His story 
is undoubtedly not unique. Research demonstrates that symptoms of PTSD are increased 
in soldiers who actively participated in combat vis a vis soldiers who passively witnessed 
violence in combat (Van Winkle and Safer 2011).  
 In addition, the time spent in active combat matters. Indeed, current research has 
found evidence of an increase in opportunistic violence based on the length of combatant 
deployment in units with weak command structure (Manekin 2013). This finding 
suggests that time in combat fatigues soldier defense mechanisms to resist impulsive and 
potentially criminal behaviors.  
As such, I suggest that time in combat functions much like the moderating effects 
of uncertainty and alcohol use on combatant cognitive defenses for moderating biased 
attitudes and beliefs. Some may posit that time in combat may alter or transform existing 
attitudes and beliefs, but as outlined throughout this dissertation, certain beliefs are more 
deeply entrenched and thusly much less malleable. It is not necessarily the attitude itself 
                                                 
181 I do not intend to make a false equivocation here. I understand that there are several conceptual 
distinctions that are important to consider. 1) Combatants and perpetrators of war crimes are categorically 
distinct. 2) An act of sexual violence is different than killing enemy combatant. In spite of this, I argue that 
the logic concerning trauma is similar.  
182 Interview conducted in Goražde on 7/17/2019 for 1 hour.  
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that is altered, but rather the defenses to moderate the bias that becomes weakened due to 
the conditions associated with the conflict context.  
 To illustrate, through experimental research conducted in laboratory settings, 
researchers found that under conditions of cognitive “busyness” and resource depletion, 
individuals rely on stereotypes to process information and ultimately make decisions 
(Fiske and Neuberg 1990; Pendry and Macrae 1994). An essential assumption to the 
argument leveraged is that the context of political conflict is inherently resource depleting  
- cognitively and materially. Individuals who spend extensive time in political conflict 
are operating in an environment that regularly and persistently depletes their available 
cognitive resources requiring reliance on stereotypes in order to navigate this complex 
setting. This means that attitudes are not necessarily changed in the case of conflict, but 
rather it is the defenses required to moderate these attitudes that are diminished183.  
 In the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), the conflict context was long. The siege in 
Sarajevo marched on for three and a half years and the countryside was ravaged. 
Respondents noted that at conflict onset, most believed the conflict would end in days not 
years184. The psychotherapist, who identified time in conflict as a factor, also emphasized 
exposure to atrocities as a concern that increases combatants’ vulnerability to commit 
political violence.   
                                                 
183 See Kenrick et al. (2010) for an updated discussion on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs and how it pertains 
to this discussion. One of the notable features of the hierarchy is that certain needs take precedence over 
others. Importantly, the need for physiological safety and self-protection preempts needs associated with 
affiliation, esteem, and status. For example, an individual who faces immediate existential threat is highly 
engaged in efforts for physiological safety and well-being, which places demand on their available 
cognitive resources.  
184 Interviews conducted between 6/22/2018 – 8/7/19 with respondents in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Belgrade, 
Zenica, and Vareš.  
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 The relationship between the victim and perpetrator is complex.  These simple 
categorizations organize our perceptions and values associated with these labels. They 
inherently hold within them a wealth of meaning and interpretation. Yet, the perpetrator 
remains a complicated figure, which is also a traumatized individual. Giesen (2004) 
states:  
 “Perpetrators are human subjects who, by their own decision, dehumanized other 
subjects, and in doing so, did not only pervert the sovereign subjectivity of the victims 
but challenged also their own sacredness. Every subject needs the recognition of others 
for its own self-consciousness, and it is exactly this recognition that is denied to 
perpetrators (p. 114).”  
 
 By its very nature, violence is traumatizing for victims and perpetrators alike with 
few exceptions185. The effects of trauma diminish the perpetrators capacity to resist 
exclusive reliance on categorical attitudinal positions, which in turn makes it more likely 
to rely on these attitudes to persist in committing acts of sexualized violence. In the case 
of this research, combatants rely on attitudes and beliefs associated with gender 
stereotypes in order to navigate the politically conflicted milieu and thus continue to 
commit acts of sexualized violence based on these biased attitudes, beliefs, and 
preferences.  
Conclusion  
 In the previous section, I find support for attitudes associated with a higher need 
for power and dominance (sub-H1.a) and a desire to adhere to traditional sex relations 
(sub-H1.b) increasing the likelihood that combatants committed sexualized violence 
during the Bosnian war (1992 – 1995). I was unable to find substantive support for more 
                                                 
185 Sociopaths and others with unique personality presentations are not equally affected. See Anestis et al. 
(2017) for more on psychopathy as a protective factor in relationship with symptoms of PTSD. I also do not 
make a claim of equivocation in the internalization of trauma between victims and perpetrators. I only 
highlight that both, perhaps differentially, experience trauma.  
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negative beliefs about the opposite sex being associated with an increased likelihood that 
combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict (sub-H1.c). On the whole, these 
two dimensions of gender biased attitudes and beliefs – higher needs for power and 
dominance and adherence to traditional sex relations – in combination, provide some 
support for the supposition that combatants who demonstrate attitudes and beliefs 
associated with gender inequality are more likely to commit sexualized violence in 
conflict.  
 In addition, the research conducted demonstrates that at the individual level, both 
socializing processes and constraints on judgments and motivations shape these 
attitudinal and belief predilections. These factors either facilitate or limit reliance on 
biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences in relationship with the likelihood that 
combatants will commit sexualized violence in conflict. Two critical shaping factors that 
were revealed are conditions of uncertainty and alcohol use by perpetrators. In the 
Bosnian case (1992 – 1995), both of these concepts appear to facilitate an environment 
whereby combatants rely on more implicitly biased and categorically based impressions 
while navigating the politically conflicted context.  
 There are limitations related to these findings. This research applies to the 
Bosnian case (1992 – 1995) only and does not account for the myriad of alternative 
factors that other cases experiencing high levels of sexualized violence in intrastate 
conflict. Also, due to the silence on the part of perpetrators, I rely on the impressions of 
those who have worked directly with or are uniquely positioned to extrapolate opinions 
about the motivations of known perpetrators. While perspectives can be faulty, in the 
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cases of sub-H1.a and sub-H1.b, there is significant enough confirmation in the quality 
and frequency of responses across respondents that suggests a pattern exists.  
 However, these results must be considered cautiously. The only way to fully 
know the attitudes, beliefs, and preferences of perpetrators compared to non-perpetrators 
is to either survey them directly or to conduct laboratory experiments in order to more 
closely capture nonconscious processes that are unknown, even to the perpetrator. The 
findings outlined in this chapter suggest that such a research agenda may be fruitful and 
worthwhile.  
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CHAPTER 7 
LOOKING AHEAD: DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
Introduction  
 This dissertation represents an initial attempt to explore the question of variation 
in sexualized violence at the individual level of analysis as a departure from existing 
evaluations that explore variations at the group and aggregate levels. In developing the 
individual difference theory, I focus largely on notions of social identity, namely gender, 
and how interactions with political contexts (i.e. civil war), either facilitates or constrains 
individual inclinations and motivations to commit sexualized violence. The theoretical 
model I developed takes into consideration important distinctions in combatants’ biased 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, while also accounting for conditions of uncertainty and 
other critical shaping factors, and how these relate to combatants’ violent behavior in 
conflict. Much like any attempt to address novel research questions, there are strengths 
and challenges associated with this dissertation project. In what follows, I enumerate 
these strengths and limitations, while also summarizing the main results generated from 
this research. Additionally, I discuss why continuing research at the individual level of 
analysis is a crucial future research agenda in conflict studies and political science 
broadly. Finally, I also highlight the important theoretical contributions made and suggest 
a way forward within a complex research agenda.  
Summary of Results  
 This dissertation begins with the development of a novel theory that seeks to 
explain the curious and observable within conflict and within combat unit variations in 
combatant violent behavior. The individual difference theory, which draws on political 
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science and social psychology, and sociology literatures, describes the ways in which 
combatants’ self-construal constructs particular biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences, 
which are, in turn, differentially motivated into distinct behavioral outcomes. The theory 
leveraged in this dissertation is focused on which attitudes, beliefs, and preferences shape 
combatant proclivities surrounding violence. In addition, the theory highlights several 
contextual factors that shapes and mediates the relationship between these individual 
points of variation and the likelihood for a combatant to commit sexualized violence in 
conflict.  
From there, and because this dissertation is particularly focused on notions of 
identity formation and mobilization, I provide an historical analysis of the case study 
explored in this project – Bosnia Herzegovina. In this section, I focus the investigation on 
the history of political violence and warfare in the region of the former Yugoslavia and 
the simultaneous formation of complex ethno-national identities fashioned throughout the 
region during various historical epochs of violence.  
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of gender role expectations and 
construction within the region since I consider the social identity formations related to 
gender a critical factor in combatants’ propensity to commit sexualized violence in 
particular. I highlight that gender distinctions date back to the Illryrian era, which extends 
to the 6th century BC and through to modern day. In this fashion, I demonstrate evidence 
of gender divisions persisting throughout Balkan history. This is further corroborated 
through interview analysis as a significant number of respondents referred to male 
chauvinism enduring throughout history to present-day Bosnian society. This discussion 
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exemplifies the process of societal norm construction and institution building across time, 
which is a key theorized contextual element in the individual difference theory.  
I follow this historical discussion with an examination of the immediate lead up to 
the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) and I outline the nature of the reported sexualized 
violence during the conflict. I focus on the form, purpose, targeting, and frequency of the 
sexual violence perpetrated during the course of the conflict. In this way, I discuss several 
of the contextual factors described by the individual difference theory including violence 
type, command control within military organizations, and targeting norms associated with 
the political violence. Additionally, I draw on secondary source analysis to assess 
patterns of combatant (non)participation in sexualized violence and find strong evidence 
of non-participation in spite of opportunity structures to do so. The descriptive evidence 
of non-participation provides support for the contention that combatants’ are differently 
motivated and behave differently in spite of exposure to the same conflict conditions 
previously explored in the literature. This evidence allows for empirical analysis of the 
motivations for soldiers who do commit sexualized violence in conflict.  
I then move on to the empirical analysis of this research. I begin the evaluation by 
examining if/how gender (in)equality at the societal level impacts the severity of conflict-
level wartime rape. To do this, I perform a cross-conflict ordered probit analysis of 86 
civil wars covering a potential range of twenty-nine conflict years resulting in 984 
observations for analysis. I use several gender (in)equality proxy indicators – fertility 
rates, life expectancy, and a secondary education ratio – to assess for an effect in the 
aggregate. Each indicator represents a dimension of institutionalized gender inequality - 
primarily vital health and education factors. Importantly, the null findings in this section 
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offer support for the argument leveraged in this dissertation. Gender inequality that exists 
in the structures and institutions of a given society is undoubtedly a crucial factor, 
however, it is in the differential way that combatants internalize these distinctions where 
the important variation lies.  
These results, along with earlier evidence of key distinctions in violent behavior 
between combatants who are similarly situated, called for deeper qualitative review of the 
patterns observed. In the final empirical chapter of this dissertation, I conducted a field 
work-based investigation assessing combatants’ biased attitudes, beliefs, and preferences 
that I hypothesize make combatants more or less likely to commit sexualized violence 
within the context of political conflict. Through qualitative interview analysis, I found 
that attitudes and beliefs linked with a high need for power and dominance being 
associated with combatants who commit sexualized violence was strongly endorsed by 
respondents. Additionally, combatants’ desire to adhere to traditional sex relations being 
associated with those combatants who committed sexualized violence during the Bosnian 
War (1992 – 1995) was also supported by respondents and key informants. In this way, 
there is evidence supporting the claim that variation in individual combatant beliefs and 
attitudes associated with gender inequality is related to a propensity to commit sexualized 
violence in conflict.  
Additional factors regarding motivational and judgment states, particularly as it 
relates to conditions of uncertainty associated to the unique state of political conflict, 
were also endorsed during interviews. While much like variation of gender inequality is 
difficult to determine at the aggregate level, so is the case of uncertainty in conflict. 
Uncertainty is equitably distributed in the areas of a conflict that are directly involved in 
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combat and warfare. While it may be differently distributed based on distance from active 
combat, combat soldiers are relatively equally exposed to the conditions of uncertainty 
present in active conflict since they are placed close to the action. What differs is how 
conditions of uncertainty allows implicit or nonsconcious variations in beliefs and 
attitudes between combatants to be mobilized. Through interview responses, there was 
support for uncertainty and existential threat being an important factor for biased belief 
systems to be enacted. And, another important judgment affecting factor highly endorsed 
during interviews was the use of alcohol. These two factors substantiate elements raised 
in the individual difference theory related to facilitators and constraints on motivation and 
judgment linked to combatant attitudes, beliefs, and preferences.  
These findings, combined with the null finding at the aggregate level through the 
ordered probit analysis, corroborate key elements of the individual difference theory.  
Thus, there is evidence that implies that the individual difference theory can serve as an 
explanation for the important variations in individual combatants’ behavior regarding a 
propensity to commit sexualized violence while being exposed to equitable external 
conditions during political conflict.  
Limitations – External Validity and Endogeneity  
 In spite of these important initial results, there are several questions that are raised 
concerning the assumptions built into this argument, along with critical inquires 
regarding external validity. In short, there are several limitations to this research that 
ought to be considered before discussing potential contributions.  
 First, given the method of analysis, it is difficult to determine a degree of certainty 
in confirming the hypotheses advanced in this research. While analysis at the aggregate 
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level points towards individual level differences in gender bias being important factors 
related to the sexually violent behavior of combatants in conflict, the qualitative 
interview analysis method is not without limitations. To begin, the number of respondents 
alone restricts the generalizability of this explanation. However, it should be noted that 
the replicable rate of responses suggests some reliability in the concepts endorsed. In 
qualitative research, quantity does not necessarily equate with the quality of the research 
and ultimately the findings. In this case, experts provided consistently similar responses 
affirming the primary concepts developed in this theory.  
Further, the scope of these findings is limited to the Bosnian War (1992 – 1995) 
and is not necessarily applicable outside of this case study. Yet, while this dissertation 
provides evidence supporting the individual difference theory, additional research is 
required to either further validate or contradict the preliminary findings established here. 
I discuss important avenues for ongoing research further along in this discussion.  
In addition to certain limitations associated with the analytical methods employed 
in this dissertation, I raise the question of endogeneity that inevitably arises in 
relationship to the key hypotheses explored throughout this project. It is reasonable to 
question the potential alternative relationship between the variables of interest, which is 
whether or not the act of committing sexual violence in conflict alters combatants’ 
attitudes and beliefs regarding gender inequality. It is further reasonable to inquire 
whether or not committing an act of sexualized violence in conflict increases combatants’ 
need for power and dominance and a desire to adhere to traditional sex relations.  
 I have addressed these questions indirectly throughout the dissertation and more 
directly in the section on judgment and motivations in Chapter 6. I argue that there is 
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strong evidence to support the contention that the attitudes of interest in this research are 
less malleable compared to other attitudes individuals may have about the social world. 
What is more fluid are combatants’ motivational and judgment states that rely on 
attitudes, beliefs, and preferences as quick data reference points in order to navigate the 
social world – in this case, political conflict.  
Essentially, I argue that the conditions of conflict require the individual combatant 
to draw on pre-established attitudes in order to make rapid decisions about the 
environment. Interview responses from psychotherapists and other experts provide 
supportive evidence that conditions of uncertainty and substance use impacts the ways 
perpetrators behaved in the Bosnian case (1992 – 1995). While this offers some 
confirmation, these results must be considered carefully.  
The most ideal way to address this particular endogeneity problem is to consider 
the aforementioned field experiment that surveys combatant attitudinal states prior to 
entering active conflict and, once again, following their engagement in conflict. 
However, the ethics of such an experiment is fraught with issues. An alternative would be 
conducting a laboratory experiment that simulates the conditions of conflict while 
following a similar measurement procedure. While not ideal, since the affective 
conditions of conflict are difficult to practically simulate, such a research design is an 
option to evaluate the endogeneity question concerning these attitudes more directly.  
Indeed, evaluating individual motivations for violence is a complex and process-
oriented research agenda. As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, in many 
ways this project generates more questions than it effectively answers. I evaluate only 
one dimension of individual motivations in this research, but it is a beginning. Individual 
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motivations cannot be effectively understood through singular dimensions. As the null 
result from the cross-conflict analysis in Chapter 5 indicates, while the effects of gender 
inequality on the severity of wartime sexualized cannot effectively be explained in the 
aggregate only, the individual difference theory advanced in this dissertation includes 
structural inequalities amongst other structural and group level socializing factors as part 
of the process of the construction of individual distinctions. In isolation, group-level and 
structural accounts simply cannot explain why combatants who are exposed similar 
conditions behave differently from each other. As such, what is under development in 
this dissertation addresses a complex and important process for conflict scholars to 
consider. Thus far, in spite of the limitations, the account developed here both logically 
and empirically provides an improved explanation for the pattern of differences observed 
between combatants. This was a central aim of this dissertation.  
Contributions to the Literature  
 This project makes two key contributions to the political science, political 
violence, and conflict literatures. First, to my knowledge, it is one of the first efforts to 
substantively evaluate individual motivations for sexualized violence within the context 
of civil war. While others have brilliantly explored the logic of violence in civil wars 
(Kalyvas 2006) and have also explored variations in patterns of sexualized violence in 
civil wars (Cohen 2013; Wood 2006, 2009a, 2009b), neither explanation can effectively 
answer the within conflict and within unit variations in sexual violence that are 
observable across civil wars. This dissertation points to important distinctions occurring 
in the conflict setting and provides an individual-level account for why this observed 
pattern of variations exists.  
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 Further, it does so by bringing individual agency back into the equation. Much of 
the existing scholarship on political violence in civil wars focuses on top-down 
explanations for violent behavior in conflict. In these explanations, the individual is 
effectually constrained by external forces with little choice in their response to these 
influences. In this account, I bring the individual and their distinctive attitudes, beliefs, 
and preferences that are associated with violence in conflict and place them on the 
existing theoretical map. In this way, I add to the existing literature by refining and 
extending key factors that are related to the outcome of conflict-related sexualized 
violence.  
 However, and perhaps more importantly, this dissertation invites conflict scholars 
to shift perspective in how we view, and approach questions related to sexualized 
violence in conflict. Inquiries connected to sexualized violence, both in academic and 
policy communities alike often explore patterns of violence by focusing on the 
perpetrator and the victim. Recorded narratives concentrate on the more severe accounts 
of violence, which deeply informs the ways in which research questions are framed and 
ultimately analyzed. Indeed, these accounts almost exclusively look for where violence 
occurs rather than the sites and spaces where violence is rare. In keeping with Hoover 
Green (2011, 2018) and  Wood (2009a), I approach this research by seeking to better 
understand how it is that a non-perpetrator behaves differently than the perpetrator who is 
exposed to nearly identical conditions believed to facilitate sexualized violence within 
conflict. In this account, I offer an explanation for the motivations associated with the 
perpetrator, but in moving this research forward it is critical for scholars to take notice of 
where and how violence is not occurring and to consider what implications this has for 
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our understanding of the broader phenomenon and ultimately the interventions 
implemented to address it. I discuss this further in the next section. 
Future Research 
A substantial amount of research remains in order to better understand the potential 
causal relationships between the individual differences amongst combatants and their 
propensity to commit sexualized violence in conflict. Indeed, this dissertation represents 
only an initial effort at grappling with the critical variables of interest related to the 
patterns of variation identified in this project. As such, this is only a beginning, but there 
is potential for a rich and productive research agenda to deepen our knowledge in this 
area of conflict studies.  
For example, while qualitative interviews was the method of choice used to 
empirically test the individual difference theory, several others were considered for this 
research. As is the case with many dissertations, constraints in terms of resources and 
feasibility in the implementation serve as a limitation. During the research design 
development phase of this project, one leading approach I considered involved the 
possibility of a field experiment to test combatant implicit biases more directly. Indeed, 
field experiments along with lab-controlled experiments may prove to be valuable in 
future research in order to better capture the internalization processes outlined in this 
project. Additionally, direct survey research with active and/or enlisting combatants 
related to their attitudes and beliefs could also be a generative option. However, the ethics 
of survey research requires deep consideration prior to implementation. Nevertheless, 
more direct empirical analysis can increase the degree of confidence with which it can be 
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stated these relationships exist and may assist in resolving any uncertainty regarding the 
question of endogeneity.  
Additionally, regional analysis can further verify the concepts explored in the 
individual difference theory. In the case of this research, and likely in most civil wars, 
violence is not equitably distributed across a region. Certain areas are more directly 
impacted, and many fighters tend to be from these same areas. In the Bosnian case, 
respondents indicated that a rural/urban division had an effect on patterns of sexualized 
violence. Research that explores the gender norms in each of these spaces can sharpen the 
conceptual analysis endeavored here. In addition to gender-related factors, the individual 
difference theory posits that combatant judgment and motivational states are crucial to 
consider. In the Bosnian case, the front lines were located in certain villages and cities of 
strategic importance over others, which makes these cities and villages important sites to 
evaluate related to the concepts raised in the theory outlined in this dissertation.  
While I mainly focus on one dimension of social identity – gender – other social 
identities likely influence violent behavior. I descriptively discuss the historical formation 
of ethno-national identities in the Balkans and the mobilization of these identities in 
conjunction with the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. The former Yugoslavia was 
well-known for its multi-ethnic heritage with several distinctive religious sites and places 
of worship closely located to each other in Bascarsija in Sarajevo186. Indeed, Sarajevo is 
sometimes referred to as the ‘Jerusalem of the Balkans,’ due to the religious diversity 
extending throughout the city. Extensive research has been conducted regarding the 
mobilization of ethno-national and religious identities that had seemingly been absent or 
                                                 
186 The main religions include adherents to Islam, Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Judaism.  
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dormant during the socialist era of Tito, which I briefly discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of 
this dissertation.  
I refer to these factors here because future research may wish to more 
substantively engage these identities as it pertains to their relationship to gender. One 
important site for gender norming is found in religious institutions. Interviewees 
described clearly prescribed gender roles according to religious doctrines during 
interviews conducted in 2014 with imams and Orthodox and Catholic priests. This is one 
site, amongst other established institutions, where values about gender are recreated 
through religious ritual and teachings. This is undoubtedly an important dimension of 
identity to consider in future analysis.  
 More critically still is the opportunity to begin to understand the non-perpetrator. 
During the course of this research, I was able to identify clear evidence of a non-
perpetrator group that is significant. Yet, their experience remains relatively concealed 
compared to the representation of the perpetrator in the literature. Research that seeks to 
better understand not only the non-perpetrator, but also the interventionist, is undoubtedly 
an essential and valuable research agenda. In spite of efforts on my part to encourage 
discussion and analysis about the non-perpetrator, respondents found it difficult articulate 
much about their behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. Interestingly, all respondents 
confirmed that they were aware of non-perpetrators and expressed understanding that 
their restraint was significant and, in some cases, valued. Reflective of the literature on 
sexualized violence, restraint and non-perpetrators are only mentioned in accounts of 
sexualized violence in passing or incidentally. Yet, there is clear agreement that these 
actors exist in great numbers. In view of this, future investigations should shift these 
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actors to the primary subjects of research and analysis rather than viewing them as 
ancillary to the roles of perpetrators and victims. This will undoubtedly improve our 
interpretation of the distinctive patterns of sexualized violence in conflict.  
Looking Ahead  
 There are numerous policy agendas surrounding conflict-related sexualized 
violence. Over the past 10 years, since the establishment of the Office of the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, a host of UN 
Security Council Resolutions has been implemented as a means to manage and deter 
political actors from committing sexualized violence in conflict (UN Secretary-General 
2019).  UN Security Council Resolutions 2106 (2013), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), and 
1960 (2010) all recommend strategic actions and represent a sign of the shifting norms 
surrounding the acceptance of sexualized violence in conflict settings. As Sikkink (2011) 
highlights, there has been a norm, and in the case of sexualized violence in conflict, a 
policy cascade that has produced a tremendous amount of research and recommendations 
related to these forms of violence.  
 Yet, Crawford, et al. (2014) remind scholars and policymakers to exercise caution 
when making recommendations and decisions regarding policy related to sexualized 
violence in conflict. They importantly state the following regarding current media 
representations and unintended consequences of these presentations:  
 “To scholars of sexual violence, these media narratives look typical in three 
related ways: They are selective and sensationalist; they obscure deeper understandings 
about patterns of wartime sexual violence; and they are laden with false assumptions 
about the causes of conflict rape. The narrative in play here carries concrete implications 
for politics and policy, including the inadvertent aiding of perpetrators and worse 
outcomes for survivors. Policies that prevent and mitigate the effects of sexual violence 
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require attention to the whole problem – not just one media-friendly subset – and to solid 
research on wartime rape (P.2).187” 
 
  
 In keeping with the warnings leveraged by scholars of sexual violence, I do not 
provide any specific policy prescriptions related to this research given the nascent and 
burgeoning nature of this agenda and the complexities associated with it. However, I 
wish to highlight the importance for future research to include evaluation of non-
perpetrators as part of strategic plans associated with data collection. A common 
recommendation made by sexual violence and conflict scholars is the importance of 
grounded research and quality data generation and analysis in order to make intelligent 
and mindful recommendations to mitigate the harmful effects of sexual violence in 
conflict (Cohen, et al. 2013; Crawford 2015; Crawford, et al. 2014). The dearth of data 
related to this significant conflict actor constrains our understanding of this important 
phenomenon that has lasting and profound effects beyond the scope of conflict.  
As highlighted throughout this dissertation and in this conclusion, much remains 
to be revealed about the combatant who resists committing sexualized violence and the 
only way to know more is if research is mobilized in order to better understand this 
important subgroup of political actors. The research conducted in this project suggests 
that there is much to be gained and learned from these individuals, but present policy 
approaches and research agendas restrict this knowledge generation. By including the 
non-perpetrator in analyses and in data collection, we increase the likelihood that 
“reliable and accurate data” are produced to more effectively moderate the effects of 
sexualized violence in conflict and to make conscientious and effective recommendations 
                                                 
187 Emphasis in the original.  
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in order to mitigate the effects of sexualized violence within conflict settings (Crawford 
2015). This underexplored actor is certainly crucial to consider in any comprehensive 
picture of sexualized violence in conflict. 
Inevitably, conflict comes to an end – even if it is identified as intractable. The 
long-term effects of the violence enacted during the course of warfare have implications 
for the ways in which the post-conflict environment is able to rebuild institutions and 
community in the aftermath. Prevention of severe sexualized violence in conflict can also 
have lasting beneficial effects for rebuilding after war. Research that explores individual 
differences can identify ways that effectively deters perpetrators while valorizing and 
learning from non-perpetrators, which promises to remediate the more severe deleterious 
effects of sexualized violence.  
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P R O J E C T  P R O P O S A L  
Prepared for: Arizona State University IRB Approval   
Prepared by: Holly Williamson 
Date: April 27, 2014  
Proposal Title: Gender role socialization, religion, and wartime rape in the former 
Yugoslavia  
Semi-structured interview schedule and guide  
 
o Interview types: Informant interviews and respondent interviews 
o Interview stance: Responsive interviewing (Rubin and Rubin 2005)  
o Overarching research question and theme driving the project: In what ways does 
gender inequality during combatants early childhood impact the severity of 
wartime rape in conflict?  
 
Some guiding questions 
 
1. What were some of the expectations for men and women in society? Were there 
very specific tasks for women and men?  
2. How important would you say it was for a military fighter to be considered strong 
and masculine? Why/Why not?  
3. What were some of the typical activities for boys and girls during childhood? 
What things did they like to do while growing up?  
4. Concerning (religious activities), what are/were some of the responsibilities of 
women? What about the responsibilities of men?  
5. Do you recall how men responded to hearing about the rape of women? How did 
they respond?  
6. How did women respond to hearing about the rape of other women? Did they 
speak about it? 
7. What did fighters think about Yugoslavia? What about regions other than the one 
where they lived in Yugoslavia?  
 
Some general themes to address in interviews 
 
• Gender roles during childhood 
• Religion and gender  
• Nationalism and gender 
• Roles of men and women in society  
• Various identities and primacy of particular identities (i.e. gender identity, 
national identity, religious identity)  
• Motherhood and women’s childbirth and child rearing obligations according 
to various identities 
• Treatment of boy and girl children by parents, teachers, religious leaders, 
other children, etc.  
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Note to participants: When responding to the questions, please use a pseudonym (a fake 
name) when referring to others.  
 
Gender questions for psychologists, attorneys, and judges  
 
1. Can you tell me a little about your professional experience and your area of 
specialization?   
2. How long have you worked in this field? Why did you select to work in this area? 
What drew you to this work?  
3. Given your professional experience, can you tell me about your knowledge of sexual 
violence committed in the war?  
4. Can you tell me in general terms about your knowledge of any sexual violence 
perpetrated by individuals you worked with? 
5. How would you describe the personalities of the combatants you treated or worked 
with?  
6. What were some of the personality traits of those who committed sexualized 
violence? How about those who did not?  
7. How did the individuals you worked with deal with/manage stress? Did those who 
commit sexualized violence deal with stress differently than those who did not? In 
what ways?  
8. Did the individuals you treated/represented experience ‘normal’ developmental 
milestones? 
9. Did those who did not commit sexualized violence achieve milestones differently 
than those who did? If yes, in what ways?  
10. What was the reason most of the combatants you treated or saw give for coming to 
see you?  
11. What were some of the main struggles the combatants you worked with report having 
at the time of treatment? In the past? Before the war?  
12. What were your impressions of the combatants you worked with who did commit 
sexualized violence?  
13. Were there similarities you noticed about the individuals you worked with who did 
commit sexualized violence?  
14. Were there differences you noticed between the combatants you worked with who did 
engage in sexualized violence and those who did not? What were some of the key 
differences you observed?  
15. Were there similarities you noticed between the combatants you worked with who did 
engage in sexualized violence and those who did not? What were some of the key 
similarities you observed?  
16. How did the combatants you worked with navigate relationships with men and 
women?  
 
Military Context Questions for Psychologists, Judges, Lawyers 
 
1. How did individuals you worked with describe their military experience?  
2. How did they feel about fighting? 
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3. Did the soldiers you treated talk about the violence they experienced during the war?  
4. Did any of them talk about sexual violence?  
5. How did the soldiers you treated talk about the rules during the conflict?  
6. Did you treat/represent commanders?     Foot soldiers?         Special forces? 
7.  [If treated/represented more than one category] What patterns did you notice about 
these soldiers?  
8. What attitudes and beliefs do you think changed in those you treated from before the 
war to after the war?  
9. If you treated soldiers who committed sexualized violence, did they appear to change 
more, less, or the same than those who did not?  
10. Did the individuals you treated/represented describe what military training was like 
for them?  
11. What did the individuals you treated/represented appear to know about military codes 
of conduct? Were these considered by the individuals you treated/represented?  
12. What are your opinions about how the individuals you treated felt about the outcome 
of the war?  
13. In your opinion, what are some of the commonalities and differences in the beliefs 
systems of those you treated/represented?  
14. Did any of those individuals you treated refrain from committing sexual violence that 
you know of? Did you explore how/why they refrained?  
 
 
General cultural/identity questions for combatants and other participants 
1. Where did you grow up?  
2. What was your community like when you were growing up?  
3. Was your family religious? What religious practices did you observe?   
4. Who were you closest to growing up? Can you use three words to describe your 
mother? Your father?  
5. Can you tell me where you were when the war started?  
6. What are three qualities you would use to describe a strong man?  
7. How about three qualities to describe a strong woman?  
8. What were some of your favorite games to play when you growing up?  
9. What did you want to be when you grew up? What do you do for work now? Before 
the war?  
10. Are you currently or have you ever been married? What makes for a good marriage or 
a good relationship?  
11. If you are married, who handles the money in your house? How about when you were 
growing up?  
12. When you were growing up, was your mother or father more of a decision-maker? 
Equal?  
13. Are there any jobs you would never do? Why or why not?  
14. Who does the housework in your home?  
 
Military Context Questions for Combatants  
1. What led to you serving as a combatant?  
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2. How long did you serve during the war? 
3. What was your training like?  
4. What were the relationships like with others in your unit?  
5. What do you think makes a good soldier?  
6. How did you / do you feel about your comrades?  
7. How did you / do you feel about the opposition?  
8. Were there women soldiers and/or helpers you or your unit worked with?  
9. What were the roles for men and women during the war? What did women do and 
what did men do?  
10. Were there any rituals your unit had? Special ceremonies and/or procedures?  
11. Were there any rites of passage you had to complete for your unit?  
12. Do you think anything about you is different since your military service? If so, what 
has changed?  
13. What about for others in your unit? Do you think some of them are more different 
than others? What are some of the reasons you think some have changed more than 
others?  
14. Did you know anyone who committed sexualized violence during the war? If yes, 
what do you think are some of the things that led to them doing so?  
15. For those who did not, what are some of the reasons why you think they didn’t? 
 
Gender Questions for Family Members 
1. What was __________ like when he was growing up?  
2. What are three words you would use to describe ____________’s personality when 
he was growing up? How about as an adult before the war? How about during and 
after the war?  
3. How does_____________ behave in relationships with women?  
4. And relationships with other men?  
5. Were there rules for the boys growing? How about rules for the girls?  
6. Is there any work that you think _____________ would never do?  
7. What are some of the differences you notice in ___________ from before the war to 
after the war?  
 
 
BSC Interview Schedule 
Napomena za učesnike: Kada odgovarate na pitanja, koristite pseudonim (lažno ime) 
kada govorite o drugima. 
 
Rodna pitanja za psihologe, advokate i sudije. 
 
1. Možete li mi reći nešto o vašem profesionalnom iskustvu i vašem području 
specijalizacije? 
2. Koliko dugo radite u ovom polju? Zašto ste odabrali raditi u ovom području? Šta Vas 
je privuklo u ovom poslu?  
3. S obzirom na Vaše profesionalno iskustvo, možete li mi reći Vaša saznanja o 
seksualnom nasilju počinjenom u ratu?  
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4. Možete li mi uopćeno reći Vaša saznanja o bilo kojem seksualnom nasilju koje su 
počinili pojedinci sa kojima ste radili? 
5. Kako biste opisali ličnosti boraca koje ste liječili ili sa kojima ste radili? 
6. Koje su bile osobine ličnosti onih koji su počinili seksualno nasilje? Šta kažete za one 
koji nisu? 
7. Kako su se osobe sa kojima ste radili nosili / upravljali sa stresom? Da li su se oni 
koji su vršili seksualno nasilje drugačije nosili sa stresom u odnosu na one koji nisu? 
Na koji način? 
8. Da li su osobe koje ste tretirali/yastupali doživjele "normalne" razvojne prekretnice? 
9. Da li su oni koji nisu počinili seksualno nasilje postigli drugačije prekretnice za 
razliku od onih koji jesu? Ako jesu, na koji način? 
10. Koji je bio razlog zbog kojeg je većina boraca koje ste tretirali ili vidjeli došla da Vas 
posjeti? 
11. Koje su bile neke od glavnih borbi boraca koje su Vam isti iznijeli za vrijeme 
tretmana? U prošlosti? Prije rata? 
12. Kakvi su bili Vaši utisci vezano za borace sa kojima ste radili, a koji su počinili 
seksualno nasilje? 
13. Da li je bilo sličnosti koje ste primijetili kod osoba sa kojima ste radili, a koje su 
počinile seksualno nasilje? 
14. Da li je bilo razlika koje ste primijetili između boraca sa kojima ste radili, a koji su 
bili uključeni u seksualnom nasilju i onih koji nisu? Koje su bile neke od ključnih 
razlika koje ste primijetili? 
15. Da li je bilo sličnosti koje ste primijetili između boraca sa kojima ste radili, a koji su 
bili uključeni u seksualnom nasilju i onih koji nisu? Koje su bile neke od ključnih 
razlika koje ste primijetili? 
16. Kakve su odnose imali borci sa kojima ste radili prema drugim muškarcima i 
ženama? 
 
Vojna kontekstualna pitanja za psihologe, sudije, advocate 
 
1. Kako su osobe sa kojima ste radili opisivali svoje vojno iskustvo? 
2. Kako se osjećaju kad je borba u ptanju? 
3. Da li su vojnici sa kojima ste radili govorili o nasilju koje su iskusili za vrijeme rata? 
4. Da li je neki od njih govorili o seksualnom nasilju? 
5. Kako su vojnici sa kojima ste radili govorili o pravilima za vrijeme konflikta? 
6. Da li ste liječili/zastupali komadire?     Pješadijeske vojnike?         Specijalne 
jedinice? 
7.  [Ukoliko su tretirane/zastupane više od jedne kategorije] Koje paterne ste primijetili 
kod ovih vojnika? 
8. Za koje stavove i uvjerenja mislite da su se promijenili kod tretiranih vojnika u 
periodu prije i poslije rata? 
9. Ukoliko ste radili sa vojnicima koji su počinili seksualno nasilje, da li su se oni 
promijenili više, manje ili isto u poređenju sa onima koji nisu? 
10. Da li su osobe koje ste tretirali / zastupali opisali kakva je bila njihova vojna obuka? 
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11. Šta su osobe koje ste tretirali / predstavljali znale o vojnom kodeksu ponašanja? Da li 
su to pojedinci koje ste tretirali / zastupali razmatrali? 
12. Kakva su Vaše mišljenja o tome kako su osobe koje ste tretirali osjetile ishod rata? 
13. Po Vašem mišljenju, koje su neke od zajedničkih osobina i razlika u sistemima 
vjerovanja onih koje ste tretirali / zastupali? 
14. Da li znate da se neko od tih pojedinaca sa kojima ste radili suzdržao od vršenja 
seksualnog nasilja? Da li ste istražili kako / zašto su se suzdržali? 
 
 
Opšta pitanja kulture / identiteta za borce i druge učesnike 
 
1. Gdje ste odrasli?  
2. Kakvo je bilo Vaše društvo gdje ste odrastali?  
3. Da li je Vaša porodica bila religiozna? Koje religiozne prakse ste zapazili?   
4. S kim ste bili najbliži za vrijeme odrastanja?Možete li opisati majku u tri riječi? Oca?  
5. Možete li mi reći gdje ste bili kada je počeo rat?  
6. Koje su tri kvalitete kojima biste opsali jakog muškarca?  
7. Tri kvalitete kojima biste opsali jaku ženu?  
8. Koje su bile Vaše omiljene igre za vrijeme odrastanja?  
9. Šta ste želejli biti kad porastete? Šta sada radite? Šta ste radili prije rata?  
10. Da li ste trenutno oženjeni ili ste nekad bili? Šta čini dobar brak ili vezu?  
11. Ako ste oženjeni/udati, ko raspoređuje novac u Vašoj kući? Šta za vrijeme 
odrastanja?  
12. Za vrijeme odrastanja, da li su donosioci odluka bili Vaša majka ili otac? Jednako?  
13. Da li postoje poslovi koje nikada ne biste obavljali? Zašto ili zašto ne?  
14. Ko obavlja kućanske poslove u Vašoj kući?  
 
Vojna kontekstualna pitanja za borce 
 
1. Šta Vas je navelo da budete borac?  
2. Koliko dugo ste služili za vrijeme rata? 
3. Kako je izgledao Vaš trening?  
4. Kakvi su bili odnosi sa drugima u jedinici?  
5. Šta mislite da čini dobrog vojnika?  
6. Kako se osjećete ili ste se osjećali kada su u pitanju Vaši drugovi?  
7. Kako se osjećete ili ste se osjećali kada je u pitanju Vaša pozicija?  
8. Da li je bilo žena vojnika ili / i pomoćnika sa kojima ste Vi ili Vaša jedinica radila?  
9. Koje su bile uloge žena ili muškaraca za vrijeme rata? Šta su radile žene, a šta 
muškarci?  
10. Da li je bilo rituala u Vašoj jedinici? Specijalne ceremonije i/ili procedure?  
11. Da li je bilo nekih obreda koje ste morali obaviti da bi bili dio Vaše jedinice?  
12. Da li mislite da se nešto kod Vas promijenilo nakon služenja vojci? Ako jeste, šta se 
promijenilo?  
13. Šta je s drugima iz Vaše jedinice? Da li mislite da su neki više drugačiji od ostalih? 
Koji su razlozi vzbog kojih mislite da su se jedni promijenili više od drugih?  
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14. Da li ste poznavali nekoga ko je počinio seksualno nasilje za vrijeme rata? Ako jeste, 
šta milite da su razlozi koji su ih naveli da počine nasilje?  
15. Za one koji nisu, šta mislite da su razlozi pa nisu počinili nasilje? 
 
Rodna pitanja za članove porodica 
1. Kakav/kakva je bio __________ za vrijeme odrastanja?  
2. Koje su tri riječi kojima biste opisali ____________ osobnost za vrijeme odrastanja? 
A riječi kojima biste opisali odraslu osobu prije rata? Za vrijeme i poslije rata?  
3. Kako se_____________ ponaša u vezama prema ženama?  
4. Odnosi sa drugim muškarcima?  
5. Da li su postojala pravila za odrstanje kod dječaka? Pravila za djevojčice?  
6. Da li postoje poslovi za koje mislite da _____________ ne bi nikad radio/radila?  
7. Koje su neke od razlika kod ___________ od prije rata pa do perioda poslije?  
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H1.a - Combatants who have a higher need for power and dominance are more likely to commit 
acts of conflict-related sexual violence.  
Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with 
concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.  
Terms/Themes 
representing concept  
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total 
mentions 
Falsifying Themes 
Terms 
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total 
mentions  
Dominance, superiority, 
strength, authority, 
privilege, command, 
dominion, supremacy, 
inferiority, weakness, 
impotent, incompetent, 
incapable, subordinate, 
aggressive, combative, 
attacking, chauvinism, 
effort to humiliate, 
victim of nation (feels 
less powerful), 
vengeance 
19 41 Non-threatening, 
easy-going, relaxed, 
compliant, calm, 
mild, cool, 
undisturbed  
1* 1* 
*Contraindicated evidence – Key informant mentioned that chauvinism is a Bosnian trait broadly that 
crosses ethno-religious identities. Did not see this as a distinctive trait, but could not speak to variations 
around this and did not really apply this to perpetrators. (Interview conducted 6/22/2018, Sarajevo)  
 
H1.b – Combatants who have a higher need to adhere to traditional sex relations are more likely 
to commit acts of conflict-related sexualized violence.  
Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with 
concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.  
Terms/Themes representing 
concept  
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total 
mentions 
Falsifying Themes 
Terms 
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total  
mentions  
Describes sex-role 
expectations in some of the 
following ways:  
Personality: 
women=nurturing/emotional  
men=aggressive/strong 
Household division of 
labor: 
women=cleaning/cooking 
men=manual labor tasks 
Occupation: “women’s 
work”= nursing, teaching, 
etc; men=doctor, lawyer, 
etc. 
Physical appearance: 
women = elegant, wears 
dresses, make up, etc. 
men= tall/muscular, strong, 
short hair, etc.  
Mentions of domestic 
11 15 Does not describe 
sex-role 
expectations, 
egalitarian. 
Describes even 
division of labor, 
shared household 
tasks, shared 
money 
management, share 
in child-care, etc.  
0 0  
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violence. 188 
How a soldier viewed 
gender relations in the 
family. 
Term: Primitive  
 
 
 
 
H1.c – Combatants who hold a more negative view of the opposite sex are more likely to commit 
conflict-related sexualized violence.  
Notes: Coding only for informant mentions and impressions of combatants in relationship with 
concept/theme mentioned. Variants and variations of the terms and themes apply.  
Terms/Themes 
representing concept  
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total 
mentions 
Falsifying Themes 
Terms 
# of 
Interview  
Mention 
0/26 
# of total 
mentions  
Uses demeaning 
language when speaking 
about the opposite sex.  
 
Speaks negatively about 
wife/partner in public. 
 
Resents women/opposite 
sex.  
 
Women/opposite sex as 
inferior. 
7 9 Speaks neutrally 
about opposite sex.  
 
Does not use 
demeaning 
language.  
 
Is kind in speech 
regarding opposite 
sex in public.  
0 0  
 
 
 
Additional Patterns, Themes, Concepts, Variables Identified During Coding  
Concept/Variable # of Interview Mentions 
0/26 
# of total mentions 
Uncertainty (existential threat) 6 8 
Ethnic Grievances 5 5 
Urban/Rural Qualifier  
Points to the importance of 
regional chapter  
13 14 
Sociopaths/Pathological 
Psychiatric Disorders 
7 7 
Low Education 4 5 
Addiction – Alcohol Use 9 10 
Denial/Implied Consent 
(Defense by perpetrators) 
Will to admit to killing, struggle 
to admit to sexualized violence 
5 5 
                                                 
188 I add mentions of acts of domestic violence here because historically, domestic violence can be 
perceived as an acceptable behavior in traditional sex relations. Indeed, it is acknowledged to this day that 
in spite of post-conflict reconstruction efforts surrounding domestic violence, it is still often considered a 
private matter (Muftić and Cruze 2014) for a more robust discussion.  
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Correlation between sexual 
violence and executions 
5 5 
Post war divorce 5 5 
Combatants forced to commit 
violence 
3 3 
Trauma and Time in Combat189 2 2 
Stranger vis a vis known 
perpetrator 
3 3 
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Model 1: Ordered Probit with Difference between Male/female Life Expectancy Indicator  
 
 
Model 2: Ordered Probit with Difference between Male/Female Life Expectancy (Lag 15 
Years) Indicator  
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Model 3: Ordered Probit Secondary Education Indicator  
 
 
Model 4: Ordered Probit Secondary Education (Lag 10 Years) Indicator  
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Model 5: Ordered Probit Secondary Education (Lag 15 years) Indicator  
 
Model 6: Ordered Probit Fertility Indicator  
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Model 7: Ordered Probit Fertility (15 year lag) Indicator  
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